On Point blog, page 13 of 104
SCOW: Police asking driver about weapons is part of any traffic stop’s “mission”
State v. John Patrick Wright, 2019 WI 45, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
The supreme court holds (again) that, as part of any routine traffic stop, police may ask a driver whether he or she is carrying a weapon.
SCOW splits 3-3 over when a defendant’s right to counsel attaches
State v. Nelson Garcia, Jr., 2019 WI 40, 4/19/19; case activity (including briefs)
ASPD Pam Moorshead briefed this appeal and argued it to SCOW less than two weeks ago. The lead issue was whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches upon the finding of probable cause and setting of bail by a court commissioner. Justice Abrahamson withdrew from participation leaving only 6 justices to decide the case.
SCOW: Courts may misinform–or not inform–defendants pleading NGI of their maximum period of commitment
State v. Corey R. Fugere, 2019 WI 33, 3/28/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Pretend you’re a defendant trying to decide whether to enter a plea. You know that maximum term of imprisonment you face. You also know that pleading NGI is one of your options. However, the circuit court doesn’t tell you (or perhaps misinforms you) about the nature and length of the commitment that will follow from pleading NGI. How can you make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary NGI plea if you don’t know the consequences of it?
SCOW dodges forfeiture-by-wrongdoing Confrontation Clause issue
State v. Joseph B. Reinwand, 2019 WI 25, 3/19/19, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
The Confrontation Clause ordinarily bars the admission of testimonial statements of a witness if the witness does not appear at trial to testify and be cross-examined. But under the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine, a witness’s testimonial statements may be admitted if the witness does appear to testify as a the result of wrongdoing by the defendant. The supreme court accepted the court of appeals’ certification of this case to address the scope of forfeiture doctrine, but as it happens the decision doesn’t address the doctrine because it determines the statements at issue are not testimonial and therefore do not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
SCOW: There’s no fundamental right to participate in treatment court
State v. Michael A. Keister, 2019 WI 26, 3/19/19, reversing a court of appeals order dismissing the appeal and vacating a circuit court order; case activity (including briefs)
The statute providing for grants to set up treatment courts, § 165.95, does not create a fundamental liberty interest for defendants to participate in treatment court and does not itself need to define the procedures for expulsion from treatment court.
SCOW: Mistakenly released inmate doesn’t get credit for time at liberty
State v. Zachary S. Friedlander, 2019 WI 22, 3/12/19, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 606 N.W.2d 536, laid down a bright-line rule for determining whether a person was in “custody” for purposes of earning sentence credit. The supreme court holds that rule is inconsistent with cases holding that an inmate who is mistakenly released from custody continues to serve his or her sentence, and so is entitled to credit for the time he or she was at liberty.
SCOW addresses juvenile competency proceedings
State v. A.L. , 2019 WI 20, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017 WI App 72; case activity
This appeal centers on the proper interpretation of §938.30(5)(d) and §938.13 governing juveniles found not competent during a delinquency proceeding. SCOW holds a circuit court may resume suspended juvenile delinquency proceedings to reexamine the competency of a juvenile who was initially found not competent and not likely to become competent within the statutory period. It also holds that circuit courts retain competency over juvenile delinquency proceedings even after the accompanying JIPS order has expired.
SCOTUS: lawyer who ignores client’s request for appeal from guilty plea is ineffective
Garza v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, reversing Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
This case involved two plea agreements that included clauses stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. After sentencing, Garza told his lawyer that he wanted to appeal, but his lawyer refused due to the plea agreement. Garza filed claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Siding with Garza, SCOTUS held that counsel performed deficiently and that “prejudiced is presumed” because the failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Garza of an appeal altogether. Opinion at 1.
SCOW alters test for whether state “suppressed” evidence under Brady v. Maryland
State v. Gary Lee Wayerski, 2019 WI 11, affirming and modifying an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
The supreme court overrules Wisconsin’s longstanding test for deciding whether the state has “suppressed” favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), saying the test is unsupported by and contrary to Brady and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applying Brady.
Can prior uncharged burglaries support restitution? SCOW’s answer: “What burglaries?”
State v. Shawn T. Wiskerchen, 2019 WI 1, 1/4/19, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 2016AP1541; case activity (including briefs)
This could have turned out worse. The court of appeals, as we noted in our post on that court’s decision, held that Wiskerchen, convicted of a single burglary of a home, could be made to pay restitution for his alleged prior burglaries of the same home, even though those alleged burglaries were neither charged nor read in, as the statute seems to require. Four justices now conclude, through a creative reading of the record, that the circuit court found Wiskerchen took everything in the single burglary. So, precedentially, this case amounts to little or nothing, and for now at least, the court avoids embracing the court of appeals’ view that results can precede causes.