On Point

State v. David D. Ramage, 2010 WI App 77; for Ramage: Jevin J. Mulrooney; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Co-tenant’s permissive use of Ramage’s computers conferred on her authority to consent to warrantless police removal of computer and search of their contents. Contrary authority, People v. Blair, 748 N.E.2d 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); State v. Lacey,

U.S. v. Comstock, USSC No. 08-1224, 5/17/10

The federal scheme for detaining the equivalent of ch. 980 sexually violent persons beyond release date from federal prison, 18 U.S.C. § 1848, is a valid exercise of Congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper clause. In reaching this conclusion, the Court “assume(s), but we do not decide, that other provisions of the Constitution—such as the Due Process Clause—do not prohibit civil commitment in these circumstances.”

Graham v. Florida, USSC No. 08-7412, 5/17/10

In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. This determination; the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders; and the severity of life without parole sentences all lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration is cruel and unusual. This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.

Question Presented:

Whether a state court sentence-reduction motion consisting of a plea for leniency constitutes an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), thus tolling the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year limitations period for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition.

• Opinion below (1st Circuit)
• Petition for certiorari
• Brief in opposition
• Petitioner’s reply

Principal impetus for review seems to be (per usual) a split of authority,

7th circuit decision

Permissive Driver, Standing to Challenge Car Search

It is well-established that a driver of a borrowed vehicle may establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle even though that driver is not the owner of the vehicle. … Courts have repeatedly recognized the right of a driver to assert a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches of a vehicle where the driver is operating that vehicle with the permission of the owner.

supreme court decision; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Court of Appeals Authority to Declare Dicta

¶57     By concluding that a statement in a supreme court opinion is dictum, the court of appeals necessarily withdraws or modifies language from that opinion, contrary to our directive in Cook. …

¶58     If the court of appeals could dismiss a statement in a prior case from this court as dictum,

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Sterling: Dianne M. Erickson; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Charging Decision – Judicial Involvement
Increase in the charge, following trial judge’s veiled suggestion to the prosecutor that such an increase would be appropriate, wasn’t occasioned by judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion, ¶¶16-22.

Initially charged with first-degree reckless injury, Sterling was ultimately convicted on an amended charge of attempted first-degree intentional homicide.

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Henry: Martin E. Kohler, Craig S. Powell; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Counsel – Request for Substitute
Trial court denial of request for new counsel is a discretionary determination, reviewed deferentially under the factors set forth in State v. Lomax, 146 Wis. 2d 356, 432 N.W.2d 89 (1988), ¶¶17-18.

State v. Chester C., 2009AP2824, District I, 5/4/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Chester C.: Dianne M. Erickson

TPR – Effective Assistance of Counsel
Failure to demonstrate prejudice within the meaning of Strickland dooms this ineffective-assistance claim that trial counsel failed to object to various hearsay statements:

¶7     Other than complaining that his trial lawyer did not object to the hearsay we have recounted,

7th circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas Review – Exculpatory Evidence
Statements of three eyewitnesses, not disclosed to the defendant, that would have implicated the state’s principal eyewitness and otherwise impeached his credibility and that of 2 other state’s witnesses was “material.” It is reasonably probable that disclosure would have netted a different result, and the state court’s contrary conclusion unreasonably applied clearly established law.

The court stresses,