On Point: A. Review Grants

State v. Jessica M. Randall, 2017AP1518, petition for review of unpublished opinion granted 10/9/18; case activity

Issue:

Was Randall entitled to suppression of the results of a test of a blood sample that she voluntarily gave to police under the implied consent law because she informed the lab that she was withdrawing her consent before the lab had analyzed the blood to determine the presence and quantity of drugs and alcohol?

State ex rel. Raytrell K. Fitzgerald v. Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 2018AP1214-W, petition for review of an Order Denying Supervisory Relief granted, 10/10/18, affirmed by an equally divided court, 2019 WI 69; case activity

Issue: State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, ¶43, 382 Wis. 2d 476, 914 N.W.2d 141 held that “involuntary medication orders are subject to an automatic stay pending appeal.”  Which event triggers the automatic stay—the entry of the involuntary medication order or the filing of a notice of appeal? Either way, must the circuit court enter an “automatic stay” order?

State v. Corey R. Fugere, 2016AP2258-CR, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 9/4/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point):

When a person enters a guilty plea to a criminal charge coupled with the defense of not responsible due to mental disease or defect under § 971.15, is a circuit court required to advise the person of the maximum term of commitment under ¶ 971.17 in addition to the maximum penalties provided for the offense?

State v. Dennis L. Schwind, 2017AP141-CR, petition for review of a summary disposition granted 9/4/18; case activity

Issues (from Schwind’s petition for review):

1. Did the circuit court have inherent authority to reduce the length of Schwind’s probation?

2. If circuit courts have inherent authority to reduce the length of probation, what standard applies to the exercise of their authority?

State v. Joseph B. Reinwand, 2017AP850-CR; certification granted 9/4/2018; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (from the court of appeals’ certification):

1.  Whether the doctrine that provides for the forfeiture of the right to confrontation by wrongdoing applies at a homicide trial where the declarant is the homicide victim, but where the defendant killed the declarant to prevent him or her from testifying at a separate proceeding.

2.  Whether preventing the declarant from testifying must be the defendant’s primary purpose for the wrongful act that prevented the declarant from testifying in that separate proceeding.

State v. Michael A. Keister, 2017AP1618-CR, state’s petition for review granted 9/4/2018; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (based on the state’s petition for review )

1. Does a person have a fundamental liberty interest in participation in a treatment court funded by the state and county when he or she is charged with an offense involving violent conduct as defined in § 165.95(1)(a) (2015-16)?
2. Does § 165.95 (2015-16), the statute creating DOJ’s grant funding for treatment courts, violate procedural due process because it does not procedures for treatment courts to follow in expelling a participant?

United States v. Dennis Franklin & Shane Salm, 2018AP1346-CQ, certification granted 8/15/18; case activity

The Seventh Circuit certified the following question of law to the Wisconsin Supreme Court:

Whether the different location subsections of the Wisconsin burglary statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m)(a)–(f), identify alternative elements of burglary, one of which a jury must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict, or whether they identify alternative means of committing burglary,

Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2017AP1468, petition for review of memorandum opinion granted 8/15/18; case activity

Issues (from court of appeals opinion):

Whether the circuit court has personal jurisdiction to recommit a person under Chapter 51 when the County concedes that it has been unable to serve her with the petition for recommitment?

Whether a circuit court has authority to enter a default judgment against the subject of a Chapter 51 petition for recommitment?

Whether “examining” physician reports recommending involuntary commitment and medication prepared physicians who never actually examined the subject are sufficient to support a Chapter 51 commitment?

Byrd v. United States, USSC No. 16-1371, 2018 WL 2186175 (May 14, 2018), vacating United States v. Byrd, 679 Fed. Appx. 146 (3rd Cir. 2017); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Terrence Byrd was pulled over while driving a rental car with no passengers. Officers quickly realized the rental agreement for the car did not name him as the renter or an authorized driver. Though Byrd told the officers his friend had rented it, they decided he had “no expectation of privacy” and searched the car, finding body armor and heroin.

Both the district court and Third Circuit agreed with the officers: a driver not on the rental contract has no standing to complain about the search of a rental car. But all nine members of the Court conclude to the contrary: at least where a driver’s possession of the vehicle is not akin to having stolen the car (a murky caveat the Court does not today clarify), mere breach of the rental contract does not negate a reasonable expectation of privacy.

State v. Johnny K. Pinder, 2017AP208-CR, certification granted 3/14/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from certification)

If a search warrant issued under Wis. Stat. § 968.12 for the placement and use of a GPS tracking device on a motor vehicle is not executed within five days after the date of issuance per Wis. Stat. § 968.15(1) is the warrant void under § 968.15(2), even if the search was otherwise reasonably conducted?