On Point

State v. Charles W. Adams, 2015 WI App 34; click here for docket and briefs.

§ 942.09(2)(am)1 prohibits recording someone in the nude, without the person’s consent, in circumstances where the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and where the recorder had reason to know that the nude person did not consent to the recording. This case holds that the statute protects a prostitute who is videotaped nude during commercial sexual activity.

Winnebago County v. Brian C., 2014AP2792-FT, District 2, 3/11/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The record supports the trial court’s finding that the County met its burden of proving Brian was incompetent to refuse medication under § 51.61(1)(g)4(intro) and b.

State v. Joshua Berrios, 2014AP971-CR, District 1, 3/10/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A witness named Trevino had been barred pre-trial from identifying Berrios as the person who shot him; but on cross-examination Trevino unexpectedly testified that Berrios was the shooter. This error does not merit a new trial in the interest of justice, nor does it support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

State v. Jason S. VanDyke, 2015 WI App 30; case activity (including briefs)

In this prosecution for reckless homicide by delivery of heroin, VanDyke’s right to confrontation was violated where the medical examiner relied on the toxicology report of an out-of-state drug testing lab to conclude the victim had died of a heroin overdose, the toxicology report was admitted into evidence as part of the autopsy report, but no witness from the lab was called to testify about the toxicology testing.

State v. Derek J. Copeland, 2014AP929-CR, 3/5/15, District 4 (not recommended for publication); click here for docket and briefs

This case explores the line between a between a “simple defense” defined as “I was last at the scene of the crime on a date that preceded the crime” versus an “alibi” defense defined as “I was at a different location and unable to get to the scene of the crime on the date it occurred.”

State v. Eddie Lee Anthony, 2015 WI 20, affirming unpublished COA decision; click here for docket and briefs

Resolving an issue of first impression, SCOW has decided that a defendant may forfeit his constitutional right to testify by stating an intent to bring up irrelevant matters or by engaging in conduct incompatible with the assertion of that right. Also, the erroneous denial of the right to testify is subject to a harmless error analysis–even where the record shows the defendant would testify to both relevant and irrelevant matters.

State v. Bernard Ikechukwel Onyeukwu, 2014AP518-CR, 2/26/15, District 4 (not recommended for publication); click here for briefs.

The State charged the defendant with 10 counts of sexual assault, 5 of which required proof that the victim suffered from a mental deficiency and that the defendant knew it. The jury acquitted on 6 counts. Just 2 of the convictions required proof of mental deficiency. They spawned interesting grounds for appeal, but this decision just wasn’t up to the task.

State v. Eduardo Ivanez, 2013AP1901-CR, 2/26/15,  District 1 (not recommended for publication); click here for briefs

Ivanez appealed his conviction for 1st-degree intentional homicide and hiding a corpse on the grounds that statements he made to the police should have been suppressed and the admission of those statements impelled him to testify that he killed the victim in self-defense, a dubious trial strategy. The court of appeals assumed, without deciding, that the trial court had erred but affirmed under the harmless error doctrine.

Dane County DHS v. Hershula B., 2014AP2076, 2/26/15, District 4  (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for docket

Hershula appealed an order terminating her parental rights. She argued that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the abandonment issue because she presented evidence that she had communicated indirectly with her child. The court of appeals held that the phrase “communicate with the child” requires that the child share in the action of communicating with the parent. Slip op. ¶22. Indirect communications don’t count.

Yates v. United States, USSC No. 13-7451, 2015 WL 773330 (February 25, 2015); reversing 733 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page

In a four-one-four decision that is chock-a-block with nautical references and features some sparring about the canons and methods of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court holds that the “anti-shredding provision” of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, applies only to records, documents, or similar types of “tangible objects” used to record or preserve information. Thus, Yates’s conviction—for destroying fish that were evidence of his alleged violation of federal fishing regulations—must be jettisoned: “A fish is no doubt an object that is tangible; fish can be seen, caught, and handled, and a catch, as this case illustrates, is vulnerable to destruction. But it would cut § 1519 loose from its financial-fraud mooring to hold that it encompasses any and all objects, whatever their size or significance, destroyed with obstructive intent.” (Plurality at 2).