On Point

State v. Brandon L. P-D., 2014AP2785, District 4, 5/14/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects Brandon’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient to support his delinquency adjudication for incest because of the victim’s inconsistent testimony. The court also rejects his arguments that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for in camera review of the victmi’s medical records and in excluding evidence of a previous sexual assault of the victim.

State v. Juan Francisco Rosas Vivar, 2014AP2199-CR, District 4, 5/14/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vivar wasn’t seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when an officer “called out” to Vivar in as he walked across a parking lot, saying “Juan, can you come talk to me?”

State v. General Grant Wilson, 2015 WI 48, reversing an unpublished court of appeals summary disposition; opinion by Prosser; concurrence by Ziegler; dissent by Abrahamson; case activity (including briefs)

If this portly opinion had been placed on 40-page reducing plan, it would have gained clarity and exposed its inner motive: ensuring that a 22-year old conviction sticks. In Wisconsin, even when the case against a defendant is overwhelming, he still has the right to present evidence that a 3rd party committed the crime of which he is accused per State v. Denny. To do so, he must show that the 3rd party had a motive and an opportunity to commit, and a direct connection to, the crime charged. SCOW here reaffirms Denny but “engineers” a more stringent “opportunity” test for certain cases.

Click here for certification order; circuit court order affirmed, 2016 WI 1; click here for case activity

Issue (composed by the court of appeals):

This appeal raises an important issue of first impression regarding the constitutionality of a mental health treatment statute related to inmates within the Wisconsin state prison system.  The question presented is whether Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar) (2013-14) is facially unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds because it does not require that a court find an inmate dangerous prior to ordering the inmate civilly committed for treatment and authorizing the involuntary medication of the inmate.  A definitive answer to this question from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, along with a clear statement as to the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny to apply in such a case, would be of great value to the bench, the bar, the legislature, and the citizenry.  Thus, we certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.61.

State v. Mastella L. Jackson, 2015 WI App 49, petition for review granted, 10/8/15, affirmed, 2016 WI 56; click here for briefs

This decision is SCOW bait. Police in Outagamie County engaged in what the court of appeals called “reprehensible” actions while interrogating the defendant. “Outraged” the circuit court suppressed the defendant’s statements to police and the physical evidence obtained during the search of her home. The court of appeals reversed the suppression of physical evidence on the theory that the untainted evidence described in the officers’ search warrant established probable cause and that the physical evidence was admissible via the inevitable discovery doctrine.

State v. Dean M. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, 5/5/15, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; opinion by Chief Justice Roggensack; case activity (including briefs)

Though police moved Blatterman beyond the “vicinity” of the traffic stop and therefore exceeded the permissible scope of the stop, the detention of Blatterman was nonetheless reasonable because police had probable cause to arrest him for OWI and, in the alternative, the detention was justified under the community caretaker doctrine.

State v. Andrew L. Jackson, 2015 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)

The standard established under State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), for determining a defendant’s competency to represent himself does not violate Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), the court of appeals holds. The court also affirms the circuit court’s conclusions that Jackson didn’t validly waive his right to counsel and wasn’t competent to represent himself.

County of Sauk v. Thomas D. McDonald, 2014AP1921, District 4, 5/7/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

McDonald was arrested for OWI and taken to the county jail, where his blood was drawn by a paramedic employed by the city’s ambulance service. Contrary to McDonald’s claims, his blood draw was constitutionally reasonable and the paramedic who performed the blood draw was a “person acting under the direction of a physician,” as required by § 343.305(5)(b).

State v. Andrew J. Joda, 2014AP1949 & 2014AP1950, District 2, 5/6/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Given the trial court’s conclusion that Deputy Becker’s testimony was more credible than Joda’s testimony, the court factual findings are not clearly erroneous just because there was a discrepancy between Becker’s testimony and his written report and Becker was unable to remember exactly where he was when he saw Joda make an illegal u-turn.

Langlade County v. Casey Joseph Stegall, 2014AP2369, District 3, 5/5/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Reasonable suspicion does not require the presence of certain facts, or a certain number of facts; rather, “what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common sense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience.” State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 424, 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1997). That “common sense test” was met here.