On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Utah v. Strieff, USSC No. 14-1373, 2016 WL 3369419 (June 20, 2016), reversing State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532 (Utah 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

“This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong. If the officer discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence anything he happens to find by searching you after arresting you on the warrant. ”  –Sotomayor, J., dissenting

Taylor v. United States, USSC No. 14-6166, 2016 WL 3369420, 579 U.S. ___ (June 20, 2016), affirming United States v. Taylor, 754 F.3d 217 (4th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In a decision that invalidates Seventh Circuit precedent, the Supreme Court holds that to obtain a conviction under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, for the robbery or attempted robbery of a drug dealer, the Government need not show that the drugs that a defendant stole or attempted to steal either traveled or were destined for transport across state lines; instead, it is enough that a defendant knowingly stole or attempted to steal drugs or drug proceeds because, as a matter of law, the market for illegal drugs is “commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction” for purposes of the Hobbs Act.

United States v. Bryant, USSC No. 15-420, 2016 WL 3221519 (June 13, 2016), reversing and remanding 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

As we explained in our prior post on the cert grant in this case, the Sixth Amendment does not apply in tribal courts. Congress has created a statutory right to counsel in such courts, including for indigent defendants, in prosecutions involving prison sentences greater than one year. But for charges involving less than a year of incarceration, only defendants who can afford a lawyer are entitled to have one. Bryant has several prior domestic violence convictions in tribal court for which he was not statutorily entitled to, and did not receive, a lawyer. The question here is whether these convictions can form the predicate for his new, federal-court conviction for “domestic assault within … Indian country” which applies only to those with at least two DV priors.

Williams v. Pennsylvania, USSC No. 15-5040, 2016 WL 3189529 (June 9, 2016), vacating and remanding Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

When he was district attorney of Philadelphia, Ronald Castille authorized a subordinate to seek a death sentence in Terrance Williams’s murder trial. Thirty years later, as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Castille refused to recuse himself from the commonwealth’s appeal of Williams’ successful habeas petition, which alleged that the DA’s office had withheld exculpatory information contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled against Williams; SCOTUS now holds that Castille’s participation in that decision deprived Williams of due process.

Dietz v. Bouldin, USSC No. 15-458, 2016WL3189528 (June 9, 2016), affirming Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2015); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In a 6-2 decision, SCOTUS holds that a federal district court has limited inherent authority to rescind a jury discharge and to recall the jury for further deliberations in order to address an error in its verdict. The court specifically limits this decision to civil cases.

Ross v. Blake, USSC No. 15-339, 2016 WL 3128839 (June 6, 2016), vacating and remanding Blake v. Ross, 787 F.3d 693 (4th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court unanimously holds there is no unwritten “special circumstances” exception to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that a prisoner exhaust administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit.

Question presented:

Whether it violates the Eighth Amendment and this Court’s decisions in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) to prohibit the use of current medical standards on intellectual disability, and require the use of outdated medical standards, in determining whether an individual may be executed.

Deborah K. Johnson v. Donna Kay Lee, 578 U.S. __ (2016)(per curiam); SCOTUS docket

Like Wisconsin, California has a rule that a defendant may not raise a claim for the first time on on state collateral review if he could have raised it on direct appeal. Wisconsin calls it the “Escalona bar.” California calls it the “Dixon bar.” The issue in this case was whether the California Supreme Court’s application of the “Dixon bar” provided an independent and adequate state ground for barring federal habeas review.  SCOTUS answered “yes.”

Lee’s litigation strategy is interesting. After losing her direct appeal in California state courts, she skipped state postconviction review and filed a federal habeas petition. The federal court stayed her petition and directed her to exhaust her state-court remedies. She filed a state habeas petition, which the California Supreme Court denied in a summary order that cited Dixon.

Foster v. Chatman, USSC No. 14-8349, 2016 WL 2945233 (May 23, 2016); reversing an unpublished order of the Supreme Court of Georgia; Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Timothy Foster, who is black, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an all-white jury. Long after his conviction, his attorneys obtained documents from the prosecutors’ files showing their heavy reliance on race in deciding which jurors to strike. Seven of the eight justices now side with Foster and reverse the state courts’ rejection of his habeas claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

Luna Torres v. Lynch, USSC No. 14-1096, 2016 WL 2903424 (May 19, 2016), affirming Torres v. Holder, 764 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The definition of “aggravated felony” under federal immigration law, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), has 21 subsections covering dozens of different crimes. Many of the subsections refer to offenses “described in” particular federal statutes, all of which include the interstate commerce element necessary for federal criminal jurisdiction. A catch-all at the end of the statute says that “aggravated felony” includes “an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law….” This decision says that a state offense that lacks an interstate commerce element, but corresponds in all other ways to a listed federal offense, is an aggravated felony.