On Point blog, page 14 of 133
SCOW to review meaning of “preliminary contested matter” under civil judicial substitution statute
State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2018AP2142, petition to review a published court of appeals decision granted 8/26/20; case activity (including briefs)
Issue presented:
Is an adjourned probable cause hearing under ch. 980 a “preliminary contested matter” that terminates litigants’ opportunity to request judicial substitution?
SCOW to review police use of polygraph results to coerce confessions
State v. Adam W. Vice, 2018AP2220-CR, petition for review of a published, split opinion granted August 20, 2020, case activity
Issue for review: (State’s petition for review; Vice’s response)
During a post-polygraph interview, police repeatedly referenced Vice’s polygraph test results and failed to inform him that the results would be inadmissible in court. Did the court of appeals give undue weight to these factors in assessing the voluntariness of Vice’s confession to sexual assault of a four year old?
SCOW to decide whether an appeal from an expired recommitment order may be dismissed as moot
Portage County v. E.R.R., 2019AP2033, petition for review of an unpublished dismissal order granted 8/20/20; case activity
Issues presented:
Whether an appeal from a Wis. Stat. §51.20(1)(am) recommitment order may properly be dismissed as moot.
Whether the County met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. R. was currently dangerous as required by Wis. Stat. §51.20(1)(am).
SCOW will review more constitutional challenges to ch. 51’s recommitment scheme
Waupaca County v. K.E.K., 2018AP1887, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals decision granted 7/24/20; case activity
Issues presented:
- Did the circuit court lose competency to conduct a recommitment hearing because the County did not file the evaluation of K.E.K. at least 21 days before the expiration of her commitment, as required by § 51.20(13)(g)2r.?
- Is the recommitment standard in § 51.20(1)(am) facially unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment because it violates the guarantees of substantive due process and equal protection of the law or abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens?
- Is the recommitment standard in § 51.20(1)(am) unconstitutional as applied to K.E.K.?
SCOW: expert testimony needn’t meet Daubert if it’s not “opinion,” Miranda violation was harmless
State v. Timothy E. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, 7/3/20, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2018AP319; case activity (including briefs)
There’s really only one important holding here: despite adoption of the Daubert standard, Wisconsin continues to permit expert testimony in the form of “dissertation or exposition.” That is, an expert can educate the jury about the principles or findings of his or her field without talking about the facts of the case, and an expert who does so is not subject to the requirement that he or she “appl[y] the principles and methods” of that field “reliably to the facts of the case.” Though the court also decides a separate Miranda issue, the discussion is fact-intensive and breaks no legal ground. What’s notable (and regrettable) about the Miranda decision is a meandering three-justice concurrence that repeats the court’s error in State v. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 906 N.W.2d 684, by grafting a third step onto the familiar two-part Miranda-custody inquiry.
Fractured SCOW okays restitution order on top of civil settlement
State v. Ryan M. Muth, 2020 WI 65, reversing a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Muth drove while intoxicated and caused the death of T.K. About a month later T.K.’s adult children reached a settlement with Muth’s insurer under which the children received the maximum payout under Muth’s policy as settlement for all claims against Muth. (¶3). Or so Muth thought. A majority of the supreme court holds that, because Muth was later convicted of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, he can also be ordered to pay more money to the children as restitution under § 973.20.
SCOW approves wide police discretion in traffic stops, lets racial bias go unchecked
State v. Courtney C. Brown, 2020 WI 63, 7/3/20, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2017AP774-CR, case activity (including briefs)
“Supreme Court affirms wide discretion in traffic stops; dissent says implicit bias will go unchecked” That’s the JSOnline’s pithy description of SCOW’s 4-1 decision in this case. Also noteworthy, Justice R.G. Bradley filed a strident, bias-denying concurring opinion suggesting that court of appeals Judge Reilly should be disciplined for writing a strident, bias-acknowledging concurrence that dared to criticize two recent 4th Amendment decisions from SCOW.
Judge’s Facebook friendship created serious risk of actual bias in custody case
Miller v. Carroll, 2020 WI 56, 6/16/20, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2017AP2132, case activity (including briefs)
You’ve surely read about this case in NY Times, the Journal Sentinel, on Wisbar.org or on On Point here or here. A judge’s Facebook friendship with one of the litigants in a child custody case before him created a serious risk of actual bias and resulted in a due process violation. Justice A.W. Bradley filed an interesting concurrence arguing that this decision is at odds with State v. Henley, 2011 WI 67, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 802 N.W.2d 175, which readers may recall, concerned a motion to disqualify then Justice Roggensack.
Defense win! SCOW unanimously holds towing and search of car not valid community caretaker action
State v. Alfonso Lorenzo Brooks, 2020 WI 60, 6/25/20, reversing a per curiam court of appeals decision, 2018AP1774, case activity (including briefs)
The police stopped Brooks for speeding in Milwaukee. Specifically, they pulled him over to the side of a residential/commercial road. The police quickly learned Brooks had a suspended license and was a convicted felon. They wrote him tickets for the speeding and operating on a suspended license. Brooks wasn’t arrested then, but he couldn’t drive away either, on account of the license issue. So, police told him, they were towing his car to impound–even though he told them his girlfriend (to whom the car was registered) was nearby and could pick it up. The police said no, that was against department policy, and then did an inventory search of the car. That search turned up a gun, which Brooks, as a felon, could not have. Then he was arrested.
SCOW continues Jensen saga, grants state’s rather thin petition
State v. Mark D. Jensen, 2018AP1952, petition for review of a summary court of appeals order granted 6/16/20; affirmed 3/18/21; case activity
Usually we do to the issues presented first. Here, they’re pretty insubstantial, so let’s just say what’s going on: the supreme court has intervened to (potentially) save a manifestly unconstitutional (and you don’t have to take our word for it) homicide conviction and life sentence in a notorious case.