On Point

State v. Jesse L. Schmucker, 2014AP165-CR, District 2, 4/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of guilt of an attempt to violate § 942.09(2)(am)1., which criminalizes capturing a representation that depicts nudity without the knowledge or consent of the person who is depicted nude in circumstances where that person had a reasonable expectation of privacy, even though the victim was not nude and the offense occurred while the victim was in the check-out line at a grocery store.

State v. James Elvin Lagrone, 2013AP1424-CR, District 1, 4/7/15 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 9/9/15; affirmed 2016 WI 26; case activity (including briefs)

Does a defendant who has raised an NGI defense have the right to testify in the mental responsibility phase of the NGI proceeding? That’s the novel issue in this case. But the court of appeals doesn’t decide the question. Instead, the court ignores relevant binding case law and, relying on a case that doesn’t apply, concludes that if Lagrone had the right to testify, any error in denying it was harmless.

State v. Sherwood A. Lebo, 2014AP730-CR, District 3, 4/7/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lebo failed to make a prima facie showing that his right to counsel was violated in two prior OWI proceedings because he didn’t point to specific facts demonstrating that he did not know or understand information that should have been provided during the waiver of counsel colloquy, as required by State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, ¶¶25-26, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92.

State v. Nathan M. Caffero, 14AP1711-CR, District 3, 4/7/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Despite the trial testimony of Muxlow, Caffero’s girlfriend, that she was the person who caused the fire in their apartment by putting lit incense on top of a toilet paper roll, Caffero’s own admissions to the police gave the jury a basis to infer he subsequently handled the smoldering roll and that he did so negligently. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for violating § 941.10.

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State v. Joel M. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, 3/31/15, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs)

This lengthy decision addresses three discrete issues: Whether Hurley was given sufficient notice of the child sexual assault charges he had to defend against; whether other acts evidence was properly admitted; and whether the prosecutor’s closing argument justified a new trial in the interest of justice.

This post covers the court’s conclusion that under its just-revised “totality of the circumstances” test for deciding whether charges of child sexual assault give a defendant adequate notice of the charges, Hurley was given sufficient notice by a criminal complaint charging him with repeated acts of sexual assault of M.C.N., his stepdaughter, on three or more occasions “on and between” 2000 and 2005. Our post on the other-acts issue is here, and our post on the prosecutor’s closing argument is here.

State v. Joel M. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, 3/31/15, reversing  an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs)

Making full use of the “greater latitude of proof” rule, the recent precedent adopting a more liberal approach to admission of other-acts evidence, e.g., State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399, State v. Payano, 2009 WI 86, 320 Wis. 2d 348, 768 N.W.2d 832, and the deferential standard of review, the court upholds the admission of other-acts evidence that Hurley had repeatedly sexually assaulted his sister, J.G., when she was between the ages of 8 and 10 years old and he was between the ages of 12 and 14 years old.

State v. Joel M. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, 3/31/15, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs)

Disagreeing with the circuit court’s holding that Hurley was entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice, the supreme court holds that the prosecutor did not improperly refer in closing argument to Hurley’s testimony that he could not “recall” allegations regarding sexual assaults that were admitted as other-acts evidence.

Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2014AP1048, 4/1/15, District 2, click here for certification; certification granted 5/12/15, circuit court orders affirmed, 2016 WI 1

Issue

This appeal raises an important issue of first impression regarding the constitutionality of a mental health treatment statute related to inmates within the Wisconsin state prison system. The question presented is whether Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar) (2013-14) is facially unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds because it does not require that a court find an inmate dangerous prior to ordering the inmate civilly committed for treatment and authorizing the involuntary medication of the inmate. A definitive answer to this question from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, along with a clear statement as to the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny to apply in such a case, would be of great value to the bench, the bar, the legislature, and the citizenry. Thus, we certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.61.

Sheboygan County v. Terry L.M., 2014AP2010, 4/1/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for docket

The court of appeals here rejects the County’s contention that it need not prove incompetency at a Chapter 55 commitment continuation hearing, but upholds the order for continued protective placement because Terry waived any errors in the jury instructions and special verdict and because the real controversy was tried.