On Point: B. Constitutional rights

Dane Co. DHS v. Laura E.N., No. 2010AP1172, District 4, 7/29/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Laura E.N.: Jean K. Capriotti

TPR – Evidence

Evidence that the mother was caring for an infant son not under CHIPS order wasn’t relevant to her ability to meet conditions for the return of her older daughters who were the subjects of the TPR proceeding, ¶¶13-16.

State v. Chester C., 2009AP2824, District I, 5/4/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Chester C.: Dianne M. Erickson

TPR – Effective Assistance of Counsel
Failure to demonstrate prejudice within the meaning of Strickland dooms this ineffective-assistance claim that trial counsel failed to object to various hearsay statements:

¶7     Other than complaining that his trial lawyer did not object to the hearsay we have recounted,

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Keri H.: Leonard D. Kachinski

IAC Claim – TPR
“The decision not to emphasize events preceding the current termination petitions was a reasonable strategic choice and does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,” ¶11. Separately: counsel did not perform deficiently in his efforts to obtain Keri H.’s client file from predecessor counsel, and then securing an adjournment to prepare for trial,

court of appeals decision

TPR – Forfeiture of Jury Trial
Failure to appear at initial hearing and make timely request forfeited right to jury trial; trial court’s ultimate refusal to enter default judgment “did not return the case to the initial hearing stage or reinstate Luis’s right to a jury trial”; nor did filing of amended petition reset this clock; finally, the court suggests that denial of right to jury trial was,

Walworth Co. DHHS v. Andrea L.O., 2008 WI 46, on Certification

TPR – Elements, Ground of Continuing Need of Protection and Services, Generally

Issue/Holding:

¶6 There are four elements to this ground for termination. First, the child must have been placed out of the home for a cumulative total of more than six months pursuant to court orders containing the termination of parental rights notice.

Waukesha Co. DHHS v. Teodoro E., 2008 WI App 16, District 2 (published)

Issue/Holding: A deported father’s participation in the TPR proceeding by a webcam system was “meaningful,” given that he could see and hear witnesses, be seen by the court, and communicate privately with counsel and with aid of an interpreter, ¶¶10-19.

State v. Lavelle W., 2005 WI App 266 (telephone hookup not functional equivalent of personal presence,

Walworth Co. DHHS v. Andrea L.O., 2008 WI 46, on Certification

Issue/Holding: Stipulation to a TPR elements did not constitute withdrawal of the demand for a jury trial, where the element was submitted to, and found by, the jury under the instructions and special verdict form, ¶¶18-24.

The court approvingly analogizes to State v. Charles J. Benoit, 229 Wis.2d 630, 600 N.W.2d 193 (Ct.

Manitowoc County HSD v. Allen J., 2008 WI App 137

Issue/Holding:

¶1 Allen J. appeals from orders terminating his parental rights to his children, Brandon [1] and Stephanie J. He argues that he was deprived of his right to a jury trial because the court, rather than the jury, answered one of the verdict questions on an element of parental unfitness. Allen’s counsel had stipulated that the element was satisfied,

State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, affirming 2006 WI App 55

 Issue: “(W)hether a circuit court may deny a parent in a termination of parental rights proceeding the statutory right to counsel when the parent has appeared in the proceeding but failed to personally attend a hearing in contravention of a court order and is found in default as a sanction for disobeying the court order.” (¶2)

Holding:

¶41 We do not accept the State’s position for three reasons.

State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, affirming 2006 WI App 55

¶57      The State also argues that Shirley E., a parent over 18 years of age, has waived her right to counsel by not appearing personally. We can quickly dismiss this argument. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.23(2) explicitly requires that any waiver of counsel must be knowing and voluntary. As we determined in M.W.