On Point

State v. Thomas W. Koeppen, 2014 WI App 94; case activity

A “motor bicycle” is a bicycle with a motor added, and can be either pedaled or self-propelled using the motor, § 340.01(30). Whether a person can be charged under the OWI/PAC statute based on his operation of a motor bicycle depends on whether a motor bicycle is a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). The court of appeals concludes that a plain-language reading of the relevant statutes shows a motor bicycle is a motor vehicle, “at least when the motor bicycle being operated is self-propelled, rather than pedaled.” (¶1).

State v. Victor J. Godard, 2014AP396-CR, District 4, 8/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The arresting officer provided Godard with accurate information about the implied consent law and thus did not cause Godard to refuse to submit to the implied consent blood test or deny him his right to a second test.

State v. Britton D. McKenzie, 2014AP314-CR, District 4, 8/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Consecutive jail sentences totaling 24 months were not unduly harsh and excessive.

State v. Todd J. Giese, 2014 WI App 92; case activity

Expert testimony regarding retrograde extrapolation of Giese’s blood alcohol concentration is admissible under new version of § 907.02(1) despite the fact some experts doubt its reliability because it was the product of reliable principles and methods and based upon sufficient facts and data.

Ozaukee County v. Mark T.J., 2014AP479, District 2, 8/27/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The failure to hold an initial hearing within 72 hours of Mark’s arrival at the hospital where he was detained deprived the circuit court of competency to order an initial commitment order under ch. 51. But his appeal from that initial commitment order is moot because he stipulated to recommitment and vacating the initial commitment would have no practical effect.

State v. Jeanmarie Carini, 2014AP526-CR, District 2, 8/27/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was reasonable cause to believe Carini was driving while impaired and therefore police properly asked her to submit to a preliminary breath test.

State v. Price G. Turner, III, 2014 WI App 93; case activity

A minor does not as a matter of law lack the capacity to consent to police interception of the minor’s conversations with another person and therefore vicarious consent by a parent is not required.

State v. Robert Kentrell Gant, 2013AP1842-CR, District 1, 8/26/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Trial counsel’s failure to ask a witness at Gant’s second trial about her inconsistent testimony from Gant’s first trial wasn’t ineffective because the omission didn’t prejudice Gant. Further, the witness’s recantation of the testimony she gave at the second trial doesn’t satisfy the newly-discovered evidence test.

State v. Johnnie J., 2014AP144 & 2014AP145, District 1, 8/21/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP144; 2014AP145

Assuming trial counsel should have objected to certain expert opinion evidence and hearsay evidence about Johnnie’s behavior, the failure to do so didn’t prejudice Johnnie because of the overwhelming evidence supporting the jury’s verdicts on one of the two grounds for terminating her parental rights.

Thomas Socha v. Gary Broughton, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 12-1598, 8/14/14

In Socha’s previous appeal of the dismissal of his federal habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit held the district court was not compelled to dismiss the petition just because it was filed after the one-year AEDPA deadline because there were a couple possible theories—specifically, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel—for finding the petition was timely filed. Socha v.