On Point blog, page 86 of 269

Family court order denying placement didn’t need to advise parent of conditions for return

G.K. v. S.C., 2019AP1645, 2019AP1646, & 2019AP1647, District 4, 11/7/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

S.C.’s parental rights to her three children were terminated due to continued denial of periods of physical placement under § 48.415(4) based on a family court order that denied her periods of physical placement. She argued the family court order could not be the basis for a TPR because it didn’t advise her of the conditions necessary for the children to be returned to her or for her to be granted placement or visitation. Maybe so, says the court of appeals, but the statute doesn’t require the family court order to do that.

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Default judgment in TPR affirmed

State v. C.M., 2019AP1483, District 1, 11/5/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court didn’t err in entering a default judgment against C.M. in her termination of parental rights proceeding. 

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COA affirms TPR of incarcerated parent

Waupaca County v. J.J., 2019AP805, 10/29/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

J.J. challenges the termination of his parental rights, alleging trial counsel was ineffective and lack of a factual basis for his no contest plea. The court of appeals rejects both claims.

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Officer’s urge to “search for the truth” doesn’t justify an extension of a traffic stop

State v. Tunis Jay LeFever, 2019AP702-CR, District 2, 10/30/19, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer stopped LeFever for speeding, noticed that he had bloodshot eyes, and detected a faint odor of alcohol but wasn’t sure of the source. He asked LeFever to complete field sobriety tests. The officer noted indicators of impairment on some of the tests and LeFever’s bright green tongue. A PBT test did not detect the presence of alcohol in LeFever’s system. The officer suspected marijuana.

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COA: ch. 51 jury doesn’t have to agree on whether you’re dangerous to self, others, etc.

Sauk County v. R.A.S., 2018AP2253, 10/31/2019, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.A.S. was committed after a ch. 51 jury trial. The county alleged and the court instructed on two forms of dangerousness–those in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and 2.d.. R.A.S. asked that the verdict form require the jury to agree on one, the other, or both to commit him, but the circuit court refused, instead submitting a form that just asked the jury if R.A.S. was “dangerous.” The court of appeals now affirms this decision, rejecting R.A.S.’s due-process claim and saying that In re Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 359 Wis. 2d 272, 856 N.W.2d 603, controls the question–though it in fact has only glancing relevance to the issue.

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COA finds no error in denying mistrial for 3 evidentiary issues

State v. Ross Harris, Jr., 2018AP1667, 10/24/2019, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The charges in this case, disorderly conduct and battery, arose from an altercation in a hospital elevator. The state said Harris, newly a grandfather, had attacked A.D., the fiancé of his newborn grandchild’s maternal grandmother, while both were visiting the baby. Harris said it was A.D. who had attacked him.

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Out-of-state deferred OWI prosecution counts as prior in Wisconsin

State v. Jeffery Scott Wiganowsky, 2019AP884-CR, District 4, 10/24/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wiganowsky was charged for OWI in Wyoming in 2015. He negotiated a deferred prosecution agreement, which he successfully completed, so the charge was dismissed. But his driving privileges were administratively suspended due to his blood-alcohol content. (¶9). That counts as a prior OWI “conviction” under §§ 340.01(9r) and 343.307(1)(d).

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Merging change of placement hearing into jury trial on grounds for TPR is okay

State v. T.S.W., 2019AP450-451, District 1, 10/22/19 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court failed to hold a hearing on T.S.W.’s motion for change of physical placement of her child, J.C., before the jury trial on the grounds phase of her TPR. She argued that this violated her right to due process because if she had prevailed at the hearing, the jury would have heard evidence that J.C. had been placed in the parental home with T.S.W., rather than outside the parental home.

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SCOW’s decision in Randall is binding on whether consent to blood test can be withdrawn

State v. John W. Lane, 2019AP153-CR, District 4, 10/17/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lane consented to a blood draw after his OWI arrest, but a week later wrote the State Hygiene Lab saying he was revoking his consent to the collection and testing of his blood. The authorities tested the blood anyway. Lane’s challenge to the test result is foreclosed by State v. Randall, 2019 WI 80, 387 Wis. 2d 744, 930 N.W.2d 223.

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Traffic stop for flashing high beams within 500 feet of approaching car was reasonable

State v. Jamie Ellin Grimm, 2019AP789-Cr, District 2, 10/16/19 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity (including briefs)

When a driver approaches an oncoming car within 500 feet,  §347.12(1)(a) requires her to “dim, depress or tilt” her high beams so that “glaring rays” aren’t directed into the eyes of the approaching driver. It is undisputed that Grimm flashed her beams within 500 feet of an approaching squad car.

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