On Point blog, page 13 of 133
SCOW to review sentence credit for Wisconsin offenders doing time in other states
State v. Cesar Antonio Lira, 2019AO691-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity
Issues presented (from the State’s PFR):
1. Under §973.155, a convicted offender is entitled to sentence credit for “all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.” And §973.15(5) provides that an offender lawfully made available to another jurisdiction is entitled to credit for custody time in that jurisdiction “under the terms of s. 973.155.”
The court of appeals awarded Lira over 11 years of credit for custody in Oklahoma under §973.15(5), despite the fact that the Oklahoma sentence was not “in connection with” the Wisconsin offenses for which he was sentenced. It relied on State v. Brown, 2006 WI App 41, 289 Wis. 2d 823, 711 N.W.2d 708, which holds that courts determining credit under section 973.15(5) may not consider “the terms of s. 973.155,” including whether the custody in the other jurisdiction is “in connection with” the Wisconsin offense.
SCOW accepts case raising issue of using lawful gun ownership as an aggravating sentencing factor
State v. Octavia W. Dodson, 2018AP1476-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity (including briefs)
Issue presented:
Did the sentencing court violate Dodson’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms by considering his status as a lawful gun owner an aggravating factor at sentencing?
SCOW rejects 2nd Amendment challenge to felon-in-possession statute
State v. Leevan Roundtree, 2012 WI 1, 1/7/21, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2018AP594-CR; case activity (including briefs)
In 2003, Roundtree was convicted of multiple felony counts of failure to pay child support. Twelve years later, police executed a search warrant at his home and found a firearm and ammunition under his mattress. He pled guilty to one count of felon in possession. On appeal, he argued that §941.29(2)(2013-2014), which barred him from possessing a firearm, is unconstitutional as applied to his case. The statute has no time limit and draws no distinction between serious or violent felonies versus less serious felonies like failure to pay child support. In a 5-2 decision SCOW upheld the statute.
SCOW clarifies Dinkins and ineffective assistance involving guilty pleas
State v. Savage, 2020 WI 93, 12/23/20, reversing a court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs).
Savage, who was homeless, claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to advise him that he had a defense under State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787 before he pled guilty to violating the sex offender registry rule that he provide his address to the DOC. According to Savage and the court of appeals, Dinkins held that a homeless person is exempt from sex offender registration requirements. In a unanimous opinion, SCOW reverses, holds that Dinkins did not establish that broad exemption, and thus counsel did not perform deficiently.
SCOW to address Miranda custody during a Terry stop
State v. Brian v. Rotolo, 2019AP2061-CR, petition for review granted 12/28/20; case activity
Issue presented (adapted from the petition for review):
In State v. Lonkoski, 2013 WI 30, ¶6, 346 Wis. 2d 523, 828 N.W.2d 552, SCOW held that the test for Fifth Amendment Miranda custody is whether “a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the interview and leave the scene.” Does this test for determining Miranda custody also apply when police legally detain a suspect under Terry?
SCOW to address child pornography surcharge
State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2020AP616-CR, petition for bypass granted 12/28/20; case activity
- Does Wis. Stat. §973.042 (the child pornography surcharge statute) permit the circuit court to impose a child pornography surcharge for an offense that is “read in” for sentencing purposes?
- Is the child pornography surcharge a punishment that must be explained during a plea colloquy? If so, was Schmidt entitled to a hearing on his claim that the plea colloquy was deficient in this case?
SCOW: Expert opinion on risk not needed in ch. 980 proceeding
State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2020 WI 92, 12/18/20, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
A five-justice majority of the supreme court holds that the state does not need to present expert opinion testimony that a person subject to commitment under Chapter 980 is dangerous to others because his mental disorder makes it more likely than not that he will engage in one or more future acts of sexual violence.
SCOW: No special procedure required to establish factual basis for Alford plea
State v. Kevin L. Nash, 2020 WI 85, 11/19/20, affirming a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Before accepting a plea entered under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), a circuit court must determine whether there is “strong proof of guilt” sufficient to “substantially negate” the defendant’s claims of innocence. State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 859-60, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995); State ex rel. Warren v. Schwartz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 645, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998). The supreme court declines to exercise its superintending authority to require circuit courts to employ a specific procedure to establish a sufficient factual basis for an Alford plea.
SCOW to address 48-hour deadline for filing Chapter 51 examiners’ report
Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 2019AP2073, petition for review granted 11/19/20; case activity
Issues presented:
1. Did the circuit court lack competency to adjudicate this Chapter 51 commitment proceeding due to the county’s violation of the rule requiring it to file psychiatric reports 48 hours before the final hearing?
2. If the circuit court retained competency, did it err in admitting a tardy report and the testimony of the report’s author?
SCOW to address important cell phone search issues
State v. George Steven Burch, 2019AP404-CR, certification granted 11/18/20; case activity (including briefs)
Issues presented (from the certification):
Did police violate Burch’s Fourth Amendment rights by:
- exceeding the scope of Burch’s consent to search his cell phone by downloading the phone’s entire contents, rather than only the text messages;
- unlawfully retaining the entire cell phone download after it completed its initial investigation and closing the case without charging Burch; and
- unlawfully conducting a second search of the cell phone download months after closing the initial investigation.