On Point

State v. Dustin M. Yanda, 2018AP412-CR, District 3, 6/18/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828, the supreme court held that a defendant seeking a “new factor” sentence modification doesn’t need to prove that the new factor “frustrates the purpose” of the original sentence. However, Harbor doesn’t preclude the sentencing court from considering whether the purpose of the sentence is frustrated in deciding whether to modify a sentence once the court has concluded the defendant has proven a new factor.

State v. T.A.D.S., 2018AP2173, District 1, 6/18/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

T.A.D.S. pleaded no-contest to the abandonment ground alleged in the petition filed to terminate his parental rights to his daughter, T.S. He argues his plea was invalid because the circuit court’s plea colloquy didn’t correctly explain the statutory standard for the disposition hearing. The court of appeals disagrees.

Terance Martez Gamble v. United States, USSC No. 17-646, 2019 WL 2493923, June 17, 2019, affirming United States v. Gamble, 694 Fed. Appx. 750 (11th Cir. 2017); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Gamble challenged the validity of the “dual-sovereignty” doctrine, which holds that it doesn’t violate the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause to convict a person in both state and federal court for the same crime. By a 7-2 vote, the Court rejects his challenge.

We posted yesterday about State v. John Finley, which addressed a challenge to the confession of an adult with intellectual limitations. Coincidentally, we learned today of two articles related to confessions that may interest our readers.

State v. John S. Finley, 2018AP258-CR, District 2, 6/12/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Here’s a succinct summary of this decision: “The Majority supports the government’s  ‘interview,’ which utilized lies, threats, and fabrication of evidence to wrestle a statement from a thirty-six-year-old man, who has the mind of a twelve year old and the social skills of a first grader.” (¶24 (Reilly, P.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)).

Quarles v. United States, No. 17-778, 6/10/19, affirming United States v. Quarles, 850 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Quarles was convicted of home invasion in Michigan. When he was later charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, that ealier conviction became one of the prior offenses that dramatically increased his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The question here is whether, under SCOTUS’s “categorical approach,” the Michigan home invasion statute qualifies as a generic burglary.

James P. Moran v. Wisconsin Department of Justice, 2019 WI App 38; case activity (including briefs)

James Moran was convicted of a felony in Virginia. That state has a procedure by which a person can petition to have his or her right to own a gun restored, and Moran’s petition was successful. So he can buy a gun there. Can he buy one here?

State v. Charles L. Neill, IV, petition for review granted 6/11/19; 2018AP75; case activity (including briefs)

This is a review of a published court of appeals decision. Here’s the issue, as stated in our prior post:

Neill pleaded to an OWI-3rd, which has a minimum fine of $600. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)3. His plea came with two statutory enhancers: the one for having a BAC over .25 (Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(g)3.), and the one for having a child in a car (§ 346.65(2)(f)2.). The former quadruples the minimum fine, and the latter doubles it. So, what’s the minimum fine?

State v. Fitzgerald, 2018AP1296-CR, 2019 WI 69, 6/13/19; case activity

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) held that a mentally ill  defendant has a constitutional right to avoid unwanted antipsychotic medication. The State can force it on him to restore his competency for trial only by proving the 4 “Sell factors.” Fitzgerald holds that §971.14 does not conform to Sell. Going forward, the State cannot obtain involuntary med orders based solely on §971.14 because it is constitutionally infirm.  The State must satisfy Sell factors. The cases where this is possible may be “rare.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  Involuntary medication to restore competency to proceed should be the exception, not the rule.

State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Milw. County Circuit Court, 2018AP1214-W, 2019 WI 69, 6/13/19, case activity

A defendant is entitled to an automatic stay of an involuntary medication pending appeal, otherwise his liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medications is rendered a nullity. State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, __Wis. 2d __, 912 N.W.2d 14. But what triggers the automatic stay–the entry of the involuntary medication order itself or the filing of the notice of appeal? SCOW split 3-3 on this issue (Abrahamson did not participate), so the court of appeals decision stands.