On Point

Milwaukee County v. I.K., 2017AP1425, District 1, 5/8/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The County proved I.K. was dangerous under both § 51.20(1)(a)2.d., by showing there was a substantial probability I.K. would suffer physical harm resulting from his inability to satisfy basic needs due to mental illness, and § 51.20(1)(a)2.e., by showing that, after being advised of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting treatment, I.K. was unable to understand and make an informed choice regarding treatment and that a lack of treatment will result in further disability or deterioration.

State v. A.E., 2017AP1773 & 2017AP1774, District 1, 5/8/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

This is the third TPR opinion in a week addressing challenges to the denial of a postjudgment fact-finding hearing under § 809.107(6)(am) and a constitutional challenge to the application of the failure to assume parental responsibility standard to a parent whose children have been removed from the home under a CHIPS order. As with the other two cases, the court of appeals rejects the challenges.

State v. L.J., 2017AP1225, 2017AP1226, & 2017AP1227, District 1, 5/1/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

L.J. challenges her no-contest plea to there being grounds to terminate her parental rights to three of her seven children. She argues the plea wasn’t knowing and voluntary and that § 48.415(6), the statute regarding failure to assume parental responsibility, is unconstitutional as applied to her. She also argues there was improper testimony at the disposition hearing. The court of appeals rejects each claim.

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2018AP145-FT, 5/1/18, District 3 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication), petition for review granted, 7/10/19, reversed, 2020 WI 41; case activity

This decision makes you wonder whether §51.20(1)(am), Wisconsin’s recommitment statute, is unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to D.J.W.

State v. C.W., 2017AP1228-1230, 5/1/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Among several interesting challenges to the termination of his parental rights, C.W. argues that he was statutorily entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his “no contest” plea was not knowing and intelligent and that SCOW should withdraw language from State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475.

State v. Anthony H. Garbacz, Jr., 2017AP1419, 5/3/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A Prairie du Chien police officer saw Garbacz driving erratically and tried to stop him. Garbacz didn’t stop, instead heading over the bridge to Iowa with the officer in pursuit. Some Iowa squads joined the chase and eventually Garbacz was arrested. He was not, however, taken before a judge in Iowa to determine the legality of the arrest–he was taken back to Wisconsin and charged with OWI. That’s a violation of Iowa’s Uniform Law on Close Pursuit, and Garbacz argues evidence derived from his arrest must thus be suppressed.

McCoy v. Louisiana, USSC No. 16 – 8255, 2018 WL 218-617, 5/14/18, reversing and remanding State v. McCoy, 2018 So.3d 535 (La. 2016); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary).

In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, SCOTUS holds that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the objective of his defense and to insist that his lawyer refrain from admitting that he is guilty of a charged crime when he objects to that admission. It further holds that if a lawyer concedes guilt in this situation, Strickland and the harmless error rule do not apply. The defendant automatically gets a new trial.

It happens. Even worse, some trial courts just say “for the reasons set forth in the State’s response, motion denied.” Turns out Judge Posner hates this practice too. Click here for more on his views.

It happens all the time, and it’s been dubbed an art. This new article,  Extending Miranda: Prohibition on Police Lies Regarding the Incriminating Evidence (54 San Diego Law Review 611 (2017), argues that police lies increase the risk of false confessions and infringe upon the defendant’s right to remain silent, the presumption of innocence, and the prosecution’s obligation to prove its accusations.

Waukesha v. S.L.L., 2017AP1468, 5/2/18, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 8/15/18, affirmed, 2019 WI 66; case activity

No Wisconsin case addresses how a circuit court acquires personal jurisdiction over the subject of a Chapter 51 petition. Neither Chapter 51 nor any case authorizes a circuit court to enter a default commitment against a person whom the County failed to serve with the petition. Nor does any authority authorize doctors who have not “personally examined” the subject of a Chapter 51 petition to opine that she is mentally ill, dangerous, and the proper subject for treatment.  Yet that is what is what happened in this case.  The subject of a Chapter 51 petition could be dead, living at the North Pole, or thriving under the care of a private physician in another county, yet according to the circuit court it can still, without service, issue a default commitment against her and writ of capias to detain her next time she enters the county.