On Point

State v. Amy Joan Zahurones, 2019 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)

Zahurones was charged with several drug-related counts along with resisting an officer and physical abuse of a child. All the counts arose out of a single encounter with the police. She ultimately pleaded to four counts. On three of those counts she got probation, but on Count 2–the felony child-abuse count–she entered a deferred-judgment agreement with the state. The court put her on a signature bond with respect to that last count, since she wouldn’t otherwise be supervised. Over the next couple of years, Zahurones spent a total of about 9 months in jail on probation holds. Ultimately both the probation and the deferred-judgment agreement were revoked. So, does she get credit for those probation holds against her sentence on Count 2, even though she was technically on a signature bond for that count when she was in jail?

Waukesha County v. J.K., 2018AP616-NM, 9/3/19 (unpublished order); case activity

The court of appeals can be pretty aggressive about dismissing Chapter 51 appeals for mootness. This time SCOW slapped its hand.  J.K.’s lawyer filed a no-merit notice of appeal. Before appointed counsel could file a no-merit report, and before J.K. could respond to any such report, the court of appeals (D2) dismissed the appeal as moot because the commitment order at issue had expired and J.K. was under a new commitment order.

SCOTUS has some very important criminal law cases on its docket for this term. They involve “crimmigration,” juvenile life without parole, and the 4th Amendment, among many other issues. Read SCOTUSblog’s preview of the 2019-2020 term thus far here.

SCOWstats just updated its data on the number of women lawyers arguing to SCOW. Looks like overall the percentage of arguments delivered by women has dipped (or, in the case of private firms, dropped). Only the State Public Defender consistently has more women than men arguing to SCOW. You go, girls! 🙂

State v. Ulanda M. Green, 2018AP1350-CR, petition for review granted 9/3/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1. Whether law enforcement’s “dialogue” with Green amounted to an “interrogation” that should have been preceded by a Miranda warning?

2. Whether Green invoked her right to remain silent when law enforcement asked her if she would like to make a statement and she responded: “No. I don’t know nothing.”

Waukesha County v. J.J.H., 2018AP168, petition for review granted 9/3/19, case activity

Issues:

1.  Whether the mootness doctrine should apply to an appeal from a commitment order?

2. Whether the circuit court violated due process when it held a Chapter 51 probable cause hearing and ordered a 30-day commitment/temporary guardianship/protective placement under §51.67 without providing J.J.H., who is deaf, sign language interpreters?

3. Whether the circuit court erred in entering a §51.67 conversion order (a) at the probable cause stage of a Chapter 51 commitment and (b) without making any of the statutorily-required findings for the order?

4. What is the mechanism for appealing a §51.67 order?

State v. Eric L. Vanremortel, 2018AP417, 9/4/19, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vanremortel was charged with disorderly conduct for an incident in which he followed the wife of a retired police officer in her car, then repeatedly got out of his own car and shouted at her. The state sought to admit evidence of three prior incidents involving Vanremortel following and/or shouting at police officers, including one that happened a few weeks before the charged conduct and involved the wife’s retired-officer husband. The circuit court admitted the evidence, finding it satisfied the test of State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998), and Vanremortel appeals.

State v. T.L.G., 5018AP1291, 9/4/19, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

T.L.G., who is cognitively limited, appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son. During the proceedings below her lawyer requested a competency evaluation; eventually the court appointed T.L.G. a guardian ad litem. T.L.G. ultimately pleaded no-contest to the asserted ground of continuing CHIPS, and her rights were terminated.

Dane County v. N.W., 2019AP48, 8/29/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

N.W. entered a written stipulation to extend his Chapter 51 involuntary mental commitment. On appeal he argued that due process required the circuit court to conduct a colloquy to determine whether he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily agreed to the extension before approving it. Ironically, the court of appeals held that in Chapter 51 cases–where a person’s mental capacity to make treatment decisions is directly at issue–circuit courts have no obligation to inquire whether he knows that he is voluntarily agreeing to an involuntary commitment for treatment.

State v. Richard Rusk, 2019AP135-CR, 8/29/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer stopped Rusk because he believed that tinting on the windshield of Rusk’s vehicles extended so far down as to violate Wis. Admin § Trans 305.34(6)(c)(May 2014). Rusk argued that this was a mistake of law because the rule was invalid and moved to suppress evidence of an OWI 3rd. He lost the circuit court, and loses again on appeal.