On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Quarles v. United States, No. 17-778, 6/10/19, affirming United States v. Quarles, 850 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Quarles was convicted of home invasion in Michigan. When he was later charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, that ealier conviction became one of the prior offenses that dramatically increased his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The question here is whether, under SCOTUS’s “categorical approach,” the Michigan home invasion statute qualifies as a generic burglary.

McKinney v. Arizona, USSC No. 18-1109, certiorari granted 6/10/19; affirmed 2/25/20

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Arizona Supreme Court was required to apply current law when weighing mitigating and aggravating evidence to determine whether a death sentence is warranted

2. Whether the correction of error under Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), requires resentencing.

Mont v. United States, USSC No. 17-8995, June 3, 2019, affirming United States v. Mont, 723 Fed. Appx. 325 (6th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), the period of supervised release imposed as part of a federal sentence is “tolled” during “any period the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a crime….” In a decision of interest to federal practitioners, the Supreme Court holds that the period the person is imprisoned includes pretrial custody in a case that is later credited toward the sentence imposed for a new conviction.

Kansas v. Glover, USSC No. 18-556, certiorari granted 4/1/19

Question presented:

Whether, for purposes of an investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle absent any information to the contrary.

Randall Mathena, Warden v. Lee Boyd Malvo, USSC No. 18-217, certiorari granted 3/18/19

Question presented:

Montgomery v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016)), held that the new constitutional rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Did the the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals err in concluding that Montgomery could be interpreted as modifying and substantively expanding the Miller rule itself, when the issue presented in Montgomery was only the retroactivity of that rule?

Kansas v. Garcia, USSC No. 17-834, certiorari granted 3/18/19

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) expressly preempts the States from using any information entered on or appended to a federal Form I-9, including common information such as name, date of birth, and social security number, in a prosecution of any person (citizen or alien) when that same, commonly used information also appears in non-IRCA documents, such as state tax forms, leases, and credit applications

2. Whether IRCA impliedly preempts Kansas’s prosecution of respondents.

Kahler v. Kansas, USSC No. 18-6135, certiorari granted 3/18/19

Question presented:

Do the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense?

Evangelisto Ramos v. Louisiana, USSC No. 18-5924, certiorari granted 3/18/19, Reversed 4/20/20

Question presented:

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of a unanimous verdict?

Timbs v. Indiana, USSC No. 17-1091, February 20, 2019, reversing State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

“The question presented: Is the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause an ‘incorporated’ protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause?” The answer: Yes.

Garza v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, reversing Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017);  Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved two plea agreements that included clauses stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. After sentencing, Garza told his lawyer that he wanted to appeal, but his lawyer refused due to the plea agreement. Garza filed claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Siding with Garza, SCOTUS held that counsel performed deficiently and that “prejudiced is presumed” because the failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Garza of an appeal altogether. Opinion at 1.