On Point blog, page 89 of 266
In deciding whether to modify sentence based on a new factor, court may consider whether the new factor frustrates the purpose of the sentence
State v. Dustin M. Yanda, 2018AP412-CR, District 3, 6/18/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828, the supreme court held that a defendant seeking a “new factor” sentence modification doesn’t need to prove that the new factor “frustrates the purpose” of the original sentence. However, Harbor doesn’t preclude the sentencing court from considering whether the purpose of the sentence is frustrated in deciding whether to modify a sentence once the court has concluded the defendant has proven a new factor.
No-contest plea to TPR grounds was valid
State v. T.A.D.S., 2018AP2173, District 1, 6/18/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
T.A.D.S. pleaded no-contest to the abandonment ground alleged in the petition filed to terminate his parental rights to his daughter, T.S. He argues his plea was invalid because the circuit court’s plea colloquy didn’t correctly explain the statutory standard for the disposition hearing. The court of appeals disagrees.
Over strong dissent, court of appeals rejects challenge to voluntariness of confession
State v. John S. Finley, 2018AP258-CR, District 2, 6/12/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Here’s a succinct summary of this decision: “The Majority supports the government’s ‘interview,’ which utilized lies, threats, and fabrication of evidence to wrestle a statement from a thirty-six-year-old man, who has the mind of a twelve year old and the social skills of a first grader.” (¶24 (Reilly, P.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)).
COA clarifies summary judgment procedure and the “continuing denial of visitation” grounds for TPR
Juneau County D.H.S. v. S.G.M., 2019AP553-556, 6/6/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
This appeal presents two issues of TPR law: (1) Whether a county must file an affidavit in support of its summary judgment motion; and (2) Whether Juneau County satisfied the requirement of §48.415(4)(a), which governs the “continuing denial of visitation.”
Defendant’s challenges to use of incriminating statements rejected
State v. Ulanda M. Green, 2018AP1350-CR, District 1, 5/29/19 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted, 9/3/19; case activity (including briefs)
Green sought to suppress incriminating statements she made to police both before and after being given the Miranda warnings. The court of appeals holds that the pre-Miranda statement Green made was not the product of interrogation, so it’s admissible. As for the statements she made after the warnings, the court rejects her argument that she invoked her right to remain silent and so interrogation should have ceased.
Defense win! Trial court should have admitted 3rd party perpetrator DNA evidence at reckless homicide trial
State v. Frederick Ramsey, 2017AP1318-CR, 5/29/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Ramsey confessed to the stabbing death of A.T., but it turns out that the DNA under her fingernails belonged to a guy named Teague. Ramsey filed a motion to admit the DNA evidence and to argue that Teague killed A.T., pursuant to State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1984). He lost, but then persuaded the court of appeals to grant an interlocutory appeal, and then won. Pretty impressive!
Court of appeals declares pro se appeal frivolous and orders sanctions
Village of McFarland v. Dale R. Meyer, 2018AP2130, 5/23/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Harsh! That’s best description for this court of appeals decision sanctioning Meyer for his pro se appeal of his first OWI. The decision runs afoul of Amek Bin- Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 335 N.W. 384 (1983) and Howell v. Denomie, 2005 WI 81, 282 Wis. 2d 130, 698 N.W.2d 62. Hopefully, a lawyer will take Meyer’s appeal, file a petition for review, and at least get the frivolous finding reversed.
Court of appeals rejects pro se litigant’s appeal of conviction for obstructing an officer
State v. Dale Andrejczak, 2019AP285, 5/23/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including response brief only)
Talk about disparate treatment. In a considered, respectful ruling against a different pro se appellant, the court of appeals here affirms a conviction for obstructing an officer out of deference to the circuit court’s credibility determinations.
Court of appeals affirms traffic stop made due to mistake of fact
State v. Kelly W. Brown, 2018AP2382-CR, Distrct 4, 5/23/19 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Deputy Weinfurter stopped Brown because he thought that Brown’s car had 6 headlights illuminated on its front rather than the maximum of 4 allowed by §347.07(1). The stop led to an OWI 2nd charge. Brown moved to suppress arguing that the deputy’s assumptions about the number of headlights on his car were unreasonable. Indeed his car had only 4 headlights.
COA: TPR default judgment was proper; refusal to vacate also proper
Barron County DHHS v. S.R.T., 2018AP1574 & 1575, 5/22/19, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
S.R.T. appeals the termination of his parental rights to his twin sons. He argues the court erroneously entered default judgments on grounds when he didn’t show up for a hearing, that the proceedings violated his right to due process because they were fundamentally unfair, and that the court erred in refusing to vacate the default judgments. The court of appeals rejects all three claims.