On Point

State v. Robert L. Brinson, 2010AP001819-CR, District 1, 5/10/11

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Brinson: Paul Bugenhagen, Jr.; case activity

Cautionary instruction cured any potential prejudice from revelation of prior record.

¶16      We disagree.  The trial court instructed the jury several times that it could not consider Brinson’s possible status as a probationer or parolee, or the fact that he spent time in jail,

State v. Calvin Jerome Pirtle, 2011 WI App 89(recommended for publication); for Pirtle: Christopher J. Cherella; case activity

Consent to Search – Georgia v. Randolph

Pirtle’s failure to object to the police presence allowed them to act on the co-tenant’s consent to a warrantless search under Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006):

¶15      In Randolph,

State v. Shantell T. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, affirming unpublished decision; for Harbor: Joseph E. Redding; case activity

Sentence Modification – New Factor

The “new factor” test for sentence modification has split into “two divergent lines of cases”: Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975) (fact(s) highly relevant to, but not brought out at, 

State v. Robert Lyle Lawver, Jr., 2010AP382-CR, District 4, 5/5/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Lawver: Cole Daniel Ruby; case activity

Conviction for disorderly conduct upheld on following facts:

¶9        The pertinent facts include the following.  Lawver was walking at night down an unlit highway, traveling with traffic, so that he would not have been in a position to see motorists approaching from behind him. 

State v. Brian M. Joski, 2010AP2223-CR, District 3, 5/3/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Joski: Thomas J. Coaty; case activity

A prior conviction used to enhance a new sentence may be collaterally attacked on the basis of violation of right to counsel, in other words, that the defendant didn’t validly waive counsel within the requirements set by State v. Klessig,

State v. Marvin L. Beauchamp, 2011 WI 27, affirming 2010 WI App 42; for Beauchamp: Craig S. Powell; case activity

Confrontation – Dying Declaration, § 908.045(3)

¶34  We therefore, like every state court that has considered the dying declaration exception since Crawford, take a position consistent with the language of Crawford and Giles and decline to hold that the constitutional right to confront witnesses is violated by the admission of statements under the dying declaration hearsay exception. 

State v. Randy L. Martin, 2010AP505-CR, District 1, 5/3/11

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication), reversed, 2012 WI 96; for Martin: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Although Martin was in custody and had not received Miranda warnings, his statement wasn’t the result of “interrogation” and therefore wasn’t suppressible. When it appeared that Martin’s uncle was going to be arrested for possessing a gun found in their car,

State v. Eliseo Peralta, 2011 WI App 81(recommended for publication); for Peralta: Martin J. Pruhs; case activity

Conspiracy, § 939.31 – “Overt Act”

The “overt act” element of conspiracy, though it must go “beyond mere planning and agreement,” may be “virtually any act,” even if “insignificant,” ¶¶19-21. Thus, Peralta’s “communication to an undercover police detective that a large quantity of cocaine was ready for immediate delivery”

in-chambers opinion on motion to stay mandate

Habeas – Stay of Mandate

The State’s request to stay the mandate in the court’s grant of relief is denied by Judge Ripple’s in chambers opinion. The standard for granting a stay is set forth in Books v. City of Elkhart, 239 F.3d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 2001):

When a party asks this court to stay its mandate pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari,

Bobby v. Harry Mitts, USSC No. 10-1000, 5/2/11 (per curiam)

The death penalty may not be imposed when the jury isn’t permitted to consider a verdict of guilt on a lesser included, non-capital offense supported by the evidence, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). As the Court now notes:

such a scheme intolerably enhances the irrelevant considerations into the factfinding process, diverting the jury’s attention from the central issue of whether the State has satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a capital crime.” Id.,