On Point blog, page 151 of 263
Six miles of “jerky” weaving + 3:00 a.m. = reasonable suspicion
Columbia County v. Brittany N. Krumbeck, 2015AP1010, 1/14/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634, our supreme court rejected the notion that “repeated weaving” within a lane, without more, amounts to reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Krumbeck invokes Post to attack her OWI conviction but the court of appeals concludes there were enough other facts to justify the stop.
Officer had reasonable suspicion for traffic stop; possible “mistake of law” was reasonable
Village of Bayside v. Ryan Robert Olszewski, 2015AP1033-34; 1/12/15; District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity, including briefs
After Heien v. North Carolina and State v. Houghton, everyone predicted lots of litigation about law enforcement’s “reasonable mistakes of law” during traffic stops. This case marks the beginning of it.
No severance, no ineffective assistance, no suppression, no in camera review of mental health records
State v. Gregory Tyson Below, 2014AP2614-2616-CR, 1/12,16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity, including briefs
This was a high profile case in Milwaukee. Below was convicted of 29 charges of kidnapping, strangulation and suffocation, sexual assault, battery, reckless injury and solicitation of prostitutes. He appealed and asserted 4 claims for a new trial. The court of appeals rejected all of them.
Record didn’t support order to install ignition interlock on spouse’s car
State v. Marguerite Alpers, 2015AP1784-CR, 1/12/16, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering Alpers to install an ignition interlock device “on [her] husband’s car” as a condition of probation in her OWI cases because the record didn’t establish the condition was a reasonable and appropriate means of advancing the goals of rehabilitation and public protection, State v. Miller, 2005 WI App 114, 11, 283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 N.W.2d 47.
Counsel at TPR trial wasn’t ineffective
Barron County DHHS v. J.H., 2015AP1529, District 3, 1/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
J.H.’s claims that her trial counsel was ineffective are rejected because trial counsel’s actions were either not deficient or not prejudicial.
One conviction doesn’t constitute a “pattern” of child abuse
K.C. v. B.S.-S., 2015AP1702, District 2, 1/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
B.S.-S.’s single conviction for intentionally causing harm to a child in violation of § 948.03(2)(b) does not demonstrate “a pattern of physically … abusive behavior” under § 48.415(5), so the circuit court erred in terminating B.S.-S.’s parental rights based on that conviction.
Defendant’s docs didn’t disprove out-of-state OWI prior
State v. Joseph C. Risse, 2015AP586, District 3, 1/12/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Risse pled to an OWI, but was it his first or second? The state, armed with a Wisconsin Certified Driving Record, says he had a 2008 chemical test refusal in Connecticut. Risse, bearing a collection of documents from Connecticut and elsewhere, submits that they prevent the state from showing the prior beyond a reasonable doubt.
Errors of law can’t be challenged by writ of coram nobis
State v. Aman D. Singh, 2015AP850-CR, District 4, 1/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Singh, appealing pro se, seeks to reverse a twelve-year-old OWI-second conviction for which his sentence is long over.
Temporarily suspending license didn’t preclude state from seeking revocation
State v. Keith D. McEvoy, 2015AP1262, District 4, 12/30/2015 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Under the facts of this case, the temporary suspension of McEvoy’s license based on his blood alcohol content didn’t equitably estop the State from seeking to revoke his license based on his refusal to submit to a chemical test of his blood.
Consent to blood draw wasn’t coerced by warning about revocation for refusal or threat to get warrant
State v. Bradley A. Anderson, 2015AP1573-CR, 12/23/15, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Anderson’s consent to a blood draw after his OWI arrest was not vitiated by being told that, if he refused the blood draw, his driving privileges would be revoked and the officer would get a warrant for a blood draw. In addition, the circuit court properly found that Anderson didn’t later withdraw his consent to the blood draw.