On Point

State v. Brad E. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, reversing 2010 WI App  11; for Forbush: Craig A. Mastantuono, Rebecca M. Coffee; amicus: Colleen D. Ball, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Forbush’s 6th amendment right to counsel had already attached – because a criminal complaint had been filed – and he had retained counsel before officers began interrogating him on that charge in the absence of his attorney.

State v. Alan Keith Burns, 2011 WI 22, affirming unpublished decision; for Burns: David R. Karpe; case activity

The court rejects Burns’s claim for a new trial in the interest of justice premised on three grounds: 1. Burns was unable to cross-examine the complainant on her implication that he took her virginity; 2. evidence of prior sexual assaults of the complainant by his father,

7th circuit decision

Habeas – Appeal: Appointed Counsel’s Obligation to Argue Issues

The court clarifies the “scope” of counsel’s responsibilities when appointed on habeas appeal. Counsel has no obligation to argue claims not certified for appeal by the court. Therefore, if after independent review, “counsel agrees that the non-certified claims are not debatable, he or she can safely set aside the non-certified claims notwithstanding the petitioner-appellant’s desire to pursue those claims on appeal.”

State v. Andrew R. Reierson, 2010AP596-CR, District 4, 4/28/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Reierson: John Smerlinski; case activity

The officer’s erroneous reading of Reierson’s license plate, causing the officer to wrongly believe that his registration had expired, nonetheless supported stop of the car under the good-faith rule.

¶11      We conclude the circuit court properly denied the motion to suppress because the officer had probable cause to stop Reierson for operating with an expired registration,

Dane County v. Kelly M., 2011 WI App 69 (recommended for publication); for Kelly M.: Ruth N. Westmont, Ashley J. Richter; case activity

Kelly M. appeals a commitment order premised on the “fifth standard,” inability by reason of mental illness to understand the advantages and disadvantages of medication or treatment for the mental illness.

¶3        We conclude as follows:  (1) Commitment is available under the fifth standard for individuals who have dual diagnoses—that is,

State v. Michael D. Below, 2011 WI App 64 (recommended for publication); for Below: Joseph L. Sommers; case activity

Below indisputably caused massive injuries that resulted in the victim’s death, albeit after medical staff terminated life support. His reckless acts were therefore a “substantial factor” in, hence caused, her death. He was not entitled to a theory of defense instruction authorizing the jury to acquit him on the basis that the termination of life support was an intervening cause of death.

State v. Darron D. Jackson, 2011 WI App 63 (recommended for publication); for Jackson: Rebecca Lawnicki; case activity

Waiver – Lesser Offense Instruction

The jury convicted Jackson of recklessly endangering safety while armed, which was submitted as a lesser offense of the charged offense, attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Although Jackson did object to the endangering instruction on the ground that it wasn’t supported by the facts,

State v. Herbert O. Richard, 2011 WI App 66 (recommended for publication); for Richard: Steven D. Grunder, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Changes in the scoring of the actuarial test which was used to support Richard’s commitment at his original trial, cannot support his discharge petition even though his new score would reduce his predicted likelihood of reoffending.

¶13      Richard argues that the circuit court improperly dismissed his petition for discharge and that he is entitled to a discharge hearing. 

Village of Menomonee Falls v. Jason R. Ferguson, 2011 WI App 73 (recommended for publication); for Ferguson: Daniel P. Fay; case activity

Ferguson’s guilt for violating local sex offender residence-restriction ordinance upheld, as against argument that he fell within grandfather clause exception. The ordinance bars registered sex offenders from living within 1500 feet of any facility for children, but excepts an offender who had established and reported a residence prior to the ordinance’s effective date.

Fond du Lac County v. Helen E. F., 2011 WI App 72(recommended for publication), affirmed 2012 WI 50; for Helen E.F.: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Alzheimer’s disease is not a qualifying mental condition for purposes of ch. 51 commitment, therefore Helen E.F. is not a proper subject for treatment as a matter of law. The disease is a degenerative brain disorder,