On Point blog, page 28 of 87
Evidence was sufficient to show defendant was the person who refused chemical test for intoxication
State v. David Francis Walloch, 2015AP574, District 2, 8/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The evidence presented at Walloch’s refusal hearing supported the finding that Walloch was the person the officers arrested and who refused to submit to chemical testing.
Reasonable objection to blood draw must be articulated at time of blood draw
State v. James Michael Warren, 2014AP792-CR, District 3, 8/4/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Under State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), which was the law at the time of Warren’s arrest, a person must present their reasonable objection and the basis for the objection at the time of the blood draw, and failure to do so means the person can’t raise it later in the case.
“Capturing a representation” under § 948.14 doesn’t cover cutting pictures from magazines or newspapers
State v. Albert J. Chagnon, 2015 WI App 66; case activity (including briefs)
Under § 948.14, no registered sex offender may intentionally “capture a representation” of a minor without consent of the minor’s parent or guardian. The phrase “captures a representation” is defined in § 942.09(1)(a) to mean “takes a photograph, makes a motion picture, videotape, or other visual representation, or records or stores in any medium data that represents a visual image.” The court of appeals concludes the phrase “captures a representation” cannot reasonably be construed to apply to Chagnon’s act of cutting pictures of minors from magazines and newspapers, pasting them into a notebook, and adorning the pictures with graphic sexual comments.
Evidence sufficient despite lack of direct evidence of time of operation
Oneida County v. Randall J. Busarow, 2014AP2766, District 3, 7/28/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Though there wasn’t direct evidence of exactly when Busarow drove and whether he was intoxicated at that time, the state need not prove the elements of an offense only by direct evidence; reasonable inferences from the evidence may suffice. Bautista v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 218, 223, 191 N.W.2d 725 (1971). The evidence in this case supported the reasonable inferences that Busarow was intoxicated when he drove and that he drove within three hours of the blood test.
Notice that juvenile adjudication bars firearm possession isn’t an element of crime under § 941.29
State v. Dijon L. Carter, 2014AP2707-CR, District 1, 7/14/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
While a court adjudicating a juvenile delinquent for a felony is required to warn the juvenile about the prohibition on possessing a firearm under § 941.29, the warning requirement doesn’t add another element to the offenses created by § 941.29. Thus, Carter can be convicted of violating § 941.29(2)(b) even though he wasn’t warned about the ban on firearm possession when he was adjudicated delinquent for possession of THC with intent to deliver.
Multiple challenges to OAR conviction rejected
State v. Robert C. Blankenheim, 2015AP239-CR, District 2, 7/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Blankenheim’s challenges his OAR conviction by arguing that he was unlawfully stopped, that the evidence wasn’t sufficient to prove operation on a highway, and that the police officer wasn’t a credible witness. The court of appeals disagrees “on all points….” (¶1).
Circuit court had jurisdiction over OWI 1st despite the fact defendant had a prior countable OWI conviction
State v. John N. Navrestad, 2014AP2273, District 4, 7/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Disagreeing with the result reached in two recent unpublished decisions that addressed the same issue, a court of appeals judge holds that a circuit court had jurisdiction to convict Navrestad of OWI 1st in violation of a local ordinance even though he had a prior offense at the time of the conviction.
Evidence about “shooting party” sufficient to support endangering safety conviction
State v. Steven E. Steffek, 2015AP93-CR, District 2, 7/1/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The evidence was sufficient to convict Steffek of endangering safety by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, § 941.20(1)(a), as a party to the crime, despite the fact there was no evidence that anyone was dodging bullets in a “zone of danger.”
Evidence sufficient to support “bail jumping” verdict, no due process violation for accidental contact with victim
State v. Lavarren D. Etienne, 2014AP2881-CR, 6/18/15, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This appeal concerned the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict that Etienne intentionally violated a bond which prohibited him from having contact with “P.J.” Etienne said the contact was accidental. Due to the deference given to jury findings, Etienne’s argument failed. So did his claimed due process violation.
SCOTUS clarifies the knowledge requirement applicable to prosecutions under the federal controlled substance analog law
Stephen McFadden v. United States, USSC No. 14-378, 2015 WL 2473377 (June 18, 2015), reversing and remanding United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
The Supreme Court holds that in order to convict a defendant of distribution a controlled substance analogue, the government must prove that the defendant knew the substance was controlled under the federal Controlled Substances Act or the Analogue Act, or that the defendant knew the specific features of the substance that make it a controlled substance analogue.