On Point

Dane County v. Damian A. Bethke, 2017AP1284, 5/31/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Bethke was acquitted of his OWI charge, so this is an appeal only of his refusal, and his claim is that the officer who detained him violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

County of Door v. Donald L. McPhail, 2017AP1079, 5/30/18, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

When McPhail was arrested for first-offense OWI, he refused a blood test. The arresting officer gave him the notice of intent to withdraw his operating privilege, which told McPhail he had 10 days to request a hearing, and that he should send his request to 1201 S. Duluth Ave in Sturgeon Bay. But that’s the Sheriff’s department, not the clerk of courts, which is at 1205 (though the two are part of the same complex).

State v. Jeffrey A. Jacobi, 2017AP1816, 5/30/18, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Based on facts specific to this case, the court of appeals held that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe Jacobi was intoxicated when he bumped into a car while driving his motorcycle. It also wagged its finger at appellate counsel for carelessness in compiling the record and for misrepresenting the record. It also noted his failure to file a reply brief.

State v. P.J., 2018AP376-2018AP381, 5/30/18, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

P.J. challenged the termination of her parental rights to her 6 children on the grounds that the circuit court failed to appropriately consider the substantial bond  that she had with her children and improperly relied on testimony by the various foster parents that the children would continue to have contact with each other. The court of appeals affirmed.

Scott Schmidt v. Brian Foster, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1727, 5/29/18, reversing Schmidt v. Pollard, No. 13-CV-1150 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2017); reversed en banc 12/20/18

A criminal defendant is entitled to counsel at all “critical stages” of the case. You probably think that a hearing, before a murder trial, that determines whether the accused will get to present his only defense counts as such a “critical stage.” The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, however, “easily reject[ed]” that notion in this (published) case. The Seventh Circuit now disagrees, saying the Wisconsin decision “unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent and, frankly, ignored reality.”

Waukesha County v. M.J.S., 2017AP1843, 5/30/18, District 2, (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

Section 51.61(1)(g)4 and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607 establish that a person subject to a possible involuntary medication order is entitled to receive a reasonable explanation of the proposed medication, why it is being prescribed, its advantages and disadvantages (include side effects), and alternatives to it. If the person is incapable of expressing an understanding of these matters or incapable of applying the information to his situation in order to make an informed decision, then he is incompetent to refuse them. In this case, M.J.S. failed to show for the examination where a doctor would have attempted the statutorily-required explanation. The circuit court ordered involuntary meds; the court of appeals reversed.

State v. Justice G. Armstead, 2017AP1586-CR, 5/30/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Armstead pled NGI to 2 misdemeanors, pursuant to §971.16. The court ordered his conditional release into the community for 6 months, along with involuntary medications. Five months into the order, Armstead filed a motion for postdisposition relief  arguing that both the examining physician and the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard for ordering involuntary medications. The circuit court denied the motion. The conditional release order expired a week later but Armstead appealed anyway. The court of appeals dismissed his appeal as moot. In doing so, it made a significant error of law.

State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2016AP883-CR, 2018 WI 59, 5/30/18, reversing in part, a published court of appeals opinion, 2017 WI App 46, case activity (including briefs)

In a 5-0 opinion (Roggensack and A.W. Bradley did not participate) SCOW overruled two court of appeals decisions, State v. Elward and State v. Radaj, which had held that the §973.046  mandatory DNA surcharge violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. SCOW delved into the reasoning of both cases and found it “faulty.” It further held that a circuit court may consider a defendant’s opposition to paying restitution as part of his character or lack of remorse when choosing a sentence.

Collins v. Virginia, USSC No. 16-1027, 2018 WL 2402551, 5/29/18, reversing Collins v. Commonwealth, 790 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 2016); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Police learned a stolen motorcycle that had evaded them on two occasions was likely parked at a house where Collins stayed. When they got to the house, they saw a motorcycle parked in the driveway with a tarp over it. They walked up the driveway, lifted the tarp, and confirmed that it was the stolen bike. The Supreme Court now holds that, though the motorcycle was an automobile–and hence subject to the “automobile exception,” which dispenses with the warrant requirement where there’s probable cause to search a vehicle–this fact does not justify the officers’ invasion of the home’s curtilage to search it.

State v. Jasetta Smith, 2017AP1807-CR, 5/23/18, District 2, (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs) Better go easy on the perfume or cologne. An officer ran the license plates on the car Smith was driving at 1:08 a.m. one night. He saw that the registered owner’s license was suspended, stopped the car, learned […]