On Point blog, page 28 of 87
Notice that juvenile adjudication bars firearm possession isn’t an element of crime under § 941.29
State v. Dijon L. Carter, 2014AP2707-CR, District 1, 7/14/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
While a court adjudicating a juvenile delinquent for a felony is required to warn the juvenile about the prohibition on possessing a firearm under § 941.29, the warning requirement doesn’t add another element to the offenses created by § 941.29. Thus, Carter can be convicted of violating § 941.29(2)(b) even though he wasn’t warned about the ban on firearm possession when he was adjudicated delinquent for possession of THC with intent to deliver.
Multiple challenges to OAR conviction rejected
State v. Robert C. Blankenheim, 2015AP239-CR, District 2, 7/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Blankenheim’s challenges his OAR conviction by arguing that he was unlawfully stopped, that the evidence wasn’t sufficient to prove operation on a highway, and that the police officer wasn’t a credible witness. The court of appeals disagrees “on all points….” (¶1).
Circuit court had jurisdiction over OWI 1st despite the fact defendant had a prior countable OWI conviction
State v. John N. Navrestad, 2014AP2273, District 4, 7/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Disagreeing with the result reached in two recent unpublished decisions that addressed the same issue, a court of appeals judge holds that a circuit court had jurisdiction to convict Navrestad of OWI 1st in violation of a local ordinance even though he had a prior offense at the time of the conviction.
Evidence about “shooting party” sufficient to support endangering safety conviction
State v. Steven E. Steffek, 2015AP93-CR, District 2, 7/1/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The evidence was sufficient to convict Steffek of endangering safety by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, § 941.20(1)(a), as a party to the crime, despite the fact there was no evidence that anyone was dodging bullets in a “zone of danger.”
Evidence sufficient to support “bail jumping” verdict, no due process violation for accidental contact with victim
State v. Lavarren D. Etienne, 2014AP2881-CR, 6/18/15, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This appeal concerned the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict that Etienne intentionally violated a bond which prohibited him from having contact with “P.J.” Etienne said the contact was accidental. Due to the deference given to jury findings, Etienne’s argument failed. So did his claimed due process violation.
SCOTUS clarifies the knowledge requirement applicable to prosecutions under the federal controlled substance analog law
Stephen McFadden v. United States, USSC No. 14-378, 2015 WL 2473377 (June 18, 2015), reversing and remanding United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
The Supreme Court holds that in order to convict a defendant of distribution a controlled substance analogue, the government must prove that the defendant knew the substance was controlled under the federal Controlled Substances Act or the Analogue Act, or that the defendant knew the specific features of the substance that make it a controlled substance analogue.
Revocation of driving privileges upheld despite pro se litigant’s efforts to comply with statute
Ozaukee County v. Michael T. Sheedy, 2015AP172, 6/3/15, District 3 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs
Sheedy was arrested for OWI and refused to submit to a blood test. A few weeks later, the circuit court entered a default judgement against him. On appeal, Sheedy, pro se, argued that he in fact wrote to the circuit court and asked to reopen his case within the 10 days required by §343.305(2). His appeal failed.
Credible victim supports adjudication on one count, but trial court’s mistake of law invalidates adjudication on second count
State v. Arron A.-R., 2014AP142, District 1, 6/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Arron delinquency adjudication for one count of first degree sexual assault is supported by the testimony of the victim, S.F., but the adjudication for a second count is reversed because the trial court erred in believing that the charge required only sexual contact, not sexual intercourse.
Victim’s inconsistent testimony didn’t make testimony inherently or patently incredible
State v. Brandon L. P-D., 2014AP2785, District 4, 5/14/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects Brandon’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient to support his delinquency adjudication for incest because of the victim’s inconsistent testimony. The court also rejects his arguments that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for in camera review of the victmi’s medical records and in excluding evidence of a previous sexual assault of the victim.
Blood draw by paramedic in jail was reasonable and complied with § 343.305(5)(b)
County of Sauk v. Thomas D. McDonald, 2014AP1921, District 4, 5/7/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
McDonald was arrested for OWI and taken to the county jail, where his blood was drawn by a paramedic employed by the city’s ambulance service. Contrary to McDonald’s claims, his blood draw was constitutionally reasonable and the paramedic who performed the blood draw was a “person acting under the direction of a physician,” as required by § 343.305(5)(b).