On Point: Important Posts

United States v. Gary, No. 20-444, cert granted 1/8/21; SCOTUSblog page

Question presented:

Whether a defendant who pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a), is automatically entitled to plain error relief if the district court did not advise him that one element of that offense is knowledge of his status as a felon, regardless of whether he can show that the district court’s error affected the outcome of the proceedings.

United States v. Palomar-Santiago, No. 20-437, cert granted 1/8/21; SCOTUSblog page

Question presented:

Whether charges that a non-citizen illegally reentered the United States should be dismissed when the non-citizen’s removal was based on a misclassification of a prior conviction.

State v. Leevan Roundtree, 2012 WI 1, 1/7/21, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2018AP594-CR; case activity (including briefs)

In 2003, Roundtree was convicted of multiple felony counts of failure to pay child support. Twelve years later, police executed a search warrant at his home and found a firearm and ammunition under his mattress. He pled guilty to one count of felon in possession. On appeal, he argued that §941.29(2)(2013-2014), which barred him from possessing a firearm, is unconstitutional as applied to his case. The statute has no time limit and draws no distinction between serious or violent felonies versus less serious felonies like failure to pay child support. In a 5-2 decision SCOW upheld the statute.

State v. Savage, 2020 WI 93, 12/23/20, reversing a court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs).

Savage, who was homeless, claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to advise him that he had a defense under State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787 before he pled guilty to violating the sex offender registry rule that he provide his address to the DOC. According to Savage and the court of appeals, Dinkins held that a homeless person is exempt from sex offender registration requirements.  In a unanimous opinion, SCOW reverses, holds that Dinkins did not establish that broad exemption, and thus counsel did not perform deficiently.

State v. Brian v. Rotolo, 2019AP2061-CR, petition for review granted 12/28/20; case activity

Issue presented (adapted from the petition for review):

In State v. Lonkoski, 2013 WI 30, ¶6, 346 Wis. 2d 523, 828 N.W.2d 552, SCOW held that the test for Fifth Amendment Miranda custody is whether “a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the interview and leave the scene.” Does this test for determining Miranda custody also apply when police legally detain a suspect under Terry?

State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2020AP616-CR, petition for bypass granted 12/28/20; case activity

1. Does Wis. Stat. §973.042 (the child pornography surcharge statute) permit the circuit court to impose a child pornography surcharge for an offense that is “read in” for sentencing purposes?
2. Is the child pornography surcharge a punishment that must be explained during a plea colloquy? If so, was Schmidt entitled to a hearing on his claim that the plea colloquy was deficient in this case?

On December 23, 2020, the court of appeals ordered publication of the following criminal law related case:

State v. Jack B. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81 (mandatory minimum for OWI trumps SAP early release requirement)

Barron County DHS v. M.S., 2020AP1257, District 3, 12/17/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

If we were quarantining in Vegas, we’d bet this case is heading to SCOW.  The briefs are confidential but the main issues appear to be: whether the summary judgment deadline in §802.08(1) governs TPR cases; whether a court may extend that deadline for good cause; and how those rules apply to the facts of this case. The COA sows confusion by stating that it has conducted “independent research” suggesting that, despite SCOW precedent and the parties’ agreement, §802.08(1) doesn’t actually apply. It then applies §802.08(1).

Fond Du Lac County v. R.O.V., 2019AP1228, 2020AP853, 12/16/20, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In these consolidated cases, the court of appeals reviewed both Ray’s initial commitment and his 2nd recommitment (not his 1st recommitment), which has not yet ended. Although the initial commitment order expired long ago, the court held that it was not moot due to a recurring, “sufficiency of the evidence” regarding dangerousness that might affect the outcome of his appeal from the 2nd recommitment.

The doctors who examined Ray for his initial commitment and for his 2nd recommitment agreed that he is mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment. They diagnosed him with either bipolar disorder with psychotic features, schizoaffective disorder bipolar type, or schizophrenia.  The main dispute was over his alleged dangerousness.

State v. Thomas A. Nelson, 2021 WI App 2; 12/9/20, District 2; case activity (including briefs).

This split court of appeals opinion, which is recommended for publication, has “petition granted” written all over it.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) held that a trial court violates a defendant’s right to confrontation when it receives into evidence out-of-court statements by someone who does not testify at trial, if the statements are “testimonial” and if the defendant has not had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant of the statement.  Yet in this case, the court of appeals holds that Nelson’s confrontation rights were not violated when the circuit court admitted a “Sexual Abuse Evaluation” requested by the police for the purpose of collecting evidence even though the author of the evaluation did not testify at trial.