On Point: E. Restraint of defendant

Danny Wilber v. Michael Thurmer, Case No. 10-C-179 (E.D. Wis., Aug. 4, 2020).

It’s said that defendants having meritorious postconviction claims are more likely to win relief on a habeas petition in federal court than on direct appeal in Wisconsin’s appellate courts. This decision could be a poster child for that theory.  On Point last reported on Danny Wilber’s case in 2018 when the court of appeals rejected seven §974.06 claims and affirmed his conviction for 1st degree homicide. Judge Griesbach just granted Wilber’s habeas petition and ordered a new trial.

State v. Danny L. Benford, 2017AP2520-CR, 3/26/19, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The Eau Claire County Sheriff Department’s policy is to require all defendants appearing for trial to wear a stun belt under their clothing. Benford did not want to wear one because he didn’t trust the sheriff’s not to zap him for no good reason. The trial court conducted an inquiry into the need for the stun belt, concluded it was necessary, and found no other suitable alternative to it.

The 9th Circuit, en banc, just issued a blockbuster 6-5 decision in United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, Appeal No. 13-50562.  Routine shackling of defendants in the courtroom violates the 5th Amendment. It doesn’t matter whether there is a jury present or not. The trial court must make an individualized finding of dangerousness. Judge Kozinski, author of the majority opinion, wrote:

State v. Anthony Colon, 2016AP1071-CR, 2/7/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Colon was on trial for 2 felonies and 3 misdemeanors. During a break in deliberations, the bailiff happened to be transporting Colon to the court room. Colon was wearing street clothes, but he was chained to other defendants who were wearing orange jail garb. Upon learning that some of Colon’s jurors may have seen him that way, defense counsel asked the judge to question the jury, but he did not move for a mistrial.

State v. Tony Phillip Rogers, 2015AP921-CR, 4/12/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Though the complainant in Rogers’s child sexual assault prosecution made statements to her mother about “hearing voices” and needing mental health assistance, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to move for an in camera review of her treatment records because he could not have made the materiality showing needed under State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 608-09, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), and State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶¶32-34, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.

State v. Richard Wade Shirley, 2012AP263-CR, District 1, 1/29/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Denial of fair trial – restraint of defendant during trial

Defendant forfeited claim that he was deprived of a fair trial because at least one juror saw he was shackled in the court room: “Not only does the record show that Shirley failed to strike the one juror that the record demonstrates saw the restraints,

State v. Allen K. Umentum, 2011AP2622-CR. District 3, 5/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Umentum: Roberta A. Heckes; case activity

Under a local, Brown County “standing order,” all in-custody defendants appearing at jury trial were required, without particularized demonstration of need, to wear a non-visible stun belt. The courthouse had no screening checkpoints, and any defendant was entitled to relief from the order “for good cause shown.”

seventh circuit decision

Habeas – Knowing Use of False Testimony (“Napue”) 

Due process prohibits knowing prosecutorial use of false testimony, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). However, the prosecutor’s exploitation of Bland’s incorrect testimony on a potentially important point (the date his gun was confiscated) doesn’t support habeas relief on a Napue-type theory.

Napue and Giglio hold that a prosecutor may not offer testimony that the prosecutor knows to be false.

State v. Jason L. Miller, 2011 WI App 34; for Miller: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; Miller BiC; State Resp.; Reply

If the stun belt (or other restraint) isn’t visible to the jury, the trial court need not consider its necessity before requiring that the defendant wear it during trial. “Because there is no evidence that the jury could see the stun belt,

John M. Stephenson v. Levenhagen, 7th Cir No. 09-2924, 08/26/2010

7th Cir decision; petition for rehearing denied 1/14/11, 3 dissents from denial of en banc review

Habeas – Effective Assistance – Stun Belt

Counsel’s failure to object to placement of stun belt on Stephenson during trial was held by the state court to be deficient: accepting that conclusion (albeit with apparent reluctance), the federal court holds on habeas review that the deficiency wasn’t prejudicial.