On Point: B. Opinions

Maryland v. Kulbicki, USSC No. 14-848 (per curiam) (October 5, 2015) granting cert and reversing Kulbicki v. State, 99 A.3d 730, 440 Md. 33 (2014); SCOTUSblog page

This is a summary reversal of a Maryland Court of Appeal’s decision, which held that Kulbicki’s defense lawyers were constitutionally ineffective back in 1995.  A jury convicted Kulbicki of 1st-degree murder for shooting his mistress. The State’s case rested on a Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis, which the scientific community generally accepted then, but doesn’t now.

Glossip v. Gross, USSC No. 14-7955, 2015 WL 2473454 (June 29, 2015), affirming Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In a 5-to-4 vote, the Supreme Court rejects the claims of Oklahoma death-row prisoners that the use of a particular drug (midazolam) in the three-drug lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment because it creates an unacceptable risk of severe pain. In addition to deep disagreements about the applicable Eighth Amendment standard and the lower court’s fact-finding, the case is notable for the sparring between two concurring justices (Scalia and Thomas) and a dissenting justice (Breyer, joined by Ginsburg), who now believes “it highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment” and that the Court should ask for full briefing on that basic question. (Breyer dissent at 1, 2).

Johnson v. United States, USSC No. 13-7120, 2015 WL 2473450 (June 26, 2015), reversing and remanding United States v. Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. 708 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A six-Justice majority of the Supreme Court holds that “the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause [of the Armed Career Criminal Act] both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges” because the case law has failed to establish a generally applicable test that prevents application of the clause from devolving into “guesswork and intuition.” (Slip op. at 5, 8). Therefore, using the residual clause to increase a defendant’s sentence denies the defendant due process of law.

City of Los Angeles v. Patel, USSC No. 13-1175, 2015 WL 2473445 (June 22, 2015), affirming 738 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A majority of the Supreme Court holds that a Los Angeles ordinance compelling hotel operators to make their guest registries available to police for inspection on demand is facially unconstitutional because it penalizes the hoteliers for declining to turn over their records without affording them any opportunity to obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply. Along the way, the Court clarifies that “facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not categorically barred or especially disfavored” (slip op. at 4), clarifying language from Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), that some courts have read as barring facial challenges to statutes under the Fourth Amendment.

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, No. 14-6368, 6/22/15, reversing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2014); SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Although the SPD doesn’t appoint counsel to litigate excessive force claims against law enforcement, this case may interest your clients. It stems from a deputy’s tasing of a pre-trial detainee at the Monroe County Jail in Sparta, Wisconsin.  In a 5-4 decision, SCOTUS held for the detainee. To prevail on an excessive force claim under § 42 U.S.C. §1983, the detainee must show only that the force purposefully or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.

Brumfield v. Cane, USSC No. 13-1433, (June 18, 2015), reversing Brumfield v. Cain, 744 F.3d 918 (5th Cir. 2014); SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary); Majority opinion by Sotomayor; dissenting opinion by Thomas (joined in part by Roberts, Scalia and Alito)

Brumfield was convicted of murder and sentenced to death before Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) prohibited the execution of the intellectually disabled. Afterwards, Brumfield, who has an IQ of 75, sought to prove is intellectual disability in state court, but was denied the time and funding to get an expert as well as an evidentiary hearing. In a 5-4 decision, SCOTUS found this an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented under 28 USC §2254(d)(2) and allowed Brumfield to have his Atkins claim considered on the merits in federal court.

Davis v. Ayala, USSC No. 13-1428 (June 18, 2015), reversing Ayala v. Wong, 756 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 2013); majority opinion by Justice Alito; concurrences by Justices Kennedy and Thomas; dissent by Justice Sotomayor

SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Jury selection for Hector Ayala’s murder trial spanned 3 months and involved more than 200 prospective jurors. So when the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike every single Black and Hispanic juror from the pool, the defense objected based on  Batson v. Kentucky. The trial court gave the prosecution a chance to present race neutral reasons for its strikes, but excluded the defense from the hearing. Ayala, who was convicted, said excluding him and his lawyer violated his constitutional rights. The majority assumed, but did not decide that, a constitutional violation occurred  and then held . . . (all together now) “harmless error!”

The California Supreme Court held that it was error (as a matter of state law)

Ohio v. Darius Clark, USSC No. 13-1352, 2015 WL 2473372 (June 18, 2015), reversing State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592 ((Ohio 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A unanimous Supreme Court holds that statements a child made to his teachers about who was physically abusing him were not “testimonial” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The Court agrees that the Confrontation Clause may apply (at least in the abstract) to statements made to someone other than a law enforcement officer; however, a majority of the Court says that, in general, statements made to someone who is not a law enforcement officer “are much less likely to be testimonial than statements made to law enforcement officers” and, with regard to children in particular, “[s]tatements made by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.” The decision is therefore likely to lead to a more restrictive application of the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence adopted in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and thus more frequent admission of out-of-court statements of witnesses.

Stephen McFadden v. United States, USSC No. 14-378, 2015 WL 2473377 (June 18, 2015), reversing and remanding United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court holds that in order to convict a defendant of distribution a controlled substance analogue, the government must prove that the defendant knew the substance was controlled under the federal Controlled Substances Act or the Analogue Act, or that the defendant knew the specific features of the substance that make it a controlled substance analogue.

Elonis v. United States, USSC No. 13-983, 2015 WL 2464051 (June 1, 2015), reversing United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved a prosecution of Elonis for threats he made in postings on his Facebook page, and it was being widely watched for the First Amendment question it raised. But the Court sidestepped the constitutional question, and holds instead that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the federal statute he was prosecuted under, requires the government to prove some sort of mental state regarding the threatening nature of the communication.