On Point

State v. Markus S. Holcomb, 2016 WI App 70; case activity (including briefs)

“While sentence diagramming may be the bane of fifth graders everywhere, it is the trick of the trade in statutory construction.” Slip op. ¶9. “Punctuation too is important. . . . It can be the difference between ‘Let’s eat, Grandma!’ and ‘Let’s eat Grandma!'” ¶12. So begins today’s lesson on the proper way to read §939.617, which provides minimum sentences for certain child sex offenses.

State v. Adam M. Blackman, 2016 WI App 69; petition for review granted 6/15/16, reversed, 2017 WI 77; case activity (including briefs)

A recent amendment to Wisconsin’s implied consent law authorizes law enforcement to request a blood, breath, or urine sample from a driver involved in an accident that causes death or great bodily harm even if there is no evidence that the driver was impaired by alcohol or a controlled substance. §343.305(3)(ar)2. If the driver refuses, his license is revoked, but he may request a refusal hearing within 10 days. §343.305(9)(a). But as §343.305(9)(a)5, the refusal hearing statute, is currently written the State could not prevail.

State v. Paul L. Linde, 2014AP2445-CR, 8/2/16, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A court commissioner issued a warrant to search Linde’s cabin for evidence of drug manufacturing and for drug paraphernalia. It was based in part on a tip by an anonymous informant, a fact that proved decisive in the court of appeals decision to reverse the circuit court’s denial of Linde’s suppression motion.

State v. Danny F. Anton, 2015AP2336-CR, District 1, 8/2/16; (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This decision openly thumbs its nose at Gallion. Between it and SCOW’s recent decision in State v. Salas Gayton you have to wonder whether Gallion has been overruled sub silentio.

Attorney Michael Cicchini and Professor Lawrence White previously documented here that jurors who were told to “search for the truth” were much more likely to convict a defendant even if they had reasonable doubt about his guilt than those who were properly instructed on reasonable doubt. In other words, truth-related language lowers the State’s burden of […]

State v. Thomas M. Ort, 2015AP1571-72-CR, 8/2/16; District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Ort did not challenge the circuit court’s findings that Officer Vosters observed a silver truck speeding and that speeding would be a reasonable basis to stop the truck. Ort’s objection was that after observing the speeding, Vosters lost sight of the truck briefly and then later simply stopped “the first silver truck he saw.”  The court of appeals disagreed:

You don’t need to click here to learn that the standards police apply when deciding to stop and search black and Hispanic drivers is considerably lower than the standards they apply to white and Asian driver. But you should click there if you want to read more about a new statistical method that several Stanford professors […]

And by “truly unanimous” we mean that no justice bothered to write a separate opinion? The answer, believe it or not, is one: State v. Tourville. In today’s post, SCOWstats digs deep into the 2015-2016 term and highlights more records that SCOW smashed this year. Click here for the details.

Pretrial detention can cause innocent defendants to plead guilty in order to get out of jail. This paper by three University of Pennsylvania Law School professors finds that the practice also increases the likelihood that detainees will commit future crimes, arguably violates a long list of constitutional rights, and costs taxpayers  lots of money. Looking […]

State v. Lauren Ann Erstad, 2015AP2675-CR, 7/28/16, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Convicted of an OWI 2nd, Erstad challenged the search warrant relied upon to collect and test her blood because: (1) the affidavit supporting the warrant contained false information; and (2) the warrant authorized the “collection” of her blood but not the “testing” of it. The court of appeals rejected both arguments.