On Point

State v. Kevin B. Hutchins, 2018AP1144-CR, 7/16/2019, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hutchins had a jury trial for the alleged sexual assault, false imprisonment, and battery of the mother of his children. The judge permitted her to testify, over objection, that he had hit her on other, earlier occasions–the proffered purpose of this testimony being to show why she didn’t immediately go to the police after this incident (and thus, apparently, to defend the credibility of her story). The court of appeals affirms.

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2018AP145-FT, petition for review granted 7/10/19; case activity

Issue: 

A doctor opined that David (a pseudonym) is unable to care for himself, and therefore dangerous under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am), because he lost employment and relies on the assistance of the government and his family for income and housing. As a matter of law, did the circuit err by concluding that the county, under these circumstances, met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that David is dangerous?

Today Mad in America, a nonprofit that publishes a webzine on science, psychiatry and social justice ran a long article on the dark side of “Assisted Outpatient Treatment” or, as we think of it in Wisconsin, “outpatient recommitments.” Turns out they have a very dark side. Chapter 51 practitioners may find the many studies and surveys linked to in this article helpful in preparing their clients cases.

United States v. Davis, USSC No. 18-431, June 24, 2019, affirming and vacating in part, United states v. Davis, 903 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

No surprise here.  Section 18 U.S.C. §924(c) makes it a crime to use a firearm during a crime of violence and 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(B) defined a crime of violence as an offense that by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force would be used in committing it. SCOTUS declared similar language unconstitutionally vague in  Sessions v. Dimaya, and it followed suit here.

State v. Andreal Washington, 2018AP1254-CR, 7/9/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A jury acquitted Washington of the felony murder of Williams. Then the State charged him with 2nd degree reckless homicide. Washington moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals here affirms.

Marathon County v. D.K., 2017AP2217, petition for review granted 7/10/19; affirmed 2/4/2020; case activity

As our prior post noted, the court of appeals upheld D.K. (or “Donald”)’s commitment against his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The supreme court has now agreed to decide whether the testimony of the examining physician, who was the sole witness at D.K.’s trial, supplied enough for the court to find by “clear and convincing evidence” a “substantial probability” that D.K. was dangerous.

State v. John E. Paul, 2018AP1496, 7/11/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Paul had three prior OWIs and was on trial for a fourth, plus the associated PAC charge. During voir dire, the prosecutor told the jury that

the other thing is the prohibited alcohol concentration in this particular case is .02. Now, many of you may have heard of the .08, but in this instance, the prohibited alcohol concentration is .02. Now, is there any person here who thinks it’s unfair that somebody could be prosecuted or convicted of the offense of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration of .02 percent or .02 grams per 210—I forgot, but per deciliter of the  defendant’s breath? So it’s a .02 standard. Is there any person here who thinks that would be unfair?

State v. Jessica M. Randall, 2019 WI 80, 7/2/19, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

A majority of the supreme court holds that a person who has been arrested for OWI and consented to a blood draw cannot prevent the testing of the blood sample for alcohol or drugs by advising the state she is revoking her consent.

State v. David Gutierrez, 2019 WI App 41, petition for review granted, 11/13/19, reversed in part and affirmed in part, 2020 WI 52; case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court allowed the state to admit testimony that Gutierrez’s DNA wasn’t found after testing of relevant evidence state as well as testimony about why his DNA might not be found; it did not, however, allow Gutierrez to admit evidence that the DNA of other men had been found. This was error.

Rehaif v. United States, USSC No. 17-9560, 2019 WL 2552487, June 21, 2019, reversing 888 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Federal law bans certain classes of people from possessing guns, and provides stiff penalties (up to ten years in prison if there are no enhancers) if they do. One of those classes consists of people who are aliens illegally in the country. Rehaif was illegally in the country and possessed firearms. The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict him only if he “knowingly” possessed a gun, but refused to instruct it that he also had to know he was illegally in the country. He was convicted, and the Court now holds this was error: the mens rea in the illegal gun possession statute applies both the the possession and to the status that makes the possession illegal.