On Point blog, page 8 of 30
SCOW to address mootness, the due process right interpreters, and other Chapter 51 issues
Waukesha County v. J.J.H., 2018AP168, petition for review granted 9/3/19, case activity
Issues:
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Whether the mootness doctrine should apply to an appeal from a commitment order?
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Whether the circuit court violated due process when it held a Chapter 51 probable cause hearing and ordered a 30-day commitment/temporary guardianship/protective placement under §51.67 without providing J.J.H., who is deaf, sign language interpreters?
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Whether the circuit court erred in entering a §51.67 conversion order (a) at the probable cause stage of a Chapter 51 commitment and (b) without making any of the statutorily-required findings for the order?
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What is the mechanism for appealing a §51.67 order?
SCOW will review whether time served on vacated sentence can go to valid one
State v. Richard H. Harrison Jr., 2017AP2440 & 2441-CR, cross-petitions for review granted 8/14/19; case activity
We posted about the unpublished court of appeals decision; the basic scenario is that Mr. Harrison served his initial confinement on a couple of concurrent sentences, then began serving the initial confinement portion of some sentences that had been imposed consecutive to that first set of sentences. But, about three years into those later sentences, they were vacated. So what happens to the three years Harrison was in prison on sentences that no longer exist? Do they count toward satisfying the extended supervision of his still-extant, earlier-imposed sentences?
SCOW to review whether judge “friending” a litigant on Facebook created the appearance of bias
Timothy W. Miller v. Angela L. Carroll, petition to review a published court of appeals decision granted 8/14/19; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (based on Carroll’s Petition for Review)
- Does a judge’s acceptance of one party’s Facebook “friend” request by itself overcome the presumption that a judge is fair, impartial, and capable of ignoring any biasing influences, given the absence of any allegation of subjective bias or of facts showing the judge treated the other party unfairly, and when there were no electronic social media (“ESM”) communications between the judge and the party regarding the merits of the case?
- Does the fact a party “liked” a judge’s Facebook posts unrelated to the pending litigation or commented on a Facebook post unrelated to the pending litigation constitute an ex parte communication between a party and a judge?
SCOW to decide whether mental illness and reliance on government benefits warrant recommitment under Chapter 51
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2018AP145-FT, petition for review granted 7/10/19; case activity
Issue:
A doctor opined that David (a pseudonym) is unable to care for himself, and therefore dangerous under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am), because he lost employment and relies on the assistance of the government and his family for income and housing. As a matter of law, did the circuit err by concluding that the county, under these circumstances, met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that David is dangerous?
SCOW will decide how multiple enhancers apply to OWI fines
State v. Charles L. Neill, IV, petition for review granted 6/11/19; 2018AP75; case activity (including briefs)
This is a review of a published court of appeals decision. Here’s the issue, as stated in our prior post:
Neill pleaded to an OWI-3rd, which has a minimum fine of $600. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)3. His plea came with two statutory enhancers: the one for having a BAC over .25 (Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(g)3.), and the one for having a child in a car (§ 346.65(2)(f)2.). The former quadruples the minimum fine, and the latter doubles it. So, what’s the minimum fine?
SCOW to address whether solicitation of reckless conduct is a crime
State v. Kelly James Kloss, 2018AP651-CR, petition and cross petition for review of a published court of appeals decision, both granted 6/11/19; case activity (including briefs)
Issues:
Is solicitation of first degree reckless injury a crime under Wisconsin law?
Is solicitation of first degree recklessly endangering safety a lesser included offense of first degree reckless injury, making conviction for both offenses multiplicitous in this case?
SCOW to decide if failing to object to consideration of information at sentencing forfeits right to review
State v. Carrie E. Counihan, 2017AP2265-CR, petition for review granted 5/14/19, and State v. Donavinn Coffee, 2017AP2292-CR, petition for review granted 5/14/19; case activity (Counihan; Coffee)
Issues:
Does a defendant forfeit his right to challenge a judge’s consideration of information at sentencing by failing to object to the information at the time of sentencing?
If trial counsel does not object to the court’s consideration of the information and the defendant alleges postconviction that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object, what is the standard for determining whether trial counsel’s failure was prejudicial?
SCOW will weigh in on aggregation of retail theft charges
State v. Autumn Marie Love Lopez & Amy J. Rodriguez, 2017AP913-CR & 2017AP914-CR, petition for review granted 4/9/19; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Does either Wis. Stat. § 971.36 or inherent prosecutorial charging discretion allow a prosecutor to charge a single felony count of retail theft for multiple separate acts of theft, each involving less than $500 in merchandise, committed over a span of time?
Once waived, always waived? SCOW will decide
State v. Matthew C. Hinkle, 2017AP1416-CR, petition for review granted 4/9/19; affirmed 11/12/19; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Once a juvenile has been waived into adult court by one circuit court, must the juvenile always be subject to adult court jurisdiction in any other cases?
SCOW to decide what quantum of information triggers a warrantless search under Act 79
State v. Roy S. Anderson, 2017AP1104-CR, petition for review granted 4/9/19; case activity (including briefs)
Issues:
What constitutes sufficient knowledge of an offender’s community supervision status where an officer wants to search him pursuant to 2013 Wisconsin Act 79?
Whether the officers in this case had reasonable suspicion to search Anderson pursuant to Act 79.