On Point

State v. Gabriel Justin Bogan, 2014AP285-CR, District 1, 10/14/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

In this 1st-degree reckless homicide and 1st-degree reckless endangering safety case, the court of appeals held that the evidence presented at trial did not support a “defense of others” jury instruction. Thus, Bogan’s trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to pursue that theory of defense.

State v. Daniel S. Iverson, 2014AP515-FT, 10/9/14, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 1/16/15; reversed, 2015 WI 101; case activity

Iverson won a motion to suppress and dismissal of his first OWI.  He prevailed again on appeal.  Turns out the state trooper did not stop Iverson on suspicion of OWI.  He initiated the stop because he observed a cigarette butt being tossed from the passenger side of Iverson’s Jeep, which is neither a crime nor a traffic violation.  Thus, traffic stops based on non-traffic forfeiture offenses are illegal.

State v. Fernando Ortiz-Mondragon, 2014 WI App 114, petition for review granted 12/18/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 73; case activity

Ortiz-Mondragon’s trial counsel wasn’t ineffective under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), for failing to advise Ortiz-Mondragon that his convictions were “crimes involving moral turpitude” (CIMT) and would result in mandatory deportation and a permanent bar on reentry. Unlike the conviction in Padilla, CIMT is a “broad classification of crimes” that escapes precise definition, and there’s no clear authority indicating any of the crimes to which Ortiz-Mondragon pled were crimes of moral turpitude. Thus, the deportation consequences of Ortiz-Mondragon’s plea was unclear and uncertain, and his attorney wasn’t deficient in failing to unequivocally inform him that his plea would result in deportation and inadmissibility.

Recently, Foley & Lardner’s appellate blog analyzed data on the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 2013-2014 term and concluded that the court is not divided.  Meanwhile, the Wisconsin Law Journal conducted its own analysis of the same period and ran the headline “Supreme splits deepen.” Well, which is it?  SCOWstats takes a cold, hard look at the […]

State v. Robert A. Harris, 2014AP965-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was reasonable suspicion that Harris was operating his motor vehicle while intoxicated and the length of Harris’s detention was not unreasonable.

Justin P. Brandl, 2014AP1036-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Even though police did not see any traffic violations or erratic driving, the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion and made the stop of Brandl’s motorcycle lawful.

State v. Jeramy J. Qualls, 2014AP141-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Without resolving the burning issue of whether ash from a cigarette violates the Village of Pleasant Prairie’s littering ordinance, the court of appeals holds that a police officer lawfully stopped Qualls’s car because he had reason to believe someone in the car threw a cigarette out the window.

State v. Joel I.-N., 2014 WI App 119; case activity

The unrecorded statement Joel I.N., a juvenile, gave to the police was admissible despite the fact the police failed to record the statement as required by §§ 983.195(2)(b) and 938.31(3)(b) because “exigent public safety circumstances” rendered recording his statement infeasible under § 938.31(3)(c)5. Joel also knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.

Lopez v. Smith, USSC No. 13-946, 10/6/14 (per curiam), reversing Smith v. Lopez, 731 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2013); docket

When a state prisoner seeks federal habeas relief on the ground that a state court, in adjudicating a claim on the merits, misapplied federal law, a federal court may grant relief only if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We have emphasized, time and again, that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), … prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is “clearly established.” …. Because the Ninth Circuit failed to comply with this rule, we reverse its decision granting habeas relief to respondent Marvin Smith. (Slip op. at 1).

State v. Leopoldo R. Salas Gayton, 2013AP646-CR, District 1, 10/7/14 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 11/4/15, affirmed, 2016 WI 58; case activity

The sentencing court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion by relying in part on Gayton’s immigration status or by failing to explain its reasons for imposing the maximum term of initial confinement and the DNA surcharge.