On Point: A. Review Grants

State v. Gerald Mitchell, 2015AP304-CR; certification granted 9/11/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law, where no exigent circumstances exist or have been argued, violates the Fourth Amendment.

State v. David McAlister, Sr., 2014AP2561, petition granted 9/11/17; affirmed 4/18/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (copied from petition for review)

1. The central issue at trial was whether McAlister participated in the charged robberies. The state’s evidence on that point consisted entirely of the allegations of two confessed participants seeking to mitigate the consequences of their own misconduct. The jury knew that the state’s witnesses had a motive to falsely accuse McAlister but those witnesses denied under oath having done so. Under these circumstances, is newly discovered evidence from three separate witnesses swearing that the state’s witnesses admitted prior to trial that they intended to falsely accuse McAlister “cumulative” and “merely tend to impeach the credibility of witnesses” such that it could not support a newly discovered evidence claim?

2. Whether the allegations of McAlister’s §974.06 motion were sufficient to require a new trial and therefore an evidentiary hearing on his claim.

State v. Andre L. Scott, 2016AP2017-CR, bypass granted 9/12/17, case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1. Whether, despite State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994), a circuit court may use §971.14(4)(b) to require a nondangerous defendant to be treated to competency against his will, and if so, whether §971.14(4)(b) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not comport with Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

2. Whether an order requiring an inmate to be involuntarily treated to competency is a nonfinal order that should be challenged by a Wis. Stat. §809.50 petition for interlocutory appeal or a final order of a special proceeding that is appealable as a matter of right via Wis. Stat. §808.03(1).

3. Whether the court of appeals exercises its discretion erroneously when it denies a motion for relief pending appeal without explaining its reasoning.

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR, certification granted 9/12/17; case activity (including briefs). This is the second certification of this case; here’s the first.

Issue

In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?

If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?

We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.

We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNA surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.

State v. Diamond J. Arberry, 2016AP866-CR, 6/16/17, granting a petition for review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

1. When a defendant is eligible for expungement under § 973.015 but expungement is not addressed the sentencing hearing, can the defendant raise the issue in a postconviction motion? If so, is a “new factor” motion the appropriate vehicle for bringing such a claim?

2. Did the circuit court err in its exercise of discretion when it denied Arberry expungement based on reasons that could apply in any case?

State v. Daniel H. Bartelt, 2015AP2506-CR, 6/15/17, granting review of a published court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1.  After confessing to an attempted homicide or other serious crimes, would a reasonable person feel free to terminate a police interview and leave an interrogation room, such that the person in not “in custody” for Miranda purposes?

2.  After confessing, did Bartelt make a clear and unequivocal request for counsel when he asked one of the detectives, “Should I or can I speak to a lawyer or anything?” the detective replied, Sure, yes, that is your option.” And Bartelt replied, “Okay, I think I’d prefer that.”

State v. Shaun M. Sanders, 2015AP2328-CR, granting review of a published court of appeals decision, 6/13/17, case activity (including briefs

Issue (copied from the petition for review):

Can a person be criminally responsible for acts he allegedly committed before the age of original juvenile court jurisdiction?

State v. Shannon Olance Hendricks, 2015AP2429-CR, petition for review granted 5/15/17; review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point)

Do Wisconsin Statute § 971.08(1) and State v. Bangert require that a defendant entering a guilty plea to a crime with alternative modes of commission understand what the state needs to prove to meet its burden of proof on the mode (or modes) of commission the state has alleged?

Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order has a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel where his lawyer fails to object to, prevent the admission of, or request a curative instruction to address, evidence of his prisoner status during his jury trial?

Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice where the jury repeatedly sees and hears evidence of his prisoner status?

Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point based on the petition for review and the state’s response to petition for review)

Is the “greater latitude” rule created by case law regarding admission of other acts evidence in child sex cases codified by § 904.04(2)(b)1., which applies to admission of other acts evidence in cases involving an array of crimes in addition to child sex offenses?

Is evidence of a defendant’s criminal acts committed against a person other than the victim admissible under § 904.04(2)(b)1. to show a generalized motive or purpose by a defendant to “control” a person with whom he is in a relationship?