On Point

Richardson v. Henderson, 2010AP1765, District 2, 3/9/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity

¶7, n.4:

Our supreme court has held that “when the supreme court overrules a court of appeals decision, the court of appeals decision no longer possesses any precedential value, unless this court expressly states otherwise.”  Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co.

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity

Briefing – Argumentation

¶10      We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[3]  We are also disturbed by the tendentious tone of both parties’ briefs and remind counsel that respect for the courts and counsel requires civility.  See Wis. SCR 62.02; Aspen Services,

State v. Lawrence Williams, 2010AP1028, District 1, 3/8/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); pro se; case activity; prior history: 220 Wis.2d 458, 583 N.W.2d 845 (Ct.App. 1998)

Williams fails to provide a “sufficient reason” to overcome the serial litigation bar on his § 974.06 motion following direct appeal. He posits ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective in various respects.

State v. Kerry J. Collins, 2010AP788-CR, District 1, 3/8/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Collins: Gary Grass; case activity

Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction under § 941.10, court rejecting Collins’ argument that State failed to prove he was the person who set off flare in City Hall bathroom. Whatever weaknesses and discrepancies existed as to culpability merely raised questions for the jury to resolve;

Henry W. Skinner v. Switzer, USSC No. 09-9000, 3/7/11

A convicted state prisoner may utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to seek DNA testing of crime-scene evidence.

When may a state prisoner, complaining of unconstitutional state action, pursue a civil rights claim under §1983, and when is habeas corpus the prisoner’s sole remedy? …

We summarized the relevant case law most recently in Wilkinson v.

Wall v. Kahlil Kholi, USSC No. 09-868, 3/7/11

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim” tolls the 1-year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition. 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2). The question in this case is whether a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law tolls the limitation period,

State v. Anthony M. Smith, 2009AP2867-CR, District 1/4, 3/3/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Smith: Rodney Cubbie, Syovata K. Edari; case activity

Trial court’s limitations on cross-examination with respect to State witness’s “prior mental condition” or use of medications (prescribed for his Bipolar Disorder and Attention Deficit Disorder) upheld as proper exercise of discretion. The witness was taking his medication at the time of the alleged offense,

State v. Jeremy D. Pinnow, Milwaukee Co. Circ. Ct. No. 2010CM1978, 2/11/11

circuit court decision; case activity

Carrying concealed weapon charge dismissed, under as-applied (state) constitutional challenge, Art. I § 25. Pinnow had a cased, unloaded gun underneath the seat of his car, had himself been the recent victim of an armed robbery, believed with reason he was transporting the gun in a lawful manner, and wasn’t carrying the gun for an unlawful purpose.

Pepper v. U.S., USSC No. 09-6822, 3/2/11

In light of the federal sentencing framework described above, we think it clear that when a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal and his case remanded for resentencing, a district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s rehabilitation since his prior sentencing and that such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range.

The thrust of the opinion is statutory,

State v. Kelly J. McCredie, 2010AP1179-CR, District 2, 3/2/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for McCredie: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

For purposes of 3rd-degree sexual assault, § 940.225(3), the actor cannot obtain consent by deceiving the victim as to his true identity. McCredie misled the victim into thinking he was his brother (she was sleeping in a dark room when he suddenly appeared;