On Point blog, page 63 of 262
Reasonable suspicion for traffic stop amply demonstrated
City of New Berlin v. Eric John Dreher, 2020AP850, District 2, 11/25/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer testified he observed Dreher cut across lanes while turning, deviate from his lane, and travel at a high rate of speed. This led the officer to believe the driver was impaired, as “it was some of the worst driving that [he] observed in over 250 drink driv[ing] arrests.”
Defense win: Police didn’t have reasonable suspicion to detain driver to do field sobriety tests
State v. Michael Anthony Dotson, 2019AP1082-CR, District 3, 11/24/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Though this is a “close case” (¶28), the objectively reasonable inferences from the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer who stopped Dotson’s car did not provide reasonable suspicion to believe that Dotson’s blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limits or that his ability to operate his vehicle was impaired. Thus, the officer’s detention of Dotson to conduct field sobriety tests was unlawful.
COA finds another exception to the Haseltine rule
State v. Richard L. Pringle, 2020AP6-CR, 11/17/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
No witness, expert or otherwise, may give an opinion that a mentally competent witness is telling the truth. State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984). This case, which the court of appeals calls “close,” holds that an expert may give an opinion that a category of individuals generally lacks the sophistication to concoct a sexual assault claim.
Evidence sufficient to satisfy Chapter 51’s 4th standard of dangerousness
Vilas County DHS v. N.J.P., 2019AP1567, 12/15/20, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
In this appeal from an initial commitment, the county conceded that it had not offered clear and convincing evidence to mee the 4th standard of dangerousness. It asked the court of appeals to affirm the commitment based on the 5th standard of dangerousness. The court of appeals rejected the county’s concession and affirmed on the 4th standard because N.J.P., who is mentally ill, had been expelled from a homeless shelter and was found dressed in tattered clothes on a bitterly cold day.
COA says hospital’s BAC data was independent source after cop’s draw suppressed
State v. Daniel J. Van Linn, 2019AP1317, 11/17/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 4/27/21, affirmed, 3/22/22; case activity (including briefs)
Police found Van Linn injured and intoxicated near the scene of an accident, and an ambulance took him to the hospital for treatment. At the hospital Van Linn refused an officer’s request that consent to a blood draw; the officer, claiming exigency, ordered blood taken anyway. Van Linn moved to suppress and the court held there was no exigency, and accordingly suppressed the BAC results. Shortly thereafter, the district attorney asked the court to approve a subpoena of Van Linn’s treatment records from the hospital; the court issued the subpoena and the hospital turned over the records, which included the results of the hospital’s own blood test. Van Linn asked the court to suppress those as well, but it declined. He was convicted and appealed.
Circuit court erred in excluding prior testimony, other acts evidence
State v. Frank P. Smogoleski, 2019AP1780-CR, District 2, 11/18/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The state wins its appeal of two circuit court orders, one excluding the use of preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who is now dead, the other excluding other-acts evidence.
Befuddled court rejects challenge to OWI conviction
State v. Timothy M. Argall, 2020AP907-CR, District 2, 11/18/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Argall was arrested for OWI based on a plethora of evidence—viz., driving after dark without headlights, slurred speech, odor of alcohol, inability to follow questions or give direct answers, admission of drinking 4 to 6 beers, 0.201 PBT. His gripe, though, is with the pre-FST pat down that found a pot pipe in his pocket.
Good cause is no excuse for failure to file timely jury demand for Chapter 51 final hearing
Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2020AP370, 11/4/20, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 2/26/21; case activity
Section 51.20(11)(a) provides that an individual or his counsel must demand a jury trial at least 48 hours before the time set for his final commitment hearing. At the start of his hearing, E.J.W requested a substitution of trial counsel and a jury trial. The court granted the substitution of counsel and postponed the trial 7 days, but it would not reset the clock for demanding a jury. The court of appeal affirmed.
COA takes close look at 51 extension, sees problems, affirms
Waukesha County v. L.J.M., 2020AP820, 11/4/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
L.J.M. (“Lisa”) appeals the extension of her commitment under ch. 51. In a thorough opinion, the court of appeals affirms, though not without pointing out deficiencies in the county’s case and the circuit court’s decision.
Court rejects hearsay, sufficiency claims in ch. 51 appeal
Waukesha County v. I.R.T., 2020AP996, 11/4/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity
The county sought to extend I.R.T.’s commitment but could not be located for a time. Eventually the court issued a capias and I.R.T. was arrested. At the extension hearing, there was testimony that after his parole in a criminal matter ended I.R.T. had become homeless and had not taken medications or communicated with the county or his “outpatient prescribers.” (¶14). A psychologist opined that I.R.T. would be dangerous if treatment were withdrawn due to his history of noncompliance with treatment and his “history of psychotic symptoms, and threatening behaviors toward others” and referred to information received from “staff” at an unnamed facility and I.R.T.’s parents. (¶16).