On Point

State v. Kamille M., 2014AP2911, District 1, 6/26/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective at Kamille M.’s TPR grounds trial for failing to object to hearsay and to the state’s veiled reference to the best interests of the child during closing arguments.

State v. Nathan Lewis Teasdale, 2015AP338-CR, District 4, 6/25/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer reasonably suspected that Teasdale was violating § 341.61(2), which prohibits displaying on a registration plates that are not issued for that vehicle, even though the officer was mistaken in believing that the make and model of the car was different from the make and model of the car for which the plates were issued.

Town of Bloomfield v. Petko Zvetkov Barashki, 2015AP226, District 2, 6/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a case the court of appeals aptly describes as “unusual,” the court exercises its discretionary power of reversal under § 752.35 to throw out Barashki’s OWI 1st conviction and refusal finding on the grounds that the evidence doesn’t show the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Barashki.

Caroline P. v. Shawn H., 2014AP2004 & 2014AP2005, District 3, 6/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Even if the circuit court considered the statutory factors for termination of parental rights under § 48.426, the court lacked an evidentiary foundation in the record to make a determination as to whether termination was in the best interests of the child.

City of Los Angeles v. Patel, USSC No. 13-1175, 2015 WL 2473445 (June 22, 2015), affirming 738 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A majority of the Supreme Court holds that a Los Angeles ordinance compelling hotel operators to make their guest registries available to police for inspection on demand is facially unconstitutional because it penalizes the hoteliers for declining to turn over their records without affording them any opportunity to obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply. Along the way, the Court clarifies that “facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not categorically barred or especially disfavored” (slip op. at 4), clarifying language from Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), that some courts have read as barring facial challenges to statutes under the Fourth Amendment.

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, No. 14-6368, 6/22/15, reversing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2014); SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Although the SPD doesn’t appoint counsel to litigate excessive force claims against law enforcement, this case may interest your clients. It stems from a deputy’s tasing of a pre-trial detainee at the Monroe County Jail in Sparta, Wisconsin.  In a 5-4 decision, SCOTUS held for the detainee. To prevail on an excessive force claim under § 42 U.S.C. §1983, the detainee must show only that the force purposefully or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.

The 4th Amendment has been described by Conservative HQ as “one of the most important arrows in the quiver against bullying big government.” Because the government doesn’t just search and seize paper–it also goes after your cell phones, your Facebook account, your email (even when stored on Google’s server), your tweets, your DNA (by definition, […]

Attorney Chis Donovan posted some interesting research on WACDL’s listserv last week.  He was looking into what constitutes a “critical stage” of a criminal prosecution at which the defendant is entitled to counsel.  He cautioned readers to “key cite” the cases before using them. On Point includes Donovan’s list here  and has indexed it so […]

Brumfield v. Cane, USSC No. 13-1433, (June 18, 2015), reversing Brumfield v. Cain, 744 F.3d 918 (5th Cir. 2014); SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary); Majority opinion by Sotomayor; dissenting opinion by Thomas (joined in part by Roberts, Scalia and Alito)

Brumfield was convicted of murder and sentenced to death before Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) prohibited the execution of the intellectually disabled. Afterwards, Brumfield, who has an IQ of 75, sought to prove is intellectual disability in state court, but was denied the time and funding to get an expert as well as an evidentiary hearing. In a 5-4 decision, SCOTUS found this an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented under 28 USC §2254(d)(2) and allowed Brumfield to have his Atkins claim considered on the merits in federal court.

Davis v. Ayala, USSC No. 13-1428 (June 18, 2015), reversing Ayala v. Wong, 756 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 2013); majority opinion by Justice Alito; concurrences by Justices Kennedy and Thomas; dissent by Justice Sotomayor

SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Jury selection for Hector Ayala’s murder trial spanned 3 months and involved more than 200 prospective jurors. So when the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike every single Black and Hispanic juror from the pool, the defense objected based on  Batson v. Kentucky. The trial court gave the prosecution a chance to present race neutral reasons for its strikes, but excluded the defense from the hearing. Ayala, who was convicted, said excluding him and his lawyer violated his constitutional rights. The majority assumed, but did not decide that, a constitutional violation occurred  and then held . . . (all together now) “harmless error!”

The California Supreme Court held that it was error (as a matter of state law)