On Point

So held the 10th Circuit in U.S. v. Ackerman last week.  The case “considers how the Fourth Amendment applies to a child pornography detection system set up by Internet service providers and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).” In a post “for serious 4th Amendment nerds” Orin Kerr pokes holes in the […]

According to a new study, criminal defendants don’t get good representation in SCOTUS.  When a lawyer from the Solicitor General’s office appears in SCOTUS, he has on average argued there 25 times before. Criminal defense lawyers in SCOTUS have on average 5.3 prior arguments. An exception is Stanford Law Professor Jeff Fisher. According to Professor Andrew Crespo, author of the study,  “Professor Fisher is the expert Supreme Court criminal defense bar — if only one person a bar could make.”

Village of Bayside v. Amber E. Schoeller, 2016AP256 & 2016AP257, District 1, 8/9/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court’s factual findings—which Schoeller doesn’t argue are clearly erroneous—doom her claims that the officer didn’t have probable cause to arrest her and that the evidence isn’t sufficient to prove she’s guilty of OWI.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently denied Rule petition 15-04, which sought to amend SCR 20:1.9 governing a lawyer’s duties to her former clients. In this post, SPD Legal Counsel, Devon Lee, explains that the current rule does not prevent the types of communications highlighted by the petitioners.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently amended portions of SCR Chapter 20 that, among other things, govern the use of technology in a law practice. SPD Legal Counsel, Devon Lee, explains what these changes mean for lawyers who use email, cloud computing, and/or social media. Isn’t that everybody?

Joseph J. Jordan v. Randall R. Hepp, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3613, 2016 WL 4119862, 8/3/16

Jordan claims the Wisconsin courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they held that he was not denied the right to represent himself and that his trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper vouching for a police witness’s credibility. The Seventh Circuit okays the state courts’ decision on self-representation but orders a hearing on Jordan’s ineffective assistance claim.

Glenn Patrick Bradford v. Richard Brown, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-3706, 2016 WL 4136957, 8/4/16

In a state postconviction proceeding Bradford presented new evidence from an arson expert named Carpenter supporting Bradford’s claim that he couldn’t have set the fire that was the basis for his murder and arson conviction. After the state courts denied relief Bradford filed a federal habeas petition, asking for an evidentiary hearing on his claims of actual innocence and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In a fact-depending ruling, the Seventh Circuit holds he isn’t entitled to a hearing.

State v. A.L., 2015AP858 through 2015AP861, District 1, 8/5/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

A.L. challenges her admissions that there were grounds to terminate her parental rights to her four children. The court of appeals holds her admissions were knowing and voluntary. The court also holds that calling A.L. as a witness at the trial of the father of one of the children without her lawyer being present doesn’t require reversal of her termination orders.

State v. Rodell Thompson, 2015AP1764-CR, District 4, 8/4/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The trial court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion in deciding to admit other-acts evidence in Thompson’s trial for sexual assault, false imprisonment, and battery, and Thompson’s IAC claims fail for want of prejudice.

State v. Jeffrey Jacob Udelhofen, 2016AP385-CR, 8/4/16, District 4 91-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The defendant was convicted of driving with a PAC (3rd offense). He appealed the denial of his suppression motion and argued that the State: (a) waited too long–until closing arguments at the suppression hearing–to specify which traffic law he allegedly violated; and (b) lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his car. The court of appeals held: