On Point

State v. Anthony E. Henderson, 2013AP2515, District 1, 10/7/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

If the trial court erred in excluding a witness’s attorney from testifying to information that would have impeached the witness, that error was harmless.

State v. Adam J. Gajeski, 2014AP612-CR, District 3, 10/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict on a theft charge because the jury could have reasonably inferred Gajeski intended to permanently deprive the owner of the property at the time he took the property.

State v. Albert Lorenzo Finch, Sr., 2014AP744-CR, District 1, 10/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Dodging an issue that has not been addressed in Wisconsin, the court of appeals assumes that even if the admission of the recording of a 911 call violated Finch’s right to confrontation the error was harmless because there was ample other evidence supporting the verdict.

Questions presented:

1. Does an individual’s obligation to report suspected child abuse make that individual an agent of law enforcement for purposes of the Confrontation Clause?

2. Do a child’s out-of-court statements to a teacher in response to the teacher’s concerns about potential child abuse qualify as “testimonial” statements subject to the Confrontation Clause?

Question presented:

This Court has held that, during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, asking a driver to exit a vehicle, conducting a drug sniff with a trained canine, or asking a few off-topic questions are de minimis intrusions on personal liberty that do not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case poses the question of whether the same rule applies after the conclusion of the traffic stop, so that an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.

State v. Micah J. Snyder, 2013AP299-CR, 10/2/14, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Based on County of Grant v. Vogt, decided just 2 months ago, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s decision to grant Snyder’s suppression motion in this OWI case. The court of appeals held that Snyder was not “seized” when a trooper parked his squad car face-to-face with Snyder’s car, approached Snyder on foot while carrying a flashlight, and then questioned him through a car window.

Portage County DHHS v. Shannon M., 2014AP1259-1260, 10/2/14, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A jury found grounds–abandonment and continuing CHIPS–to terminate Shannon’s parental rights to her  children.  But the circuit court became worried that the jury might have viewed Shannon’s conduct very differently if it had known that the court had improperly entered a dispositional order against her, so it granted Shannon JNOV and dismissed the petitions to terminate her rights.  The Department appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.

State v. Jody A. Bolstad, 2014AP915-CR, 10/2/14, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Bolstad shot a deer decoy from the window of his friend’s pick-up truck while a DNR warden was watching.  Afterwards, while sitting in a DNR car, he confessed to the warden and signed a written statement. The State charged Bolstad with various game regulation violations, and he moved to suppress his statements because the warden failed to inform him of his Miranda rights. The court of appeals held that Bolstad was not “in custody,” so Miranda did not apply.

State v. Charles L. Chew, 2014 WI App 116; case activity

In its first decision addressing Wisconsin’s recently adopted “castle doctrine,” § 939.48(1m), the court of appeals holds Chew wasn’t entitled to a self-defense jury instruction under the statute because the men Chew shot at were not “in” his “dwelling.”

State v. Jeremiah R. Popp & Christopher A. Thomas, 2014 WI App 100; case activity: Popp; Thomas

The search warrant for the home shared by Popp and Thomas was invalid because the primary basis for the warrant was derived from observations made by police when they trespassed on the defendants’ property and peered into their windows.