On Point: 5. Confessions

State v. Thomas G. Kramer, 2006 WI App 133, PFR filed 7/10
For Kramer: Timothy A. Provis

Issue: Whether pre-custodial assertion (during standoff with police) of right to counsel barred interrogation following subsequent arrest.

Holding:

¶13      Hassel is dispositive here. … Observing that Miranda safeguards apply only to custodial interrogations and that Hassel did not argue he was in custody when he invoked his right to silence,

State v. Yediael Yokrawn Backstrom, 2006 WI App 114
For Backstrom: Timothy A. Provis

Issue: Whether re-administration of Miranda warnings was necessary where the suspect had previously waived those rights following a “full and proper recitation twenty-one hours earlier.”

Holding:

¶11      Based on the record presented, we conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to suppress Backstrom’s statement.

State v. Thomas G. Kramer, 2006 WI App 133, PFR filed 7/10
For Kramer: Timothy A. Provis

Issue1: Whether failure to electronically record Kramer’s interrogations requires suppression.

Holding1: Although the supreme court exercised supervisory authority granted it under Wis. Const. Art. VII, § 7, to require recording of juvenile interrogations, State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, the grant of authority to court of appeals under Wis.

State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, reversing 2004 WI App 9
For Terrell C.J.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶58      … All custodial interrogation of juveniles in future cases shall be electronically recorded where feasible, and without exception when questioning occurs at a place of detention. Audiotaping is sufficient to satisfy our requirement; however, videotaping may provide an even more complete picture of what transpired during the interrogation. 

State v. Richard Allen Hassel, 2005 WI App 80
For Hassel: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding1: Hassel’s custodial statement, “I don’t know if I should talk to you” was ambiguous and therefore triggered no duty to terminate the interrogation, ¶¶16-19.

The court of appeals purported to follow Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), which holds that the police have no duty to clarify an ambiguous assertion of rights made after clearly waiving them.

State v. Xavier J. Rockette, 2005 WI App 205
For Rockette: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding:

¶24     We conclude that Rockette did not waive his Miranda rights. Rockette does not argue that Chausee did anything to coerce his confession. Indeed, the purpose of Rockette’s cooperation at the interview, which his own counsel set up, was to increase his chances of securing some leniency from the State.

State v. Richard Allen Hassel, 2005 WI App 80
For Hassel: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Hassel’s noncustodial statement, “I can’t talk to you,” did not amount to a Miranda-protected assertion of rights, largely because such rights can’t be invoked “anticipatorily,” ¶¶8-15. (State v. Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d 224, 325 N.W.2d 703 (1982) distinguished as a rule of evidence safeguarding against substantive use at trial of prearrest silence.)

State v. Charles W. Mark, 2005 WI App 62, affirmed, 2006 WI 78
For Mark: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶14 … (I)f probationers are required to choose between answers that will incriminate them in pending or subsequent criminal prosecutions and loss of their conditional liberty as a price for exercising their right to remain silent, the statements are compelled. 

State v. Maurice S. Ewing, 2005 WI App 206
For Ewing: David R. Karpe

Issue/Holding: Where the defendant waived his rights and gave pre-trial statements to the police and presented an alibi defense at trial, prosecutorial evidence that the defendant had not revealed the alibi during those statements, and exploitation of that omission during closing argument, did not amount to impermissible comment on silence. “Rather, the prosecutor was highlighting the inconsistency between what Ewing did say and what his alibi witnesses testified to at trial.” ¶¶10-13.

 A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2004)

Issue/Holding1:

In determining whether a person is “in custody,” the question is whether, examining the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the petitioner’s position would have felt “at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). In making this determination, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.”Berkemer v.