On Point

Question presented:

Whether, in the bank-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, subsection (1)’s “scheme to defraud a financial institution” requires proof of a specific intent not only to deceive, but also to cheat, a bank, as nine circuits have held, and as petitioner argued here.

Question presented:

What are the jurisdictional prerequisites for appealing a deferred restitution award made during the pendency of a timely appeal of a criminal judgment imposing sentence, a question left open by the Court’s decision in Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010)?

State v. Russell C. Troka, 2016 WI App 35; case activity (including briefs)

Because the record does not reflect an adequate basis for a finding of manifest necessity warranting a mistrial over Troka’s objection, retrying Troka would violate his right against double jeopardy.

State v. Miguel Angel Langarica, 2015AP1546, 4/21/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Langarica’s misunderstanding about whether the conviction would require him to register as a sex offender under Illinois law doesn’t entitle him to withdraw his plea because he didn’t prove the misunderstanding was based on incorrect information from his trial lawyer.

Molina-Martinez v. United States, USSC No. 14-8913, 2016 WL 1574581 (April 20, 2016), reversing and remanding United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 Fed. Appx. 333 (5th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Emphasizing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ “central” role in sentencing because they “serve as the starting point for the district court’s decision and anchor the court’s discretion in selecting an appropriate sentence” (slip op. at 9, 15), the Supreme Court holds that the application of an erroneous Guidelines range will usually be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome for the purposes of plain-error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).

State v. Donald Weso, 2015AP1004-Cr, 4/19/16, District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This unpublished opinion appears to decide an issue of first impression for Wisconsin. Section 973.055(1) requires a court to impose a $100 surcharge if it finds that an adult convicted of domestic abuse committed the act “against an adult with whom [he] resides. ” The novel question is: what does “resides” mean? The answer is only a little more involved than the title to this post suggests.

State v. T.D.M., 2015AP2289, 4/20/16, District 2, (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

T.D.M. was charged with burglary and theft, as party to a crime, and obstructing an officer. The circuit court waived him into to adult court mostly because his “pattern of living” was more like an adult’s than a juvenile’s. That is, he was not reliant upon his mother for large periods of time. His whereabouts were unknown for at least 3 months in 2014. He allegedly had fathered a child. He did not attend school or avail himself of services. And he repeatedly violated curfew and came and went as he pleased. See ¶14.

State v. J.L.M., 2015AP1695, 4/19/16, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The State charged J.L.M. with one count of robbery with use of force, as a party to a crime, due to his alleged involvement with a group of youths who stole M.H.’s bike and struck him several times in the process. J.L.M. lost at trial and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. 

Waukesha County DH&HS v. K.R.G., 2016AP222, 4/20/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals here holds that a mom’s failure to follow court orders and failure to make court appearances were egregious enough to justify a default finding of grounds for terminating her parental rights even though she asserted a “desire” and “determination” to participate in the proceeding.

Welch v. United States, USSC No. 15-6418, 2016 WL 1551144 (April 18, 2016), vacating and remanding an unpublished order of the 11th Circuit; Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Associate Federal Defender Shelley Fite has kindly agreed to provide her take on the high court’s latest:

Federal defenders and procedure wonks naturally appreciate Welch v. United States, in which the (7–1) Supreme Court held that Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.  But (read on!) the case does have some application for state practitioners—at least those who do post-conviction work.