On Point

Steven T. Kilian v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2011 WI 65; case activity

Statutory Construction – Legislative Acquiesence

¶30 n. 12:

“Legislative failure to act is ordinarily weak evidence of legislative intention to acquiesce in or countenance a judicial or executive branch interpretation. . . . Under proper circumstances, however, inaction by the legislature may be evidence of legislative intent.”  Schill v.

order denying motion for reconsideration of in: State v. Dimitri Henley, 2011 WI 67; for Henley: Keith A. Findley; case activity; additional history: 2010 WI 12 (memorandum decision, Roggensack, J.); court order (5/24/10)

Henley’s motion to reconsider, though directed formally to the decision reversing grant of new trial, as a practical matter is directed to reconsideration of Justice Roggensack’s prior refusal to disqualify herself (on the ground she had previously “handled”

State v. Esteban M. Gonzalez, 2011 WI 63, reversing, 2010 WI App 104; for Gonzalez: Frank J. Schiro, Kristin Anne Hodorowski; case activity

Gonzalez has shown a reasonable likelihood that the jury instructions relived the State of its burden to prove the element that he knowingly exhibited harmful material to a child.

The facts are essentially undisputed: Gonzalez watched pornography while care-taking his 3-year-old daughter,

State v. David D. Funk, 2011 WI 62, reversing unpublished summary disposition; for Funk: Michele Anne Tjader; case activity

Juror Bias – Assessment, Generally

A claim of juror bias relies requires proof of the two-step test articulated by State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 726, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985): “(1) that the juror incorrectly or incompletely responded to a material question on voir dire;

County of Jefferson v. Karla J. Raue, 2010AP3131, District 4, 7/7/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Raue: Walter Arthur Piel, Jr.; case activity

Act of bar patron (turning off car and taking key from Raue) was private, non-governmental action, therefore didn’t implicate Raue’s 4th amendment rights. State v. Butler, 2009 WI App 52, 317 Wis. 2d 515, 768 N.W.2d 46 (acts of private security guard not subject to 4th amendment scrutiny),

State v. Randy L. TeStroette, 2011AP290-CR, District 2, 7/6/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for TeStroete: Kirk B. Obear, Casey J. Hoff; case activity

Report from named (therefore non-anonymous) citizen of “possible intoxicated driver,” describing the vehicle’s location, plate number and color,  supplied reasonable suspicion to stop TeStroete’s car, even though the officer himself observed neither erratic driving nor traffic violations.

¶11      TeStroete relies on State v.

Mayor La Guardia on legal writing.

Dominique Srauss-Kahn prosecution: Reminiscent of Tawana Brawley? Or of Michael Nifong? Or is it just possible that there there is no thematic connection to be made, simply because DSK got “what most defendants never get — early  Brady material”?

Michael Cicchini: Bad as the job picture for newly minted lawyers might be nationally,

On Point is very pleased to present this Guest Post discussion of Bullcoming v. New Mexico by Daniel D. Blinka, Professor of Law, Marquette University of Virginia. (Cross-posted at Marquette.)  Professor Brandon L. Garrett, Virginia, also has a Guest Post on Bullcoming. Feel free to submit comments in the box at the end of the Post.

Note that issues discussed in these posts will be further refined by the recent grant of certiorari in Williams v.

On Point is very pleased to present this Guest Post discussion of Bullcoming v. New Mexico by Brandon L. Garrett, Professor of Law, University of Virginia. (Cross-posted at ACS. On Point has made a minor editing change in the first sentence, to add the date of decision.) Professor Garret has previously guest-posted on DNA and habeas procedure.  Professor Daniel D. Blinka, Marquette,

State v. Charles M. Ermers, Jr., 2011 WI App 113 (recommended for publication); for Ermers: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

A ch. 980 discharge hearing requires that the petitioner allege “facts from which the court or jury may conclude the person’s condition has changed since the date of his or her initial commitment order so that the person does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person,”