On Point

The last decision is out, and the numbers are in. SCOW has set some new records. Click SCOWstats to learn about the court’s record-breaking 2015-2016 term.

A prosecutor’s exercise of discretion can trigger or avoid collateral consequences for your client. This new law review article analyzes how and why prosecutors make these decisions.

So far, only one Wisconsin case has interpreted and applied our new Castle Doctrine law–State v. Chew, 2014 WI App 116. Attorneys researching the issue may find a new law review article about this history of this type of legislation helpful.

State v. Giancarlo Giacomantonio, 2016 WI App 62; case activity (including briefs)

This is Wisconsin’s first published decision about how parties are to authenticate photographs of text messages so that they are admissible at trial.  The answer is the same way they authenticate other kinds of evidence–via §909.01 and §909.015. Nothing more is required.

State v. C.A.P., 2016AP824, District 1, 7/12/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

While § 48.427(1) gives a parent the right to present evidence and be heard at a dispositional hearing, in this case the trial court properly exercised its discretion in excluding two of C.A.P.’s witnesses and denying her request to recall a witness who testified earlier.

State v. Eric L. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, 6/13/06, on certification from the court of appeals, case activity (including briefs)

The developer of COMPAS says that he didn’t design it to be used in sentencing, and he won’t disclose its “trade secret” algorithm. See Pro Publica interview here. But in a 7-0 decision (with 2 concurrences) SCOW holds that if used properly, observing certain “limitations and cautions,” a circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not violate due process. Slip op. ¶8.

State v. Patrick J. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, 7/13/16, affirming (for all practical purposes) a published court of appeals decision, 2015 WI App 2, 359 Wis. 2d 482, 859 N.W.2d 125; case activity (including briefs)

A very divided supreme court once again declines to overrule State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), and State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, and leaves the current standard and remedy intact—or, as the mandate puts it, “the law remains as the court of appeals has articulated it.” But four separate writings totaling 135 pages make it clear Shiffra in its current form will certainly be subject to challenge again.

State ex re. Aman Singh v. Paul Kemper, 2016 WI 67, 7/13/16, affirming in part and reversing in part a published court of appeals decision, 2014 WI App 43, 353 Wis. 2d 520, 846 N.W.2d 820; case activity (including briefs)

This habeas case involves three discrete ex post facto claims regarding multiple offenses committed and disposed of over a short time span during which there were three versions of Truth-in-Sentencing. A fractured court issues five separate opinions, resulting in holdings that find some ex post facto violations but apparently provide no relief to Singh, the petitioner.

City of Eau Claire v. Melissa M. Booth Britton, 2016 WI 65, 7/12/16, reversing a circuit court order on bypass, case activity (including briefs)

OWI specialists, pay attention to this case! It abolishes subject matter jurisdiction challenges to improperly-charged 1st offense OWIs. Everyone else, pay attention too. Justice Abrahamson’s 33-page dissent offers a comprehensive analysis of how the majority opinion (written by R.G. Bradley) fundamentally misunderstands circuit court competency and subject matter jurisdiction and broadly impacts public policy as well as civil and criminal litigation.

State v. Timothy L. Finley, Jr., 2016 WI 63, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2015 WI App 79, 365 Wis. 2d 275, 872 N.W.2d 344; case activity (including briefs)

Reaffirming the long-standing law governing plea withdrawal that was established in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and limiting the reach of two recent cases that muddied the Bangert procedure, the supreme court holds, 5 to 2, that Finley is entitled to withdraw his plea because the circuit court misadvised Finley of the maximum penalty during the plea colloquy and the state failed to prove Finley knew the actual maximum penalty.