On Point blog, page 89 of 262
Anonymous tip and officer’s own observations supported traffic stop
State v. Kevin Ian End, 2018AP1437, 3/6/19, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An anonymous caller told police about a vehicle swerving in her lane and having difficulty with speed control. She provided no license late number. An officer proceeded to the area and saw a vehicle make an assortment of traffic violations. When the vehicle eventually went over a curb, the officer activated his lights and conducted a stop. The driver, End, was charged with OWI and PAC as second offenses. On appeal he challenged the stop.
Hearsay, its exceptions, and harmless error
State v. Christopher Deshawn McGinnis, 2017AP2224-CR, 3/5/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals found certain hearsay statements admissible under the “statement against penal interest” and “prior inconsistent statement” exceptions to the hearsay rule. It also held that part of a detective’s testimony qualified as hearsay, but its admission was harmless error.
Polite questioning about drinking and evening plans don’t amount to custody or require Miranda warning
Marquette County v. Christopher Patrick Bray, 2018AP665, 2/28/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs).
Bray was convicted of OWI. He argued that the circuit court should have suppressed statements he made to a sergeant during a traffic stop because he wasn’t Mirandized. The court of appeals held that Bray wasn’t in custody so no Miranda warning was necessary.
Court of Appeals rejects constitutional challenges to detectable amount of controlled substances law
State v. Blake Lee Harrison, 2017AP1811, District 3, 2/26/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Harrison’s due process and void-for-vagueness challenges to § 346.63(1)(am) (prohibiting driving with a detectable amount of restricted controlled substance) go up in smoke.
Judge’s comments at start of restitution hearing showed objective bias
State v. Deshawn J. Driver, 2018AP870-CR, District 1, 2/26/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
At the start of Driver’s restitution hearing, before hearing testimony from any witness, the judge told defense counsel on the record that the victim’s word “is more credible than your client’s words[.]” Later in the hearing, when defense counsel told the judge that Driver and his co-defendant did not see “a lot” of the items the victim claimed were in the stolen car, the trial court said it would “take that without their testimony” and added, “That’s why I didn’t give them a chance to say it.” Does that show “objective bias”? You bet it does.
Sentencing judge could conclude defendant made choice to kill despite stipulation to adequate provocation
State v. Ashlee A. Martinson, 2017AP1889-CR, District 3, 2/20/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Martinson was charged with two counts of first-degree intentional homicide for killing her mother and stepfather. She pled to second-degree intentional homicide based on her claim of adequate provocation, which is premised on a complete lack of self-control, § 939.44(1)(a). That mitigating defense didn’t preclude the sentencing court from basing its sentence on the conclusion the defendant “had a choice” whether to kill the victims.
Defense win! Circuit court erroneously denied State’s motion to dismiss and then to amend charge
State v. Esmeralda Rivera-Hernandez, 2018AP311-312-CR, 2/20/19, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
DAs have almost limitless discretion in deciding whether to initiate a prosecution. But their discretion to terminate a prosecution is subject to independent review by the circuit court, which must consider the public’s interest in: (1) the proper enforcement of its laws, and (2) deferring to the prosecutor’s legitimate discretion. See State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 45, 270 N.W.2d 170 (1978). In this case, the court of appeals holds the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it considered (1) but not (2).
Partial summary judgment, best interests determination upheld
D.R. v. B.D., 2018AP1731 & 2018AP1732, District 3, 2/20/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
B.D.’s challenges to the order terminating his parental rights come up short.
Victim’s failure to wear seatbelt doesn’t diminish OWI defendant’s culpability
State v. Pierre Deshawn Johnson, 2018AP595-CR, 2/12/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Johnson pled to operating a vehicle with a suspended license and injury by operating under the influence of a controlled substance. His lead issue–whether the victim’s failure to wear a seatbelt was a significant intervening factor that diminished his culpability and warranted a new sentence–failed based on State v. Turk, 154 Wis. 2d 294, 453 N.W.2d 163.
To prove misdemeanor bail jumping, State must show defendant was arrested, not charged, with a misdemeanor
State v. Melodie Cheree Taylor, 2018AP1953-CR, 2/14/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In a misdemeanor prosecution under §946.49(1)(a) is the State required to prove that, before jumping bail, the defendant had been charged with a misdemeanor? Or may the State simply prove that the defendant had been released from custody under 969 after an arrest for a misdemeanor?