On Point

Recall that SCOTUS recently ordered the Solicitor General to file an amicus brief on the question of whether Loomis’ petition for writ of certiorari should be granted or denied. Here is the SG’s amicus brief. It argues that “the use of actuarial risk assessments raises novel constitutional questions that may merit this Court’s attention in a future case.” Amicus Br. at 12. However, says the SG, Loomis is not a good vehicle for addressing th0se issues because, among other things:

Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, 6/8/2017, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 370 Wis. 2d 262, 881 N.W.2d 359; case activity

In Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., which involved a woman with Alzheimer’s disease, SCOW held that a person is a “proper subject for treatment” under §51.20(1) if she can be “rehabilitated.” It then set forth a test for determining whether a mentally ill person has “rehabilitative potential.” In this case, J.W.J. argued that Helen E.F.’s framework should be modified because it does not account for the characteristics of mental illnesses other than Alzheimer’s, such as the one he has–paranoid schizophrenia.

Taylor County DHHS v. S.A.L., 2016AP2369, 6/7/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

S.A.L. appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. She alleges ineffective assistance of her trial counsel and that the court failed to properly exercise discretion during the dispositional phase. The court of appeals affirms.

State v. Julius Lee Sanders, 2014AP2644, 6/6/2017, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Julius Sanders appeals from his judgment of conviction and the denial, without a hearing, of his postconviction motion.

State v. Bruce C. Brenizer, 2015AP2181, District 3, 6/6/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including select briefs)

The Department of Health Services didn’t have authority to transfer Brenizer to the Department of Corrections because the circuit court’s commitment order unambiguously states that Brenizer is committed to DHS custody for life unless his custody is terminated under § 971.17(5) (1991-92).

Question presented:

Whether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cell phone records revealing the location and movements of a cell phone user over the course of 127 days is permitted by the Fourth Amendment.

Terry Michael Honeycutt v. United States, USSC No. 16-142, 2017 WL 2407468 (June 5, 2017), reversing United States v. Honeycutt, 816 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A federal statute—21 U.S.C. § 853—mandates forfeiture of “any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of” certain drug crimes. This case concerns how § 853 operates when two or more defendants act as part of a conspiracy. Specifically, the issue is whether, under § 853, a defendant may be held jointly and severally liable for property that his co-conspirator derived from the crime but that the defendant himself did not acquire. The Court holds that such liability is inconsistent with the statute’s text and structure. (Slip op. at 1).

The 9th Circuit, en banc, just issued a blockbuster 6-5 decision in United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, Appeal No. 13-50562.  Routine shackling of defendants in the courtroom violates the 5th Amendment. It doesn’t matter whether there is a jury present or not. The trial court must make an individualized finding of dangerousness. Judge Kozinski, author of the majority opinion, wrote:

State v. David Earl Harris, Jr., 2016AP548-CR, 5/31/17, District 1 (unpublished); case activity (including briefs)

The state charged Harris with heinous conduct giving rise to false imprisonment, sexual assault, and strangulation charges. At trial, the DA introduced a copy of a TRO that pre-dated the criminal complaint but mirrored the facts that it alleged. Defense counsel didn’t mind letting the jury see the TRO because she thought it showed that the TRO allegations were false. But she didn’t notice the part of the TRO where the court commissioner found reasonable grounds to believe that Harris had committed all heinous conduct described in the TRO. Uh oh. Guess what happened?

State v. Sara Ann Ponfil, 2016AP2059-CR, 5/31/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A police officer discovered cocaine after he detained Ponfil, who, as the officer approached, got out of one of two vehicles parked next to each other outside a bar. The court of appeals concludes that, considered together, the bar’s status as a “high-crime area,” the behavior of the vehicles’ occupants, and the presence of a known gang member in the other vehicle provided reasonable suspicion to believe she was engaged in illegal conduct.