On Point blog, page 1 of 3
SCOW reverses defense win on speedy trial violation, overrules Borhegyi, and holds that 46-month delay did not violate federal constitution
State v. Luis A. Ramirez, 2025 WI 28, 6/27/25, reversing a published decision from COA; case activity
When this case was issued in COA, we got excited and informed our readers that this “big defense win” was an important decision on the speedy trial right. However, SCOW now unanimously reverses in favor of the State.
D4 issues another speedy trial decision recommended for publication, holds that COVID-related delays should not weigh against the state
State v. Cordero D. Coleman, 2023AP2414-CR, 12/27/24, District IV (recommended for publication), case activity
COA holds that a 32-month delay in trying Coleman did not violate his constitutional right to a speedy trial where the COVID-19 pandemic was the primary cause of the delay. In doing so, COA identifies a new category of reasons for state-attributed delay, “which encompasses those delays that are caused by a reasonable government response to a legitimate public emergency” and holds such delays should not be weighed against the state. (¶56).
In big defense win, COA holds that 46 month delay was a violation of defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial
State v. Luis A. Ramirez, 2022AP959-CR, 4/25/24, District IV (recommended for publication); petition for review granted 10/7/24, reversed 6/27/25 case activity
In a must-read defense win, COA holds that the State’s “cavalier disregard” for Ramirez’s speedy trial rights entitle him to dismissal of the underlying complaint.
Purported lack of prejudice dooms constitutional speedy trial claim
State v. Ned Guerra, 2022AP2098-CR, 7/19/23, District 2 (1-judge decision; not eligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Twenty-0ne months passed between the filing of the criminal complaint and Guerra’s trial. The delay was caused by a state’s witness’ temporary unavailability and the circuit court’s COVID-based backlog of higher-priority trials. While Guerra clearly asserted his right to a speedy trial, the court affirms the circuit court’s denial of Guerra’s motion to dismiss because “there is no evidence that Guerra was prejudiced by the delay.” Opinion, ¶23.
Pretrial delay did not violate defendant’s right to speedy trial
State v. Benjamin G. Churley, 2022AP189-CR, District 4, 12/8/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The 35-month delay in Churley’s case did not violate his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
COA holds no speedy trial violation; most delays were attributable to defendant
State v. Ronald Eugene Provost, 2020 WI App 21; case activity (including briefs)
It’s unclear why this opinion is recommended for publication. Best guess is that is provides a (rather thin) gloss on the “systemic breakdown” exception to the rule that delays attributable to defense counsel don’t weigh in favor of a speedy trial violation. The court cites and adopts a statement from a New Mexico court that defense counsel’s delays represent a “systemic breakdown” only when they are caused by “problems that are both institutional in origin and debilitating in scope.” (¶40). Sounds like a slightly longer way of saying “systemic breakdown,” no?
No speedy trial violation due to defendant’s effort to exploit “loophole” in OWI statute
State v. Julio Cesar Pacheco Arias, 2017AP228-CR, 9/26/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In 2015, Pacheco-Arias was charged with 2 separate OWI offenses just weeks apart. Because he had 2 prior OWI convictions, both of the 2015 OWIs were charged as a misdemeanor OWI-3rd offenses. Under the law in effect in 2015, if the earlier charge resulted in a conviction, the later charge would, by operation of law, become a felony OWI offense. See §346.63(1)(a), §346.65(2)(am)3 (2015-2016). As you might guess, the defendant wanted the later charge resolved first in order to avoid a felony conviction.
SCOTUS: No Sixth Amendment speedy sentencing right; maybe try due process
Betterman v. Montana, USSC No. 14-1457 (May 19, 2016), affirming State v. Betterman, 342 P.3d 971 (Mont. 2015); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Brandon Betterman pled guilty to bail jumping, and then spent 14 months in jail before he was finally sentenced. He appealed, contending that the lengthy delay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Montana Supreme Court determined that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a speedy sentencing, and SCOTUS now agrees.
Betterman v. Montana, USSC No. 14-1457, cert. granted 12/4/15
Whether the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause applies to the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution, protecting a criminal defendant from inordinate delay in final disposition of his case.
Habeas petitioner’s speedy trial claim stopped cold
Chester O’Quinn v. Tom Spiller, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 14-1836, 11/25/15
The state appellate court reasonably applied Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the controlling Supreme Court precedent for Sixth Amendment speedy‐trial claims, when it rejected O’Quinn’s claim that the 42-month delay in holding his trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.