On Point

City of Ontario v. Quon, USSC No. 08-1392, 6/17/10

Assuming without deciding that police officer Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages of his department-issued pager, the Court concludes that the warrantless review of Quon’s pager transcript was reasonable because it was motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose and was not excessive in scope.

The 4th amendment came into play because Quon’s employer was a government agency,

City of Ripon v. Jonathan Lebese, No. 2009AP2996-FT, District II, 6/16/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Lebese: Wendy A. Patrickus; BiC; Resp.

¶13     The circuit court’s “preliminary ruling” was based on the well-established standards of reasonable suspicion. Lebese’s counsel had proffered that the additional defense witness would corroborate Lebese’s account that he swerved in an evasive maneuver to avoid colliding with the car to his right.

court of appeals decision; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Confidentiality – § 51.30(4) – Emergency Detention Statement

Release by a police department of a statement of emergency detention, occasioned by a deputy sheriff’s threat to kill superior officers, violated the § 51.30(4) prohibition on release of “treatment records”; and was not justified by the public policy exception that imposes on psychiatrists the duty to warn potential targets of threats made by patients.

Shawano Co. v. William P. Pari, No. 2009AP2338-FT, District III, 6/15/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Pari: John S. Bartholomew; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶10    We agree that Pari’s minimal deviations within the traffic lane do not alone give rise to reasonable suspicion that he was operating while intoxicated. See id., ¶¶18-21. Nor do we place great emphasis on that fact here when considering the totality of the circumstances.

State v. Armando J. Castanada, No. 2009AP1438-CR, District I, 6/15/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Castanada: Jeremy C. Perri; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Appellate Review – Implicit Findings

¶30     The postconviction circuit court did not make any express findings as to the credibility of any of the witnesses’ testimony. However, as the State observes, when the circuit court does not make express findings,

State v. Daniel Arends, 2010 WI 46, affirming as modified, 2008 WI App 184; for Arends: Leonard D. Kachinsky

Procedure clarified for handling discharge petitions under recently amended § 908.09 :

¶3   We conclude that § 980.09 requires the circuit court to follow a two-step process in determining whether to hold a discharge hearing.

¶4   Under § 980.09(1),

Issues: (1) Whether it is appropriate under § 2254 for a federal court to conclude that a state court’s rejection of a claim was unreasonable in light of facts that an applicant could have but never alleged in state court; and (2) what standard of review is applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Docket: 09-1088

• Opinion below (9th Circuit)
• Petition for certiorari
• Brief in opposition
• Petitioner’s reply

(Links,

7th circuit court of appeals decision

Judges – Elections – Partisan Affiliation, Endorsements

The judicial candidate partisan affiliation ban, SCR 60.06(2)(b)1, violates the first amendment.

The crux of the state’s concern here seems to be that a judge who publicly affiliates with a political party has indicated that he is more inclined toward that party’s stance on the variety of legal issues on which that party has a position.

Dolan v. United States, USSC No. 09-367, 6/14/10

This case concerns the remedy for missing a statutory deadline. The statute in question focuses upon mandatory restitution for victims of crimes. It provides that “the court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim’s losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.” 18 U. S. C. §3664(d)(5). We hold that a sentencing court that misses the 90-day deadline nonetheless retains the power to order restitution—at least where,

Holland v. Florida, USSC No. 09-5327, 6/14/10

Habeas – Filing Deadline – Equitable Tolling, Generally

The 1-year limitations period for filing an 18 U.S.C. §2254 habeas petition is subject to “equitable tolling”:

We have not decided whether AEDPA’s statutory limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons. … Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have considered the question, we hold that §2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.