On Point: B. Opinions

Winnebago County v. J.M., 4/18/18, 2018 WI 37, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2016AP619, case activity.

This opinion will interest lawyers who handle Chapter 51 cases and appellate lawyers of all stripes. It establishes that persons undergoing Chapter 51 mental commitments are entitled  to the effective assistance of counsel and formally adopts the Strickland test for ineffective assistance. It further holds that, due to the overwhelming evidence of dangerousness in this case, J.M. was not prejudiced when his counsel failed to object to him appearing before the jury wearing prison clothes accompanied by uniformed guards–even as he testified. Of particular interest to appellate lawyers, SCOW granted a motion to strike significant parts of Winnebago County’s oral argument because its lawyer asserted facts outside the appellate record.

State v. Brian Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 2016AP173; case activity (including briefs)

Here’s the upshot: the majority opinion here means that, if you don’t have a concealed carry permit, you can’t have a handgun “concealed” in your car, unless it’s out of your reach. How will you know if it’s out of your reach? Simple: you’ll consider the location of the gun and yourself, the size of your vehicle, and your ability to reach the gun, and then you’ll “find guidance in [SCOW] precedent and common sense.” (¶31). While you’re considering all these things you should maybe also consider how, say, a police officer might consider them. Or a prosecutor. Or a jury. Because if they reach a different conclusion, well, that’s gonna be a problem.

State v. Gerrod R. Bell, 2018 WI 28, 4/10/18, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2015AP2667-2668-CR; case activity (including links)

A defendant is presumed innocent until the State proves him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That’s what the Constitution says. Yet, in this child sexual assault case, the State cleverly told jurors that they could not acquit the defendant unless they believed his accusers had lied about the alleged assaults and unless they had evidence of the victims’ motive for lying.  Bell argued that this prosecution strategy impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him. In a 3-1-1 opinion, SCOW approved the strategy and ruled against him.

State v. Shannon Olance Hendricks, 2018 WI 15, 2/20/18, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)

Can a defendant knowingly and intelligently plead guilty to a charge that requires proof of intent to do “X” if the defendant does not know what “X” is? The majority answers “yes.” Justice Abrahamson (joined by A.W. Bradley) answers “no.” Kurt Vonnegut fans will Shirley enjoy the dissent. 🙂 

State v. Daniel J.H. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, 2/20/18, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)

Suppose you confessed to attempted homicide while sitting in a police station interrogation room with 2 officers who are positioned between you and the exit. Would you feel free to leave? The majority says a reasonable person would. The dissent by A.W. Bradley (joined by Abrahamson) says a reasonable person would not.  

State v. Anton R. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, 1/25/28, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)

On Point has posted extensively about this case here regarding the court of appeals’ two opinions and here regarding Dorsey’s petition for review. This post focuses on the bottom line for trial lawyers because the majority opinion cements a change in Wisconsin law. Under common law, the “greater latitude rule” allows for the more liberal admission of “other acts” evidence in cases of sexual abuse particularly those involving children. Opinion ¶32. In 2013, the legislature amended §904.04(2)(b)1, and according to the majority, thereby extended this rule to a range of cases beyond child sexual abuse, including domestic abuse.  Specifically :

State v. Diamond J. Arberry, 2018 WI 7, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court holds that a defendant may not seek expunction after sentence is imposed because the language of § 973.015 and State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811, require the decision regarding expunction to be made at the sentencing hearing.

State v. Frederick S. Smith, 2018 WI 2, 1/9/18, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

This 60-page, 4-3 decision authorizing an officer to continue a traffic stop even after he realizes that he does not have reasonable suspicion is worth reading. Justice Kelly says the result sends “a tremor through the Foundation of the Fourth Amendment” and should “shock” you. Opinion, ¶67, ¶79. It certainly appears to contradict Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) and should make for a great cert petition.

State v. Michael L. Washington, 2018 WI 3, 1/9/18, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court determines that, despite the absence of any colloquy, a defendant who was not present for his trial waived his statutory right to be there.

State v. Jose Alberto Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, reversing a published court of appeals decision, 12/19/17; case activity (including briefs)

A judge taking a guilty or no contest plea is required by § 971.08(1)(c) to warn the defendant that if he or she is not a U.S. citizen the plea might result in deportation, inadmissibility, or denial of naturalization. If the judge doesn’t comply with § 971.08(1)(c) and the defendant shows the plea is likely to result in one of those immigration consequences, the defendant can move to withdraw the plea under § 971.08(2). State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1, held that harmless error principles don’t apply to § 971.08(2), so the defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea even if the state claims the defendant actually knew the immigration consequences. This decision overrules Douangmala and holds that the judge’s failure to comply with § 971.08(1)(c) in Reyes Fuerte’s case was harmless.