On Point blog, page 1 of 1
SCOTUS maintains Batson; DA’s history of striking black jurors matters
Flowers v. Mississippi, USSC No. 17-9572, 2019 WL 2552489, June 21, 2019, reversing Flowers v. State, 240 So. 3d 1082 (Miss. 2017); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
The Court reverses Curtis Flowers’ conviction and death sentence and orders a seventh new trial on the ground that the district attorney at his sixth trial (he also prosecuted the other five) exercised at least one peremptory strike with racially discriminatory intent. Three previous convictions were overturned by lower courts because of “numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct” (that was the first one) “prosecutorial misconduct” (two) and “as strong a prima facie case of racial discrimination” as the Mississippi Supreme Court had “ever seen” (this was trial number three).
SCOTUS decides Mitchell v. Wisconsin–vacates judgment and remands case for a hearing!
Mitchell v. Wisconsin, No. 18-6210, 6/29/19, vacating and remanding State v. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
This is the decision we’ve all been waiting for on whether a blood draw from an unconscious OWI suspect requires a warrant. Wouldn’t you know–the opinion is splintered. Alito, writing for 4 justices (a plurality, not a majority), concludes that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood draw with out a warrant. The plurality vacates the judgment and remands the case for a hearing so that Mitchell has a chance to show that there were no exigent circumstances in his case. Way to go, Andy Hinkel, for fending off the State’s contention that implied consent is actual consent.
SCOTUS leaves dual-sovereignty doctrine intact
Terance Martez Gamble v. United States, USSC No. 17-646, 2019 WL 2493923, June 17, 2019, affirming United States v. Gamble, 694 Fed. Appx. 750 (11th Cir. 2017); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Gamble challenged the validity of the “dual-sovereignty” doctrine, which holds that it doesn’t violate the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause to convict a person in both state and federal court for the same crime. By a 7-2 vote, the Court rejects his challenge.
SCOTUS adopts broader ACCA definition of “remaining-in” burglary
Quarles v. United States, No. 17-778, 6/10/19, affirming United States v. Quarles, 850 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Quarles was convicted of home invasion in Michigan. When he was later charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, that ealier conviction became one of the prior offenses that dramatically increased his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The question here is whether, under SCOTUS’s “categorical approach,” the Michigan home invasion statute qualifies as a generic burglary.
SCOTUS resolves issue regarding tolling of supervised release under federal law
Mont v. United States, USSC No. 17-8995, June 3, 2019, affirming United States v. Mont, 723 Fed. Appx. 325 (6th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), the period of supervised release imposed as part of a federal sentence is “tolled” during “any period the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a crime….” In a decision of interest to federal practitioners, the Supreme Court holds that the period the person is imprisoned includes pretrial custody in a case that is later credited toward the sentence imposed for a new conviction.
SCOTUS: The Eighth Amendment’s excessive fine clause applies to states
Timbs v. Indiana, USSC No. 17-1091, February 20, 2019, reversing State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
“The question presented: Is the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause an ‘incorporated’ protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause?” The answer: Yes.
SCOTUS: lawyer who ignores client’s request for appeal from guilty plea is ineffective
Garza v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, reversing Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
This case involved two plea agreements that included clauses stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. After sentencing, Garza told his lawyer that he wanted to appeal, but his lawyer refused due to the plea agreement. Garza filed claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Siding with Garza, SCOTUS held that counsel performed deficiently and that “prejudiced is presumed” because the failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Garza of an appeal altogether. Opinion at 1.
SCOTUS: Diagnosis doesn’t matter; states can’t execute defendant who doesn’t understand why he’s being executed
Fortunately, Wisconsin does not have the death penalty. However, On Point readers might find this SCOTUS decision Madison v. Alabama, interesting. The government cannot execute a prisoner who is insane or is so mentally ill that he can’t understand the State’s rationale for executing him. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).