On Point blog, page 87 of 262
CoA rejects plea, ineffective assistance and new trial claims; affirms TPR order
State v. T.R.C., 2018AP820, 4/2/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity
T.R.C. pled “no contest” to grounds for termination of her parental rights to D. On appeal she argued that her plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, that her trial counsel was ineffective, and that the TPR order should be vacated in the interests of justice. The court of appeals affirmed.
Unauthorized stay of sentence should be remedied by resentencing, not vacating of stay
State v. Caleb J. Hawley, 2018AP1601-CR, District 4, 3/28/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The judge who sentenced Hawley after revocation of probation stayed the sentence and ordered it to start some 14 months down the road, when Hawley would finished serving the 18 months of conditional jail time ordered in a different case. That stay was illegal, and the remedy is resentencing—not, as Hawley argues, credit for the time he was in custody since the day of his sentencing after revocation.
Traffic stop, field sobriety tests lawful
State v. Faith A. Parafiniuk, 2018AP1956, District 2, 3/27/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The stop of Parafiniuk’s car was supported by reasonable suspicion and the officer had sufficient reason to extend the stop to administer field sobriety tests.
Escalona hurdle overcome, but § 974.06 motion rejected on merits
State v. Casey M. Fisher, 2017AP868, District 1, 3/26/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Fisher’s § 974.06 postconviction motion clears the hurdle erected by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), but fails on the merits.
Ineffective assistance, multiplicity claims rejected
State v. Martez C. Fennell, 2017AP2480-CR, District 1, 3/26/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Fennell unsuccessfully challenges his convictions for armed robbery and operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent, arguing that the charges are multiplicitous and that trial counsel should have subpoenaed a witness who would have impeached the victim’s identification of him.
Court of appeals holds defendant can be forced to choose: wear a stun belt or don’t attend your trial
State v. Danny L. Benford, 2017AP2520-CR, 3/26/19, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The Eau Claire County Sheriff Department’s policy is to require all defendants appearing for trial to wear a stun belt under their clothing. Benford did not want to wear one because he didn’t trust the sheriff’s not to zap him for no good reason. The trial court conducted an inquiry into the need for the stun belt, concluded it was necessary, and found no other suitable alternative to it.
Speedy trial, incompetence to go pro se, and freedom of religion claims fail on appeal
State v. Maries D. Addison, 2018AP55-57-CR, 3/26/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals agreed that the 17-month delay in bringing Addison to trial was presumptively prejudicial, but based on the unique facts of this case, it held that his speedy trial rights weren’t violated. Addison did a fine job representing himself (he got “not guilty” verdicts on 5 of 22 counts) so his “incompetency to proceed pro se” claim went nowhere. Plus his freedom of religion claim (right to have a Bible with him during trial) failed because his argument was insufficiently developed.
Kinda a defense win on a complicated sentencing issue
State v. Richard H. Harrison Jr., , 2017AP2440-2441-CR, 3/21/19, District 4, (not recommended for publication); Review Granted 8/14/19, reversed, 2020 WI 35; case activity (including briefs)
This post requires some concentration. Harrison was sentenced to 3 years IC (Initial Confinement) and 3 years ES (Extended Supervision) in a 2007 case and a 2008 case. In an unrelated 2010 case he was sentenced to 13 years IC and 7 years ES. And in a 2011 case he received 30 years IC and 10 years ES. The 2010 and 2011 sentences ran consecutive to all other sentences. Harrison served the IC parts of his 2007 and 2008 cases and started serving his IC in the 2010 case when–lucky him–both his 2010 and his 2011 convictions were vacated. By this point all he had to serve was the ES of his 2007 and 2008 cases.
Officer’s testimony about defendant’s evasive behavior during interview okay under Haseltine
State v. Edward L. Branson, 2018AP873-CR, 3/21/19, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Branson was convicted of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine. He argued that his lawyer was ineffective for failing to object to an officer’s testimony comparing his behavior to that of the passenger in his car where a bag of meth was found. The officer described the passenger as calm, helpful and willing to look him in the eye. In contrast, he described Branson as nervous and failing to make eye contact.
Defendant’s travelling to Wisconsin to commit crime was not improper sentencing factor
State v. Marshawn Terell Johnson, 2017AP2445-CR, District 3, 3/19/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In sentencing Johnson for possession of heroin with intent to delivery, the circuit court remarked that he’d traveled to Superior from Chicago to commit his crime. The sentencing court’s consideration of that fact did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U. S. Constitution.