On Point blog, page 29 of 133
SCOW will address whether circuit court can revisit expungement if it overlooked eligibility at sentencing
State v. Diamond J. Arberry, 2016AP866-CR, 6/16/17, granting a petition for review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (composed by On Point)
1. When a defendant is eligible for expungement under § 973.015 but expungement is not addressed the sentencing hearing, can the defendant raise the issue in a postconviction motion? If so, is a “new factor” motion the appropriate vehicle for bringing such a claim?
2. Did the circuit court err in its exercise of discretion when it denied Arberry expungement based on reasons that could apply in any case?
SCOW to decide whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes after he confesses to a crime
State v. Daniel H. Bartelt, 2015AP2506-CR, 6/15/17, granting review of a published court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)
Issues:
1. After confessing to an attempted homicide or other serious crimes, would a reasonable person feel free to terminate a police interview and leave an interrogation room, such that the person in not “in custody” for Miranda purposes?
2. After confessing, did Bartelt make a clear and unequivocal request for counsel when he asked one of the detectives, “Should I or can I speak to a lawyer or anything?” the detective replied, Sure, yes, that is your option.” And Bartelt replied, “Okay, I think I’d prefer that.”
SCOW: Defendant entitled to self-defense instruction
State v. Robert Joseph Stietz, 2017 WI 58, 6/13/17, reversing a per curiam decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
This case breaks no new legal ground, but simply reaffirms some long-standing rules governing when a trial judge should instruct a jury on self-defense: The defendant has only to meet the “low bar” of producing “some evidence” to support the defense; the evidence supporting the instruction should be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant; and that the trial judge shouldn’t weigh the credibility of the evidence because that’s the job of the jury. (¶¶12-23). Under the specific facts of this case, the trial judge erred in not giving Stietz a self-defense instruction. (¶¶24-60).
SCOW to decide whether Wisconsin recognizes a minimum age for criminal responsibility
State v. Shaun M. Sanders, 2015AP2328-CR, granting review of a published court of appeals decision, 6/13/17, case activity (including briefs
Issue (copied from the petition for review):
Can a person be criminally responsible for acts he allegedly committed before the age of original juvenile court jurisdiction?
SCOW scolds DOJ for releasing erroneous criminal history reports, but justices don’t agree on remedy
Dennis A. Teague v. Brad A. Schimel, 2017 WI 56, 6/8/17, reversing a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Dennis Teague has no criminal record, but if you ask DOJ to run a criminal background check on him DOJ will hand over a lengthy rap sheet showing someone else’s criminal history. Why? Because that someone else once used Teague’s name as an alias. The good news is the supreme court holds DOJ is wrong to give out someone else’s history in response to an inquiry about Teague. The bad new is the court can’t agree on the remedy for Teague and others in his situation.
SCOW declines to clarify test for determining whether mentally ill person is a “proper subject for treatment”
Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, 6/8/2017, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 370 Wis. 2d 262, 881 N.W.2d 359; case activity
In Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., which involved a woman with Alzheimer’s disease, SCOW held that a person is a “proper subject for treatment” under §51.20(1) if she can be “rehabilitated.” It then set forth a test for determining whether a mentally ill person has “rehabilitative potential.” In this case, J.W.J. argued that Helen E.F.’s framework should be modified because it does not account for the characteristics of mental illnesses other than Alzheimer’s, such as the one he has–paranoid schizophrenia.
SCOW to decide whether plea colloquy must address mode of commission of charged crime
State v. Shannon Olance Hendricks, 2015AP2429-CR, petition for review granted 5/15/17; review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (composed by On Point)
Do Wisconsin Statute § 971.08(1) and State v. Bangert require that a defendant entering a guilty plea to a crime with alternative modes of commission understand what the state needs to prove to meet its burden of proof on the mode (or modes) of commission the state has alleged?
SCOW to address ineffective assistance of counsel and allowing client to appear in prison garb at Chapter 51 trial
Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order has a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel where his lawyer fails to object to, prevent the admission of, or request a curative instruction to address, evidence of his prisoner status during his jury trial?
Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice where the jury repeatedly sees and hears evidence of his prisoner status?
Jeremy Perri Guest Posts: SCOW holds warnings not required before finding defendant has forfeited right to counsel
State v. Jack M. Suriano, 2017 WI 42, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2015AP959-CR; case activity (including posts)
In Wisconsin, a defendant can lose his or her right to counsel in two ways: waiver and forfeiture. Waiver is voluntary and requires a colloquy with the defendant. Forfeiture does not.
Three different attorneys accepted State Public Defender (SPD) appointments to represent Jack Suriano. Each, in quick succession, withdrew from representation. After granting the third attorney’s motion to withdraw, the court found that Suriano had forfeited his right to counsel.
SCOW: 1 car crash killing 2 victims yields 2 counts of “hit and run” in violation of sec. 346.67(1)
State v. Sambath Pal, 2017 WI 44, 4/28/17, affirming a court of appeals summary disposition, 2015AP1782-CR; case activity (including briefs)
Driver crashes into group of motorcyclists, kills one, mortally injures a second, flees the scene, and eventually pleads guilty to 2 counts of hit and run resulting in death contrary to §346.67(1). He’s sentenced to 2 consecutive terms of 10 years IC and 10 years ES. Questions Presented: Did driver commit 1 offense or 2? And is his sentence unduly harsh?