On Point

State v. Kim B. Simmelink, 2014 WI App 102; case activity

The court of appeals holds that § 939.74(2)(b)’s extended statute of limitation for certain theft charges runs from actual discovery of the theft, and not from when the theft should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence.

State v. Chase A.T., 2014AP260, District 4, 9/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A student’s tip to an assistant principal that a bathroom “smelled like marijuana smoke” and that a student named Chase walked out of the bathroom immediately before the tipster smelled the smoke provided reasonable grounds for the assistant principal to search Chase. In addition, the search of Chase was not excessive in scope. Thus, his motion to suppress was properly denied.

State v. Deborah K. Salzwedel, 2014AP301-CR, District 4, 9/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s finding that Salzwedel’s act of turning without signaling affected the movement of other traffic was not clearly erroneous, and therefore the officer had a reasonable basis to stop Salzwedel for violating § 346.34(1)(b).

State v. James E. Grant, 2013AP1829-CR & 2013AP1830-CR, District 4, 9/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1829-CR; 2013AP1830-CR

Two of the three arguments made in Grant’s appellate brief were sufficiently stated to survive the state’s motion to strike, but they are ultimately too undeveloped to address under State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). Moreover, Grant failed to arrange for the production of the transcript of the circuit court’s oral ruling on his postconviction motion, meaning the transcript is assumed to support the circuit court’s decision, State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, ¶5 n.1, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 637 N.W.2d 774.

State v. Deshun Latrell Bannister, 2013AP2679-CR, District 1, 9/3/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

A claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely alibi notice founders on the lack of prejudice, as there’s nothing in the record showing what the alibi witness would have said had she been allowed to testify.

State v. Eugene P., 2014AP361, 2014AP362 & 2014AP363, District 1, 9/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP361; 2014AP362; 2014AP363

Allowing a doctor to testify at a CHIPS trial that the children’s injuries were the result of abuse was harmless because there was overwhelming evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

Milwaukee County v. Rebecca G., 2014AP359, District 1, 9/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rebecca’s appeal of her ch. 51 commitment is dismissed as moot because the six-month commitment order expired while the appeal was pending and the County didn’t seek an extension.

You don’t have to guess.  Answers to these and other intriguing statistical questions about the Supreme Court of Wisconsin may be found in the latest edition of SCOWstats. For the 15-year period covering 1998-2013, SCOW  reversed 77% of pro-defendant lower court rulings and just 24% of pro-State rulings.  Of course, the composition of the court changes over time, so it’s […]

State v. Thomas W. Koeppen, 2014 WI App 94; case activity

A “motor bicycle” is a bicycle with a motor added, and can be either pedaled or self-propelled using the motor, § 340.01(30). Whether a person can be charged under the OWI/PAC statute based on his operation of a motor bicycle depends on whether a motor bicycle is a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). The court of appeals concludes that a plain-language reading of the relevant statutes shows a motor bicycle is a motor vehicle, “at least when the motor bicycle being operated is self-propelled, rather than pedaled.” (¶1).

State v. Victor J. Godard, 2014AP396-CR, District 4, 8/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The arresting officer provided Godard with accurate information about the implied consent law and thus did not cause Godard to refuse to submit to the implied consent blood test or deny him his right to a second test.