On Point

7th circuit court of appeals decision

Issues as Defined by Certificate of Appealability

Holmes’s failure to brief on appeal the merits of his constitutional claims did not waive them, because the order granting certificate of appealability “invited the parties only to brief the [threshold] procedural issue” of whether the claims had been defaulted in state court.

Even were the government correct that the certificate of appealability is defective for failure to require the parties to brief the constitutional issues,

Bradley K. Darwin, No. 2009AP2608-FT, District IV, 6/10/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Darwin: Bill Ginsberg; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶5     Darwin argues that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for OWI. The municipal court made the following findings of fact with respect to probable cause: Darwin signaled a turn, but failed to complete it; he denied drinking;

State v. Melody P.M., No. 2009AP2994, District IV, 6/10/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication)

Civil conviction for an ordinance violation may be expunged under § 973.015.

Can’t provide any of the background beyond what’s recited in the opinion, because all traces have been removed from both circuit court and appellate dockets. Makes sense: if you’re going to order expungement then the order ought to have practical meaning.

Barber v. Thomas, USSC No. 09-5201, 6/7/10

Credit for good behavior for a federal prisoner is awarded after, rather than before, the fact under 18 U. S. C. §3624(b)(1).

Of course, computation of federal sentence credit will ordinarily be a matter of indifference to the state practitioner, but the Court’s discussion of the rule of lenity may hold interest:

Fourth, petitioners ask us to invoke the rule of lenity and construe §3624 (2006 ed.) in their favor,

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Oetzman: Kirk B. Obear; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Traffic Stop – U-Turn

¶8     As such, three rules of the road come into play.Under Wis. Stat. § 346.34(1), no person may turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in Wis.

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); pro se; Resp. Br.

Assistance of Counsel – Plea-Withdrawal

Counsel’s failure to file pre-sentencing motion to withdraw plea wasn’t due to failure to investigate claimed newly discovered evidence, hence wasn’t ineffective: according to trial court findings of fact, counsel indeed considered the value of this evidence and moreover allowed Townsend himself to decide whether to file the motion,

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Manske: Jennifer R. Drow; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Traffic Stop – Reasonable Suspicion

¶16     Manske submits that because his driving was in some respects not consistent with an impaired driver, Galipo did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. However, the test for reasonable suspicion is not whether all of the driver’s actions constituted erratic driving.

court of appeals decision, affirmed 2011 WI 6; for Brenda: Leonard D. Kachinsky

TPR – Plea to Grounds

In taking a plea to TPR grounds, the court need not inform the parent of “sub-dispositions,” i.e., those which “pertain only to the effect on the child, addressing who will have guardianship and custody in the event the parent’s rights are terminated as a primary disposition,”

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Maceo: Brian C. Findley

TPR – Assume-Responsibility Ground

Evidence sufficient to support verdict on § 48.451(6) ground of failure to assume parental responsibility for child born prematurely with significant medical needs:

¶30     The trial court accurately concluded that the evidence it outlined was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Maceo failed to assume parental responsibility of Jalacea.

Berghuis v. Thompkins, USSC No. 08-1470, 6/1/10

Thompkins’ acknowledgment that he prayed for God’s forgiveness for the shooting was admissible as valid waiver of Miranda rights, despite being preceded by nearly 3 hours of silence during custodial interrogation. Rights must be invoked unequivocally, or not at all:

The Court has not yet stated whether an invocation of the right to remain silent can be ambiguous or equivocal, but there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis.