On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Rehaif v. United States, USSC No. 17-9560, 2019 WL 2552487, June 21, 2019, reversing 888 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Federal law bans certain classes of people from possessing guns, and provides stiff penalties (up to ten years in prison if there are no enhancers) if they do. One of those classes consists of people who are aliens illegally in the country. Rehaif was illegally in the country and possessed firearms. The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict him only if he “knowingly” possessed a gun, but refused to instruct it that he also had to know he was illegally in the country. He was convicted, and the Court now holds this was error: the mens rea in the illegal gun possession statute applies both the the possession and to the status that makes the possession illegal.

Flowers v. Mississippi, USSC No. 17-9572, 2019 WL 2552489, June 21, 2019, reversing Flowers v. State, 240 So. 3d 1082 (Miss. 2017); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The Court reverses Curtis Flowers’ conviction and death sentence and orders a seventh new trial on the ground that the district attorney at his sixth trial (he also prosecuted the other five) exercised at least one peremptory strike with racially discriminatory intent. Three previous convictions were overturned by lower courts because of “numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct” (that was the first one) “prosecutorial misconduct” (two) and “as strong a prima facie case of racial discrimination” as the Mississippi Supreme Court had “ever seen” (this was trial number three).

Mitchell v. Wisconsin, No. 18-6210, 6/29/19, vacating and remanding State v. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This is the decision we’ve all been waiting for on whether a blood draw from an unconscious OWI suspect requires a warrant. Wouldn’t you know–the opinion is splintered. Alito, writing for 4 justices (a plurality, not a majority), concludes that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood draw with out a warrant. The plurality vacates the judgment and remands the case for a hearing so that Mitchell has a chance to show that there were no exigent circumstances in his case. Way to go, Andy Hinkel, for fending off the State’s contention that implied consent is actual consent.

Banister v. Davis, USSC No. 18-6943, certiorari granted 6/24/19

Question presented:

Whether and under what circumstances a timely Rule 59(e) motion should be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005).

Terance Martez Gamble v. United States, USSC No. 17-646, 2019 WL 2493923, June 17, 2019, affirming United States v. Gamble, 694 Fed. Appx. 750 (11th Cir. 2017); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Gamble challenged the validity of the “dual-sovereignty” doctrine, which holds that it doesn’t violate the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause to convict a person in both state and federal court for the same crime. By a 7-2 vote, the Court rejects his challenge.

Quarles v. United States, No. 17-778, 6/10/19, affirming United States v. Quarles, 850 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Quarles was convicted of home invasion in Michigan. When he was later charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, that ealier conviction became one of the prior offenses that dramatically increased his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The question here is whether, under SCOTUS’s “categorical approach,” the Michigan home invasion statute qualifies as a generic burglary.

McKinney v. Arizona, USSC No. 18-1109, certiorari granted 6/10/19; affirmed 2/25/20

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Arizona Supreme Court was required to apply current law when weighing mitigating and aggravating evidence to determine whether a death sentence is warranted

2. Whether the correction of error under Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), requires resentencing.

Mont v. United States, USSC No. 17-8995, June 3, 2019, affirming United States v. Mont, 723 Fed. Appx. 325 (6th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), the period of supervised release imposed as part of a federal sentence is “tolled” during “any period the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a crime….” In a decision of interest to federal practitioners, the Supreme Court holds that the period the person is imprisoned includes pretrial custody in a case that is later credited toward the sentence imposed for a new conviction.

Kansas v. Glover, USSC No. 18-556, certiorari granted 4/1/19

Question presented:

Whether, for purposes of an investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle absent any information to the contrary.

Randall Mathena, Warden v. Lee Boyd Malvo, USSC No. 18-217, certiorari granted 3/18/19

Question presented:

Montgomery v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016)), held that the new constitutional rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Did the the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals err in concluding that Montgomery could be interpreted as modifying and substantively expanding the Miller rule itself, when the issue presented in Montgomery was only the retroactivity of that rule?