On Point blog, page 14 of 33

OWI laws applied to roadways in Boy Scout camp

Kenosha County v. Robert P. Adams, 2015AP2184, District 2, 7/27/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Based on evidence adduced at trial, the roadways at Camp Sol R. Crown were “premises held out to the public for use of their motor vehicles” under § 346.61 and the cases interpreting that statute, in particular State v. Tecza, 2008 WI App 79, 312 Wis. 2d 395, 751 N.W.2d 896 (roadways of private, gated community were held out for public use). Thus, Adams’s driving while intoxicated on those roadways was punishable under § 346.63.

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Flawed, unreliable field sobriety tests deprived officer of probable cause to arrest for OWI

State v. Alejandro Herrera Ayala, 2015AP865-CR, District 3, 7/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals affirms the circuit court’s findings that the manner in which standardized field sobriety tests were administered to Herrera Ayala was “fatally flawed” because of “significant communication issues” between the officer and Herrera Ayala (a Spanish speaker with apparently limited English) and that those flaws made the SFSTs “unreliable” for purposes of determining probable cause to arrest. 

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Arrest, conviction of unconscious driver upheld

State v. Mark G. McCaskill, 2015AP1487-CR, District 4, 7/21/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

McCaskill’s challenges to his arrest and conviction for operating with a prohibited alcohol content don’t persuade the court of appeals.

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Statute creating both misdemeanor and felony offense isn’t subject to rule of lenity, doesn’t violate due process or equal protection

State v. Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 2016 WI App 61, petitions for review and cross-review granted 1/9/2017, affirmed 2017 WI 74, ; case activity (including briefs)

Lazo Villamil was convicted and sentenced for operating after revocation and causing death under § 343.44, one of the provisions of which says that the offense is both a misdemeanor and a felony. He claims that convicting and sentencing him for the felony rather the misdemeanor violated the rule of lenity and his rights to due process and equal protection. The court of appeals disagrees, but grants resentencing due to the circuit court’s failure to consider certain sentencing factors..

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SCOW says circuit courts never ever lack subject matter jurisdiction over OWIs or other matters

City of Eau Claire v. Melissa M. Booth Britton, 2016 WI 65, 7/12/16, reversing a circuit court order on bypass, case activity (including briefs)

OWI specialists, pay attention to this case! It abolishes subject matter jurisdiction challenges to improperly-charged 1st offense OWIs. Everyone else, pay attention too. Justice Abrahamson’s 33-page dissent offers a comprehensive analysis of how the majority opinion (written by R.G. Bradley) fundamentally misunderstands circuit court competency and subject matter jurisdiction and broadly impacts public policy as well as civil and criminal litigation.

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Consent to blood test was valid despite officer’s statement that a warrant wasn’t needed

State v. Navdeep S. Brar, 2015AP1261-CR, District 4, 7/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication),petition for review granted 12/19/2016, affirmed, 2017 WI 73 ; case activity (including briefs)

The record supports the circuit court’s conclusion that Brar consented to a blood test after his arrest for OWI and that his consent was voluntary.

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SCOTUS: Warrantless alcohol breath tests reasonable, blood tests not

Birchfield v. North Dakota, USSC No. 14-1468, 2016 WL 3434398 (June 23, 2016), reversing State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 2015); vacating and remanding State v. Beylund, 861 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 2015); and affirming State v. Bernard, 844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 2014); Scotusblog pages: Birchfield, Beylund, Bernard (include links to briefs and commentary)

Three years ago, in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the Court rejected a bright-line rule that police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have probable cause to believe is driving drunk, pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception. In these three cases, the Court adopts a bright-line rule that the police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have arrested for driving drunk, pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception. But they can only Conduct a test of the motorist’s breath, and not the motorist’s blood. Make sense?

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State barred from amending OWI charge from felony to misdemeanor

State v. Brian R. Corvino, 2016 WI App 52; case activity (including briefs)

This decision examines § 967.055(2)(a), which requires the State to apply to the circuit court before amending an OWI charge. The court of appeals found that amending the charge here would be inconsistent with the public policy of deterring drunk-driving and held that the circuit court had the inherent authority to order the State to file an Information charging Corvino’s 4th OWI as a felony.

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Logic dictates that invalid blood test results aren’t per se inadmissible at OWI trials

State v. Keith A. Wiedmeyer, 2016 WI App 46; case activity (including briefs)

In an impressive of feat of judicial activism, the court of appeals here rewrites §343.305(5)(d) and (6)(a) and defies precedent to achieve its desired outcome: the admission of statutorily invalid blood test results at OWI trials. On Point looks forward to SCOW’s take on this published court of appeals decision.

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Evidence sufficient to support verdict of drugged driving

Walworth County v. James E. Robinson, Jr., 2015AP2504-FT, 5/18/16, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including memo briefs)

The County needed to prove Robinson drove his motor vehicle on a highway while under the influence of a drug to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving, § 346.63(1)(a). It succeeded.

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